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
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
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HEGEL'S LOGIC

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HEGEL'S LOGIC

AN ESSAY IN INTERPRETATION

BY

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, PH.D.

STUART PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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
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To

J. D. H.

Drei Schwestern, Güte, Heiterkeit, Verstand,
Du hast zu Deinen Parzen sie erkoren ;
Sie sind's, die weben Deines Lebens Band.

—HEGEL.



PREFACE

IN his *Logic* Hegel has endeavored to incorporate the essential principles of philosophy which in the development of the world's thought have forced themselves upon men's convictions, and have been attested by a general consensus of opinion. An insight into the Hegelian system means, therefore, a comprehensive and appreciative grasp of the history of philosophy in the salient features of its progress. The *Logic* serves also as an excellent introduction to the more specific study of German philosophy which has been most profoundly affected by the writings of Hegel, both in the philosophical schools whose doctrines have been grounded confessedly upon Hegelian principles, and also among those which represent a radical reaction against Hegel. Moreover, the system of philosophy as outlined in the *Logic* is not merely a speculative system of abstract thought, but is at the same time an interpretation of life in all the fulness of its concrete significance. Upon these considerations, therefore, it is evident that a knowledge of the Hegelian system must prove

of inestimable value to the student of philosophy. Unfortunately the proverbial obscurity of Hegel has deterred many from undertaking a systematic study of his works. It is my conviction that the text of the *Logic* is self-illuminating. It has been my endeavor, therefore, to simplify all technical terms and explain their significance in the light of the definitions as given by Hegel himself, and as indicated in the context where such terms severally occur. There has been throughout an attempt to render intelligible the fundamental Hegelian doctrines by means of simple statement and illustration. The method of interpretation has grown out of the belief that the best commentary upon Hegel is Hegel himself. The basis of this exposition has been the *Logic* of the *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, Hegel's *Werke*, VI.

During the preparation of this volume I have received valuable suggestions from my friend, Professor Creighton of Cornell University, to whom I gladly express my indebtedness.

J. G. H.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
October 6, 1902.

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INTRODUCTION

- Von der Grösse und Macht des Geistes kann der Mensch nicht gross genug denken. Das verschlossene*
- Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft in sich, welche dem Muthes des Erkennens Widerstand leisten könnte, es muss sich vor ihm aufthun und seinen Reichthum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen und zum Genusse bringen. — HEGEL.*

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

HEGEL'S *Logic* is not a logic in the formal and restricted sense in which that term is usually understood, as the science or the art of reasoning. It has a far larger scope, embracing as it does a complete system of philosophy in itself. Philosophy, according to Hegel, is a science of things in a setting of thoughts; it is the science of the universe as it is interpreted by thought, and as it has significance for the mind which observes the wealth of its varied manifestation. The intelligence which contemplates the universe finds therein a like intelligence revealing itself, as face answereth to face in a glass. That intelligence which characterizes the observing mind and the world which is the object of the observation is one and the same. In order to understand the essential features of the Hegelian system, it is necessary to appreciate at the beginning the funda-

mental characteristics of the intelligence which constitutes its centre and core.

With Hegel thought, whether manifested in the activity of mind or revealed in the order and harmony of the universe, has four distinctive features.

It is essentially active and never passive. The mind is not to be regarded as a plastic medium upon which impressions are produced by the varied stimulation of the several senses. The mind is not a photographic plate to hold whatever may be printed upon it and then to give back upon demand whatever it may have received. Thought is rather to be conceived as a force, a dynamic centre. Its function is constructive. The creative and sustaining source of the universe is a thought force; and the thought activity which we are conscious of exercising partakes of the same nature.

The second function of thought is to transmute the crude material given by the senses into a systematic body of knowledge. Out of a chaos of sensations, perceptions, feelings, and the like, thought builds up an orderly cosmos. To extend the figure already employed, thought interprets the world in a series of portraits rather than photographs. And as an interpre-

tation by means of a portrait always involves an ideal element, so in the interpretation of the world of thought there is always an ideal element. But the introduction of an ideal element does not render the interpretation unreal. On the contrary, whenever a superficial view of the world gives place to a deeper insight, when thought like the great creative Spirit broods over it, we are persuaded that the change which is wrought by thought brings us nearer to the heart and truth of things themselves.

It is of the nature of thought in the third place to seek the universal significance of every particular experience by which it is confronted. The animal lives and moves and has its being in the midst of particular experiences, and it does not possess the capacity of reflecting upon them, or possesses it in a very restricted manner. Reflection, which is the characteristic mode of thought, may be defined as the reference of a particular experience to its appropriate universal. Man as the reflective animal alone possesses this power of seeing things in their universal aspect. It is often said that man differs from the animal in that he is endowed with a conceptual capacity, that is, the capacity to form universal ideas. Thus when one says,

"This is a man, a dog, a horse," etc., he is simply referring the particular object of perception which occupies the centre of the field of vision for the moment to the appropriate class or group or kind to which it belongs. Such a group or class idea is a concept and has always a universal significance, and all of our assertions contain some such reference to a universal. Moreover, language itself as the vehicle of thought is a system of symbols which represent universal ideas, and which thought employs for the purpose of a complete characterization of particular experiences which must remain without meaning until they are properly interpreted in the light of their universal relations.

In the fourth place, every thought reference carries with it a consciousness of the Ego, or the personality which makes the reference. Every conscious thought process, however simple, and however relatively unimportant, is in itself the declaration of a free personality. Wherever there is thought, there is personality, according to Hegel's fundamental dictum. Therefore the intelligence which is so variously manifested in the world about us bespeaks an all-embracing Ego, which is the great universal and to which all separate Egos are to be referred

as individuals to their corresponding genus. Such an Ego, as a cosmic centre, gives unity to the activities of all personalities throughout the universe, comprehending all in one system, which in every part, however minute, is characterized by intelligence.

Such being the nature of thought in general, a dynamic, constructive, interpretative, and personal force, we will now examine its functions more in detail. Occupying as it does the central place in the Hegelian system, it is necessary at the outset to understand fully Hegel's conception of thought activity. It is obvious that thought manifests its activity in numerous ways. In the reference of the individual experience to its appropriate universal there is an incalculable number of universals, as various as the manifold possibilities of the world of experience itself. In this connection there is a question which naturally suggests itself, and which is also one of the fundamental problems of philosophy, "Are there not in thought a certain definite number of comprehensive universals to which all others may be referred, and which will serve to mark off well-defined areas of knowledge or modes of thought, so that when we speak of the world of knowledge these divisions may be re-

garded as constituting the great continents of thought?"

Such large divisions of our knowledge are called categories (*die Denkbestimmungen*). The original meaning of category is found in the Greek verb *κατηγορεῖν*, to predicate, that is, the categories are the possible ways one can predicate various attributes of any subject, so that together they form a natural classification of the most comprehensive themes of our thinking. They indicate the different ways in which the mind can view the world of experience. They are to be regarded as the typical modes of thought.

As an illustration, we may take the table of the categories, as outlined by Aristotle, which is as follows: —

1. Substance.
2. Quantity.
3. Quality.
4. Relation.
5. Action.
6. Passion (*i.e.* the object of action).
7. Where (*i.e.* space).
8. When (*i.e.* time).
9. Posture.
10. Habit.

When we have described anything as regards its substance, how large it is, what its nature is, its relations to other things, how it acts, how it is acted upon, its space and time conditions, its posture and its habit, then we have well-nigh exhausted the possibilities of description.

Hegel's system of philosophy as contained in his logic may be appropriately styled a natural history of the categories, being essentially an exposition of their nature, their relations, and the mode of their development. The main doctrines of the logic concerning the categories may be summarized briefly as follows:—

The categories are not to be regarded as separate and isolated points of view. They sustain such reciprocal relations that together they form a single and harmonious system. This system, moreover, partakes of the nature of a series, in which the several terms may be grouped in the order of their progressive complexity, the first term being the simplest, and the succeeding terms more and more complex. Every term also contains two kinds of elements,—the explicit and the implicit. Explicitly every term is the result of all the terms which precede it, and implicitly it is the potential of all which are to follow.

It is the nature both of thought itself, and

also of things as interpreted by thought, that when we start at the lowest category where knowledge is reduced to a minimum, *i.e.* the least that can be possibly predicated of anything, there is a natural constraint of the mind to pass on to a higher category, a higher level of thought, in order to complete the defects and to remove the limitations of the lower; and so on and on, until the highest possible category is reached which will comprehend and explain all the others. This movement of thought is occasioned by the circumstance that the mind revolving about itself in the sphere of a single category is always confronted by two disquieting considerations. It is never satisfied with a result that is partial, and it will not tolerate a contradiction or inconsistency. Hence arises this inner constraint to transcend the limits of the single category in question, that is, a partial point of view, in order to overcome its defects and contradictions. This progressive movement of thought is called the dialectic, and is the distinctive feature of the Hegelian method in the construction of his system of philosophy.

The term "dialectic" originates in the ancient Greek philosophy, probably with the old Eleatic Zeno, and it has been made familiar in the teach-

ings of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato. The latter recall to mind a picture of two disputants, the one maintaining a proposition, the other opposing it, while out of the discussion there emerges a more exact and adequate statement of truth. This is, in substance, the method of Hegel: the examination of a positive statement or thesis, which is confronted by an opposed statement or antithesis, and out of the opposition there results a synthesis, which is a resolution of the existing contradiction upon a higher plane of thought. Upon the same level or from the same point of view contradictory statements must ever remain obstinately irresoluble; it is only in a higher sense that they can be regarded as half truths combining to form truth entire. Such a synthesis, therefore, always represents a progress in thought, an advance to a higher point of view, a more comprehensive survey, a deeper insight, a wider prospect.

In order to understand the dialectic method, the following observations must be carefully considered: —

The first stage, that of the so-called thesis, is designated by Hegel as the stage of the abstract understanding; the second, the antithesis, which is a representation of the incompleteness of the

first by showing its obverse side, is known as that of the negative reason; the third, the synthesis, is known as the speculative stage, or that of positive reason.

The terms which are here employed—the abstract understanding, the negative reason, and the positive reason—are used in a sense peculiar to Hegel. There is a fundamental distinction drawn between abstract and concrete, a distinction which runs through the entire philosophical system of Hegel. Abstract is used always in the sense of a one-sided or partial view of things. Concrete, on the other hand, is used to indicate a comprehensive view of things which includes all possible considerations as to the nature of the thing itself, its origin, and the relations which it sustains; it is the thing plus its setting.

The first of the three stages is referred to also as the product of the understanding (*der Verstand*), the second and third, as that of the negative and positive reason (*die Vernunft*) respectively. There is evidently a distinction drawn between the understanding and the reason. Hegel does not intend to leave the impression, however, that there is a certain definite faculty of the mind which we call the under-

standing, and still another quite distinct which we call the reason. Such a view fails wholly to grasp his meaning. Hegel maintains that the mind works as it were upon two levels, a lower and a higher, and yet one and the same mind withal. Upon the lower certain considerations are overlooked which are the characteristic and essential features of the higher. Upon the lower level, that of the understanding, the mind employs one of its functions to the exclusion of the rest; namely, that of discrimination, the seeing of things in their differences, and therefore as distinct, separate, and isolated,—out of relation to other things and to the unitary system which embraces them all. While, therefore, the function of the understanding may be regarded as a process of differentiation, that of the reason is essentially a process of integration. Reason is the synthetical power of thought. It is the putting of things together in their natural relations. The reason takes note, it is true, of the differences which are in the world of experience, and yet nevertheless is capable of apprehending the unity which underlies these differences. It sees things not as apart and separate, but as cohering in systems, and the distinct systems

themselves as forming one all-comprehending system, the universe itself.

It is evident, therefore, that the understanding and the reason are not necessarily antithetical terms. The work of the understanding is preliminary to that of the reason. Where they appear, as they often do in the *Logic*, as antagonistic, it is the false view of the understanding which is the object of the Hegelian scorn; namely, that view which regards the offices of the understanding as complete in themselves, and needing no higher operation of the mind to supplement or correct them.

It is the office of the negative reason to make manifest the limitations of the understanding and the contradictions which every one-sided and partial view of things necessarily involves. The office of the positive reason, on the other hand, is to make good the defects which the negative reason reveals. In this connection Hegel employs two technical terms which appear frequently in the development of his system. They are negation and absolute negation. By negation is to be understood this process of negative reason which results in the denial of the primary thesis. By absolute negation is meant the overcoming in turn of this first con-

tradiction by an assertion which denies it and which involves a higher point of view. This is equivalent to a negation of a negation, which has the force always of an affirmation. *Duplex negatio affirmat*. The three steps of the dialectic, therefore, are affirmation, negation, then a negation of this negation which is itself an affirmation. It is to be observed, moreover, that the term "dialectic" is used in two senses in Hegel, — a general and a special sense. In the former sense it designates the threefold process of thought as a whole, which has just been outlined. In its special use it is applied merely to the second or negative stage of the process, — the limiting of the original statement through its contradiction.

The antithesis, moreover, which opposes in thought the primary thesis is not a chance confronting of a statement by another which happens to oppose it. The contradiction is never external, artificial, or arbitrary, but is one which grows out of the very nature of the original thought itself. Every thought which is one-sided, thereby of necessity involves its own contradiction. From the very fact that it is finite and therefore incomplete, it must at some point or other prove inadequate, and therefore

fall of its own weight. It cannot support itself, nor can it justify itself. Thus, to use an illustration of Hegel, we say that man is mortal, and seem to think that the ground of this mortality lies in the external circumstances which constantly surround and menace him; but the true view of the matter is that life in its very nature as life involves the germ of death, and so the life of a finite creature being essentially at war with itself works its own dissolution. This dialectic may be seen in the common proverb *summum jus, summa injuria*; that is, to push an abstract right to its extreme is to pass insensibly to its contradictory, and to cause in reality injustice rather than justice. So also Hegel draws attention to the fact that in the sphere of politics extreme anarchy passes over into its opposite extreme despotism; and that in the sphere of ethics the following proverbs attest the same general principle, — "Pride goeth before a fall" and "Too much wit outwits itself."

The dialectic finds further illustration in the history of philosophy itself, wherein the several systems of thought are confronted each by its opposed system, while out of the controversies which ensue there emerges a more complete system which combines the truth and

discards the errors, which each of the conflicting systems contained. Such a process is repeated again and again in the gradual development of the fulness of truth which only centuries of controversy and of experience are able to reveal.

We have referred thus far to the method by which Hegel proposes to construct the world of knowledge, and to show how part is related to part throughout, and all parts to the whole in a progressive development wherein every advance marks a growing completeness of knowledge. But this is but one-half of his system; for Hegel maintains, as one of the cardinal doctrines of his philosophy, that the laws of thought are at the same time the laws of things, and that the categories of thought correspond precisely with the determining characteristics of things. The rational system of thought is with him equivalent to the true philosophy of all being. Thus with him epistemology and ontology are one; the secret of the mind is the secret of the universe. Man as a rational being is veritably a microcosm. "Know thyself and all is known." This is all summarily expressed in the Hegelian dictum, "The real is the rational, and the rational is the real." This is in accord with the

doctrine of Spinoza, who affirms that "the order and concatenation of ideas is the same as the order and concatenation of things."¹ Hegel regards the cosmos and the cosmic processes as the manifestation of reason. Moreover, it is of the essence of reason to manifest itself in the objective world. Reason has two sides,—a thought side and a force side, a rational and a dynamic essence,—and these two are one. Reason is to be regarded, therefore, as underlying all thoughts and all things. In the physical world the laws of phenomena finding expression in mathematical formulæ represent the thought side of reason; the phenomena themselves are but the particular manifestations of these laws, the concrete and dynamic realization of the reason implicit in them. Every individual thing in the universe must be regarded as having some universal law or principle of reason as the very root and substance of its being, attributes and activities. This universal principle of reason is the creative and constructive force of the universe. It is seen in the architectonic principle which is the soul of the plant, in the creative and sustaining power in the animal and in man, in the formation of character, in the building of insti-

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, p. 7.

tutions, in the development of church and of state, and of the arts and sciences.

This principle of reason Hegel calls the *Begriff*. To convey its full significance I have adopted the usual translation of this term; namely, the notion. It will be necessary, however, to enlarge our usual connotation of the term "notion," so that as an equivalent for *Begriff* it will signify this universal principle of reason which is active in all thought and in all things. Let us examine a few passages of the *Logic* in order that at the beginning we may form a correct idea of Hegel's own interpretation of the term. "The *Begriff* is the principle of all life; it is at the same time the absolutely concrete, that is, finding complete manifestation in reality."¹

"The *Begriff* is found in the innermost heart of things, constituting them what they in reality are."² "The forms of the *Begriff* are the living spirit of reality, and whatever is real is such only because these forces are active in them, making them what they are."³

It is obvious that the Hegelian system is one of idealism. The cosmic force is to be regarded

¹ Hegel, *Werke*, VI, § 160.

² VI, § 166.

³ VI, § 162.

as the manifestation in its various phases of the all-embracing reason, and all history as an evolution of this reason in the progressive unfolding of its inner activity. This idealism is, moreover, an absolute idealism; that is, the underlying reason, which is the creative and sustaining principle of all things, is in the midst of all its variety of manifestation absolutely one and the same, from which nothing can be taken, and to which nothing can be added. It is completely unconditioned and independent. It is, therefore, the Absolute, that is, God. The highest manifestation of this principle of reason Hegel calls the Idea (*die Idee*), desiring to indicate by a single word that the supreme power of the universe is not mechanical and material, but essentially rational and spiritual. The Idea, the Absolute, God, are to be regarded as strictly synonymous terms used by Hegel interchangeably, and with no shade of distinction in their meaning.

In the exposition of Hegel's system he endeavors to show that the world of knowledge unfolds by the inner constraint of its own dialectic from the simplest beginnings through more and more complex stages until it reaches complete fulfilment in the all-embracing Abso-

lute. But though the Absolute is the consummation of the process as a whole, nevertheless the Absolute, as the creative and sustaining principle of reason itself, must be both the beginning of the process, and must underlie every succeeding stage of the process as well. Therefore every cross-section, as it were, of this process of evolution reveals some phase of the Absolute, incomplete it is true, and, therefore, if taken by itself misleading, but so far forth it remains an unmistakable manifestation of the divine reason which is its ground and justification. Thus Hegel defines the Absolute as the essence of all being in general; as cause, and as law in the physical universe; as consciousness, purpose, beneficence, justice, etc., in the realm of mind. From this point of view Hegel's system may be characterized as the progressive revelation of God.

Hegel's method of exposition in general may be summarized, therefore, as an attempt to show the various stages of development in the manifestation of the principle of reason as a growing revelation of the Absolute in such a manner that every stage by itself is partial, and therefore involves its own contradiction; but that these contradictions contain, nevertheless, common

elements by which, from a higher point of view, they may be reconciled and combined. Such a point of advantage being gained in the progress of thought, there will be disclosed, however, a new contradiction, again to be resolved by earnest consideration and penetrating insight in a higher synthesis, and so on and on through every stage of the process to the end where alone there may be found an abiding place in the Absolute, wherein there is found no contradiction and no incompleteness. The process is one, the underlying ground is one, and any element in the process receives its full significance solely in the light of the whole ; then and then only is its truth revealed. Truth with Hegel means always that knowledge which embraces its object upon all possible sides and in all of its possible relations as the complete expression of the eternal reason which underlies it. This is a thought akin to that of the old Hebrew poet and philosopher who said, "In thy light shall we see light," and that of the later Hebrew who so constantly insisted that everything is known only as it is viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*.

CHAPTER II

THE VARIOUS ATTITUDES OF THOUGHT TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE WORLD. THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS

THE fundamental conception of the Hegelian system of philosophy is that of universal reason dominating all thoughts and all things. It is necessary, therefore, at the very beginning to appreciate the inherent relation between thoughts and things in general, or more specifically between the thinking mind and the objective world. In order to understand fully the Hegelian attitude of thought to the objective world, the world which furnishes us the materials of knowledge, and of which we ourselves are but a part, it will be worth our while to examine somewhat in detail the doctrines of other philosophical systems upon this subject in the light of Hegel's criticism of them. Their divergence from the Hegelian system will serve by contrast to mark the characteristic features of that system itself. There are four typical views as to the

relation of the thinking subject to the objective world. They are as follows:—

1. The metaphysical systems.
2. The empirical schools.
3. The critical philosophy.
4. The theory of intuitive or immediate knowledge.

The first of these attitudes of thought regards the external world as perfectly pictured in thought. The question is not raised as to the difficulty of passing from the object which is perceived to the thinking subject which perceives it. The way is regarded as open and free. The objective reality of the outer world is assumed as a matter of fact. The testimony of the senses is taken as unquestionable. It is the standpoint of naïve realism, which rests upon the assumption that all things are in their essence what they seem to be in our perception of them. A natural result of this point of view and of this method of interpreting the world of experience was that abstract and empty phrases, refined metaphysical distinctions, in short, the terminology of the schools came to be used instead of living words in the description of living experience. No wonder that philosophy became sterile and dry as dust when the truth of the

world of reality was expressed in the desiccated formulæ of metaphysical speculation. In other words, the actual world of living experience was forced in a purely artificial and arbitrary manner into metaphysical molds. For these molds were cast with no consideration whatsoever of the patterns which the real world might have furnished. They were fashioned according to the caprice of speculation, and the demands of certain postulates of thought which had no basis in reality. In respect to all this, Hegel's contention is that a genuine knowledge of the external world must come through a process in which the particular objects of knowledge are allowed actually to characterize themselves; in other words, we must interrogate the facts of experience and allow them to tell their own story. We must not take for granted certain characteristics and certain relations as necessarily obtaining because our speculations seem to demand them. We dare not apply to concrete objects of thought predicates which have been derived elsewhere and without any consideration of the nature of the objects themselves. We should not anticipate experience, but faithfully interpret it. Take for example the supreme object of all

thought, God Himself. It is but a poor and inadequate conception of God which results merely from ascribing to Him a series of predicates which have been deduced from certain metaphysical necessities. However many such predicates may be, they together fail utterly to exhaust His infinite nature. The Orientals appreciated this when in the Hindoo philosophy God is declared to be the many-named, or the many-sided, and this without limit of any kind or degree, so that if the resulting names should be formed together to constitute a series, the result would of necessity be an infinite series.

Moreover, Hegel insists that the various metaphysical schools all adopted a wrong criterion in that they are content to derive their definitions from popular conceptions. Any popular conception of God, of the world, or of the soul is necessarily inadequate and therefore false, for it must be colored necessarily by the nature of the age, or of the race whence it emerges, and so far forth it is particular, local, and misleading. Any definition of God which embodies a popular conception of Him, however complete that conception may be, fails to sound the depths of His being and nature. It is Hegel's most vehement contention that the only true

method of building up the world of knowledge is to allow the objects of thought freely and spontaneously to expound their own characteristics. Thus God's being is known only as revealed in the continuous unfolding of Himself in the cosmic processes, in nature, in history, in man. And so we may define man as a rational animal; but at best this is only a vague groping in the dark, for our knowledge of man cannot be compressed into a single judgment. That was the snare of the metaphysical schools, the belief that all objects of knowledge could be expressed completely within the scope of a formal definition or a stereotyped formula. What man is, in all the possibilities of his development as artisan, mechanic, scholar, soldier, citizen, statesman, martyr, or reformer, and so on without limit, that the complete history of humanity alone can reveal. The term "rational," as used in the traditional definition of man, conceals a vast territory of knowledge which lies behind it. We appreciate the limitless extent of this region when we even superficially meditate upon the many-sided manifestations of which the idea of rationality is capable. It is only in the free activity of the constructive principle working within an object of knowl-

edge that its essential characteristics are revealed.

Moreover, the old metaphysic was dogmatic in the extreme. Although the results of such speculation were partial and one-sided, they were nevertheless stoutly maintained as absolute and final. This insistence upon the ultimate nature of partially conceived truth indicates the characteristic spirit of the school. Content with the half truth and the twilight of the understanding they never attained the full knowledge as revealed in the light of reason. In addition to the general point of view and method of the metaphysical systems, their treatment of several special problems is not only a matter of interest in itself, but has an indirect bearing upon some important points of the Hegelian system. These problems are four in number.

1. As to the nature of being in general, — ontology.

2. As to the nature of the soul, — rational psychology or pneumatology.

3. As to the nature of the world, — cosmology.

4. As to the being and nature of God, — natural or rational theology.

The doctrine of being, or ontology, resulted

from the attempt to answer the question as to how being in general might be adequately characterized. The distinctions raised by the metaphysical schools were largely verbal. Whenever certain absolute terms were found which seemed to involve no contradiction to the generally received conceptions of the day, then the metaphysician was completely satisfied that he had given expression to the truth in its fulness. He did not pause to inquire as to the concrete significance of the terms which he used or as to their illustration in actual experience. Such terms, for example, as existence, finitude, simplicity, complexity, and the like, were used as the current coin of expression by the metaphysical school, and with but little thought as to their precise meaning and the definite scope of their application. Hegel's criticism, at this point, is quite characteristic and illustrative of his general method. He insists that every term which we employ in philosophical thinking should represent a notion, that is, an idea of universal and necessary significance, and that such a notion cannot have a one-sided, abstract, and rigid meaning, but must have a wealth of meaning in itself. Every notion, moreover, must be regarded as a small world within itself,

having manifold characteristics connected and interrelated in an indefinite variety of ways. The term which represents such an idea can therefore never be employed in a stereotyped manner as was the custom of the metaphysicians. The very fact that such an idea embodies within itself inner connections or relations renders it necessary that contradictions must arise which can be resolved only by viewing them in the light of the whole body of knowledge. To cut such an idea off as a finished product, incapable of further modification or development, is to deal with it in a manner extremely artificial and unphilosophical as well. Ideas are living processes and not dead products. "Let us avoid, therefore," Hegel would say, "the use of terms to which we have attached partial and poor meanings. Let the supreme task of thought be to overcome the superficial and the abstract."

The second question discussed by the metaphysicians was that of rational psychology, or pneumatology; it had special reference to the nature of the soul. The pre-Kantian metaphysic regarded the soul as a thing, an independent entity. This conception at once suggested the question, which proved to be an

utterly futile and misleading inquiry, as to the seat of the soul; and the further question as to whether the soul, inasmuch as it is a thing, should be regarded as simple or composite. It was thought that upon the fact of its simplicity depended the truth of the doctrine of immortality, inasmuch as whatever is not composed of parts can suffer no dissolution. Hegel insists at this point that the inner life of the mind or soul cannot be regarded as a finished thing, a product once for all complete, without possibility of development. Such a conception renders impossible also any processes of action and reaction between the several elements which constitute the essence of the soul's life and varied activity, and leaves unexplained the external phenomena of the mind which are so incalculably complex in all the variety of their many-sided manifestations. The mind must be regarded, according to Hegel, as a concrete reality which is evidenced by its manifestations. It is not a "thing," as the metaphysicians use the term "thing," but rather an inward constructive force determining the various phases of its external phenomena in an unlimited, progressive development.

The third branch of the traditional metaphysic

was that of cosmology. The topics which it embraced were the world, its contingency or necessity, its eternity or its necessary limitation in time and space, the formal laws of its changes, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil. The general standpoint of the metaphysician before the time of Kant was that thought presents to us a number of alternative judgments, one of which must be wholly true and its opposite wholly false. Therefore, in reference to the particular questions which arose in the sphere of cosmology, the metaphysicians held that one is of necessity constrained to choose between the theory that the world is created or that it is eternal; that man is the product of the law of necessity or that he is free. They held, moreover, that the good and evil in the world are natural opposites, and can never be reconciled. Hegel characteristically opposes this one-sided view of things by maintaining that the world contains on all sides an indefinite number of opposites, and that it is the peculiar function of the reason to reconcile and harmonize them completely. His system is essentially a universal resolution of all the contradictions and inconsistencies of existence in the all-embracing synthesis of the reason.

Thus the idea of freedom which involves no necessity, and the idea of necessity which involves no freedom, are alike merely the partial abstractions of the understanding. In the actual world, the world in which we live, and move, and have our being, freedom and necessity are not divorced. For there can be freedom only in that community wherein liberty is guaranteed by law. And as regards the necessity which nature everywhere imposes upon us, it must be remembered that the free activity of the individual is possible only to the extent to which he can depend implicitly upon the uniformity of nature's laws; for were nature without law, and its phenomena the result of the caprice or whim of ruling deities as in the old mythological conception, the free purpose of man would be constantly thwarted and annulled.

The fourth branch of metaphysics is that of natural or rational theology. It is concerned with the fundamental conception of God, His attributes, and the proof of His existence. The radical error of the metaphysical logic is revealed in their attempt to discover some objective ground for the being of God. The resulting idea of God thus formed, creates the

impression of being derived from something external to God Himself. But God must be conceived as the sole ground of all things visible and invisible, and therefore as independent of anything in the nature of a foundation or support of His being and existence. For if God is regarded as a being, derived from the world, then the very finitude of the world processes would cling to the idea of a God thus conceived. As Hegel suggests, the metaphysician is confronted with the following dilemma: either God is the actual substance of the world, including the mind of man, which is endeavoring to come to a knowledge of Him,—which is pantheism; or God is an object distinct from the apprehending mind, the subject,—which is dualism. Hegel in the development of his system endeavors to effect a synthesis of the divine and human consciousness in such a way as to avoid the two extremes of dualism and of pantheism; it is only, however, when the entire system is unfolded before us that we have any basis for judging whether he has succeeded in this difficult undertaking. At this stage of the discussion it is sufficient merely to mark his general purpose in this regard as a radical point of departure from the metaphysical view.

There is a phrase which is often employed in speculations concerning the being of God. It is this, "Consider nature, and nature will lead you to God." Hegel in this connection enters a vigorous protest, inasmuch as this phrase seems to imply that God is the consummation merely of the great cosmic process, whereas the truth lies in the thought that while God may be regarded in a certain sense as the final consummation of all things, yet nevertheless He must be regarded also as the absolute ground of the initial stage and every subsequent stage of the cosmic development. God is the beginning as well as the end of the world's evolution. It is only in a very partial sense, therefore, that we are justified in saying that nature leads man to God, for in another and deeper sense we are constrained to believe that it is God Himself who makes nature possible. Nature leads backward as well as forward to God.

As to the attributes of God, they were conceived by the metaphysicians in so indefinite and vague a manner as to be utterly devoid of any genuine significance. These schools of thought seemed to possess a natural dread of assigning to God any attributes whatsoever which

were distinctively human upon the ground that to think of God's nature as at all resembling human nature would be to degrade and dishonor Him. Fearing that they might become anthropomorphic, they lapsed into a vague indefiniteness which was without any significant content whatever. Yet they seemed oblivious of this evident defect, and satisfied with a summary of the divine attributes in some such vague and unmeaning expression as the following, "God is the most real of all beings." But Hegel in criticising such a statement as this insists that the most real of all beings of whom, however, nothing is affirmed definitely, is after all the very opposite of what it purports to be, and what the understanding supposes it to be. Instead of a being ample and above all measure, the idea is so narrowly conceived that it is on the contrary poor and altogether empty. It is with reason that the heart craves an answer to its question as to the nature of God which will mean something. When the idea of God is reduced to an indefinite and meaningless formula, God is then removed to a sphere so foreign to our thought and life as to be reduced to an absolute zero. Without a content pos-

sessing any positive significance our thought is shorn of all meaning whatsoever. As Hegel puts it in striking epigram, "Mere light is mere darkness."¹ Notwithstanding Hegel's radical difference in general point of view, however, and his critical attitude toward the metaphysical schools, nevertheless he frankly acknowledges that there is something of permanent value in one feature at least of their teachings, — namely, in their insistence upon the fundamental truth that thought constitutes the essence of all that is. And this truth he has incorporated in his own philosophical system as its cardinal doctrine. Thought, however, with Hegel does not consist in abstract definitions and formulæ, but is revealed in its fulness only in the concrete realities of life.

¹ *Werke*, VI, § 36, *Zusatz*.

CHAPTER III

THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL

IN the course of the development of philosophical thought it was natural that there should follow a reaction against the abstract, vague, and indefinite results which had been the outcome of the metaphysical speculations. This reaction found expression in the teachings of the empirical school of philosophy. The empiricists insisted that the starting-point of all thought must be something definitely fixed and secure, some concrete reality such as can be found only in actual experience. The metaphysical procedure started with abstract universals, and the difficulty which it could not overcome lay in the fact that there was no way of passing from vague generalities to the abundant variety of particular manifestations which correspond to such universals in the world of reality. It is the function of thought to interpret experience and not to anticipate it. Therefore the empiricists urged that the logical

and natural beginning of all inquiry after truth should be the particular instances which nature presents in such prodigal profusion. They insisted, moreover, that the true and only source of all experience is to be found in our sensations and perceptions. According to this view the foundations of knowledge rest solely upon the direct testimony of the senses; here, and here alone, can consciousness be certain of itself and the results of its own operations. Whatever may be doubted, here at least is certitude, a firm footing, and the assurance of substantial progress. And so we find the fundamental doctrine of empiricism formulated in the words, "Whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation." This would seem to be indeed a common-sense basis for all serious investigation and for the construction of a sound practical philosophy; and there is, indeed, much to recommend and to justify its claims. Hegel calls attention to the very valuable contribution to thought which has come directly from the empirical school, and to which he himself fully subscribes,—namely, that it is necessary for every man to see for himself and to feel that he is present in those primary facts of knowledge

which he feels constrained to accept. If one is really to know things, he must see them as they are. This is certainly in complete accord with the modern scientific spirit of inductive inquiry which grounds all investigation upon a study of actual sources, and that, too, at first hand.

The weakness of empiricism, however, as Hegel points out most conclusively, consists in the fact that any sensation, or combination of sensations which according to the empiricist is the ultimate ground of appeal, is always a particular and individual experience. It is impossible to pass from such experiences to the universal idea or law which they illustrate without introducing some conceptions which transcend the purely empirical presupposition that we know only particular phenomena and their immediate connections and relations.

Hume had long since drawn attention to the fact that when we interpret the phenomena of experience as manifesting universal principles and as related by necessary causal connections, we are thereby reading into the phenomena what they themselves do not contain, but that with which they have been invested by our thought. Granted that necessity and universality are found

everywhere in our consciousness, what reason have we, Hume would say, to assert that these characteristics are also the attributes of things themselves. If sensation is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of all that men hold as truth, then these ideas of universality and necessity must be regarded as merely convenient fictions of the mind, clever it is true, but by no means trustworthy. Hume very frankly accepted this conclusion; and so must every thoroughgoing empiricist. Hegel insists, however, that the reason joins to these fundamental processes of sensation and perception its peculiar function of interpreting in the light of their universal and necessary significance that which they present as particular experiences. This relation between the reason on the one hand and the elementary data of the senses on the other, follows logically from the basal postulate of the Hegelian system that whatever is found to be an ultimate characteristic of reason must also apply in like manner to reality itself.

Again, the method of empiricism is essentially one of analysis,—that is, the subjecting of our experiences to a kind of dissecting process which separates them into their constituent elements. The defect of such a method is that it makes

no provision whatsoever for any corresponding synthesis. After the work of analysis is complete, it is necessary to have some unifying and constructive function of the mind as its natural and necessary complement. It is such a function which enables us to pass from phenomena to the laws which underlie them. Dissection as an exclusive process is suggestive only of death, and can never reproduce the living organism.

Moreover, if thought is active in systematizing the crude material which is given by the senses, then it must bring to the process something more than that which the crude sensation of itself is able to give.

As to the questions which are of special moment for the philosophical thinker, concerning God, the soul, and the world, the empirical school took the position that the mind of man is so constituted that it can deal only with finite material. Finding truth only in the outer world as mediated by the senses, they insisted that even if the existence of a supersensible world be granted, any knowledge of that world would be impossible. From this point of view it follows that there is no place in such a system either for a theory of morals or a philosophy of religion. Both ethics and religion thus lose all objective

character, and at the same time their universal validity. The logical outcome, therefore, of this doctrine is materialism, which in its general methods and results is diametrically opposed to Hegelianism. There have been, however, some philosophers who have styled themselves disciples of Hegel and yet have been pronounced materialists. They are the so-called *Hegelians of the left*; they are such writers as Feuerbach and Strauss. This peculiar development of the Hegelian school must be regarded as a perversion of Hegel's teaching rather than the logical outcome of his system. Hegel's criticism of materialism is so clear and emphatic as to give no uncertain sound. He draws attention to the fact that materialists in general regard matter in the light of an abstraction; it is after all the unknown somewhat behind phenomena, of which they are merely the manifestation. And when the materialists come to explain what matter itself is, its fundamental nature and essential characteristics, they are constrained to employ certain concepts as force, causation, action and reaction, and the like, which are essentially metaphysical concepts for which materialism pure and simple can give no warrant whatsoever.

Moreover, the world of sense-perception, as

materialism conceives it, can give only a series of isolated and separate phenomena. To think of them as forming component parts of an interrelated system, and as sustaining necessary relations to each other and to the whole, would be equivalent to the rationalizing of the material universe, and this means the introduction of some non-materialistic factors. This procedure, of course, would contradict the fundamental postulate of materialism, that all knowledge is confined to the material data furnished by the senses. Materialism is here confronted by a practical dilemma. To defend its position, it must use the weapons of metaphysics; but the moment one appears as a metaphysician he ceases immediately to be a materialist. The materialistic creed, therefore, must suffer either from inadequacy or inconsistency. And it is to overcome these limitations that Hegel seeks a solution in the creed of absolute idealism.

CHAPTER IV

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

THE critical philosophy takes its name from the fundamental Kantian point of view that thought must itself investigate how far it has a capacity of knowledge, and in this way become critical of itself. Inasmuch as the sensation regarded as a pure sensation can never give in and of itself the idea of necessity and universality, and yet we are conscious that our whole body of knowledge depends upon this very idea for its primary features of order and uniformity, therefore, the source of this idea, according to Kant, must lie in the very nature of thought itself. Moreover, he insists that this source is not to be sought for in the thought of any individual, regarded merely in his individual capacity, but in the thought which is the common possession of all individuals alike, — that is, in the very nature of thought itself as pure thought irrespective of the peculiar modes, or habits of thought incident to the peculiarities of

any particular individual whatsoever. These fundamental ideas which seem to be the common property of all rational creatures, and which, together with their relations and connections, form the determining factors in reducing the crude material of sensation to a system of knowledge characterized by order and law, are the so-called categories, — such as the ideas of necessity, cause and effect, unity, plurality, and the like.

The critical philosophy sets itself the task of testing the value of these categories in reference to their application to the sciences, to the sphere of metaphysics, and to our ordinary conceptual processes. It also seeks to determine the precise nature and function of these categories so as to distinguish in our knowledge between that which is subjective and that which is objective. These terms “subjective” and “objective” play such an important rôle in philosophical discussions generally, and especially in the systems both of Kant and of Hegel, that it will repay us at this stage of our investigation to inquire somewhat in detail as to the meaning and usage of these terms. Hegel draws attention to three distinct senses in which the term “objective” is used: —

In the first place, objective is used in a loose

and rather popular manner to designate whatever subsists externally, in contrast to which the subjective comes to be regarded as that which exists only in our fancy, hopes, or dreams.

In the second place, the Kantian use of objective consists in an application of the term to the elements in thought which are universal and necessary, — that is, what all men are constrained to think, in contrast to the subjective character attached to individual experiences which give them a certain particular and occasional coloring.

In the third place, the Hegelian use of the term objective has regard to the universal and necessary elements of thought in general after the manner of Kant, but in addition Hegel considers these universal and necessary elements of thought as representing at the same time the real essence of existing things.

This latter distinction marks the point of departure of Hegel from Kant. For, as Hegel maintains, if the necessary and essential factors in the building up of our world of knowledge belong only to the processes of thought, then all thought must be forever separated from the thing itself as the object of our thought which

perceives it, and as it exists apart from our perception of it. And although it is true that the categories as causality, necessity, universality and the like lie strictly within the province of thought, it does not necessarily follow that they must be ours merely in a subjective sense and not at the same time also the essential characteristics of things themselves. Hegel, moreover, will not allow that the convenient Kantian fiction of the thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*) can possibly express the real nature of the object when we have eliminated all that is present in consciousness relative to it,—all the deliverances of feeling and all specific judgments concerning it as to its evident attributes and qualities. What is left, Hegel asks, but an utter abstraction, a total emptiness?

When the balance between subjective and objective is struck by Kant, the totality of knowledge is found to be on the side of the subjective, while nothing at all remains to the credit of the objective. For when Kant speaks of the unity of consciousness as transcendental, he means by this phrase that our body of knowledge regarded as constituting a system possessing order and unity throughout has validity only for our thoughts, and not for objects apart

from our knowledge. What they are in themselves must remain, therefore, an unknown quantity,—the insoluble x of the equation of knowledge.

It is characteristic, moreover, of the Hegelian method that the significance which he attaches to the term objective is in reality a synthesis of the two other views mentioned above. The first holds that objectivity refers to the external thing; the second that objectivity refers to the necessary and universal thought; while Hegel insists that the objective is the combination of the two, being the true thought concerning the real thing. The subjective would signify, therefore, that which for the time being has a place in our thoughts but has no reference to reality, and which others under similar circumstances might not be constrained necessarily to entertain.

Kant's position is known as one of subjective idealism,—that is, the things which we know are appearances merely, and we possess no certitude as to the truth of what they are in themselves. Hegel's position, on the other hand, is one of absolute idealism, as has been already mentioned,—that is, it is conceded that the objects of our knowledge are phenomena,

but nevertheless must be regarded by us as the true representation of the things themselves. The warrant for such a belief lies in the postulate that what thought discovers in phenomena is a manifestation of the divine and universal reason, of which the very thought itself is a kindred manifestation. To show how this must be so, and to indicate its significance as the corner-stone of the entire Hegelian system, is the purpose of the *Logic* itself, and can be appreciated in its fulness only after a mastery of the detailed exposition which the *Logic* contains.

As to the special problems of the soul, the world, and of God, Kant's position may be outlined as follows : —

As to their teaching concerning the nature of the soul, Kant and Hegel are at one in their criticism of the old metaphysical definition of the soul as substantial, simple, selfsame, and maintaining its independence in its intercourse with the material world. Such a definition they both hold to be eminently unsatisfactory. The reasons assigned for this opinion, however, are quite different. Kant affirms that the metaphysical definition is unsatisfactory because the reason has no more of a warrant in making the

transition from the soul as we think it to be, to the soul as it really is in itself, than in the procedure from the appearances of things as perceived by thought to the things as they are in themselves. Hegel, however, repudiates the metaphysical definition on the ground that these attributes enumerated as the elementary characteristics of the soul are totally inadequate to express the concrete wealth of content which our idea of the soul should embrace.

As to the problem of the world, Kant draws attention to the fact that the thought in endeavoring to comprehend the unconditioned nature of the world stumbles upon certain contradictions which are called antinomies, for it is frequently found necessary to maintain two contradictory propositions about one and the same object in such a way that each one of the mutually destructive propositions seems of itself to have the stamp of necessity and of universal validity. The Kantian antinomies are four in number and are as follows: —

1. The world is limited as to space and time.
The world is not limited as to space and time.
2. Matter is indefinitely divisible.
Matter is not indefinitely divisible.

3. The will must be free.

The will must be determined.

4. The world is caused.

The world is uncaused, eternal.

Kant's explanation of these seemingly contradictory statements is that the difficulty is not inherent in the objects themselves which are under contemplation, but attaches only to the reason which fails to comprehend them in their true significance. At this point Hegel takes exception to Kant's explanation, and insists that there are not merely four antinomies, but that there is an indefinite number of such contradictions arising from the essential nature of all being itself. The difficulty, therefore, lies not in the defects of reason. On the contrary, it is the peculiar office of reason to show that these contradictions attach to the things themselves and that they are necessary in order to assume a progressive development whose very essence consists in overcoming contradictions and in establishing a higher unity in the midst of all differences. It is only the absolute reason, according to Hegel, which is capable of constructing such a unity, and so far forth as the reason of man partakes of the divine reason is he capable of comprehending it. Here, again,

we obtain a characteristic glimpse of the fundamental Hegelian conception, and a suggestion as to the working of his dialectic method.

As to the final problem, the theistic question, it would be well to examine briefly the Kantian criticism of the proofs concerning the being of God. These proofs may be divided into two kinds according to one or the other of two methods of procedure:—

We may begin, on the one hand, with an analysis of being and through that process reach the idea of God.

Or, on the other hand, we may begin with an analysis of the idea of God, and through that process reach the ground of His being.

The former of these methods of procedure will give either the cosmological or the physico-theological proof of the being of God. The cosmological proof reasons from the variously related and interconnected phenomena of the universe to a first cause as necessary to account for their origin and their sustained existence. This proof turns upon the concept of causation. The physico-theological proof reasons from evidences of design manifested in phenomena to the existence of One who is the great architect of them all, and this proof turns upon the con-

cept of final cause. Kant's criticism of these proofs is based upon the fact that in the transition from the world which is finite to God who is infinite, there is in the conclusion far more than is contained in the premises, and therefore the inference is an unwarranted one. For if we may not logically pass from the crude material of the sensations to the ideas of universality and necessity, neither may we pass from the same beginnings to the idea of God. Hegel contributes two thoughts of special significance to the general conclusions of Kant; the first is concerned with a question of form, the second with the question of matter or of content.

As to the first, that of the formal process involved in our reasoning; if we regard the transition from the finite to the infinite as represented by a syllogistic process, the starting-point must involve some theory of the world which makes it an aggregate either of contingent facts, or of relations implying design. But the world as thus conceived is no longer a world of mere sensations. It is a world of sensations as they have been transmuted by thought, and as they contain the elements of necessity and universality; for we have seen that it is the fundamental nature of thought to

exercise this function of transmuting sensations into these higher forms of the mind. But in such a process the crude sensation is destroyed as a sensation. This is what Hegel calls the element of negation in the process of transition from the world to God. The world regarded as an aggregate of sensations has disappeared. Out of its ashes rises the new world as interpreted by the categories of thought, and such a world with its implications of universality and necessity is an adequate starting-point for the proof of the being of God.

Hegel's second contribution to this general discussion relates to the matter or body of truths to which the transition from the world to God at first leads, such truths as concern the nature of the world's substance, its necessary essence, and the cause which regulates and directs it according to design. These ideas express but a very partial and inadequate knowledge of God, and yet they are necessary to a complete conception of Him. Hegel insists that while they should not be overlooked, they must nevertheless be supplemented by higher truths, and that while inanimate nature gives us intimations of God, there is a higher revelation of Him when we start with living organisms. Thence we reach

the idea of God as the source of life. In a similar way, there is still a higher level which may be taken as our starting-point. This higher level is that of mind itself; it is through mind alone that we reach the highest possible conception of God. His nature, therefore, can be adequately defined only when we regard Him as the absolute mind.

The second general method of proof is the inverse process of the first. It starts with the idea of God and reaches His being as the conclusion. It is the so-called ontological argument for the being of God. Beginning with the idea of God as the most perfect being conceivable, it proceeds to the belief in the actual being of God. Kant's criticism is that we may not reason from the thought in the mind to the actual existence of the object of that thought outside of the mind, and he illustrates this point by showing that a hundred thalers as conceived in the mind does not put a hundred thalers in one's purse. Hegel's criticism of Kant, however, puts the matter in a very different light. He insists that no such analogy as drawn by Kant can discredit the ontological argument, because the idea of God which we are constrained to entertain is wholly unique. The

very nature of any finite thing is expressed by saying of it as Kant does that its being in time and space is very different from our notion of it. But of the idea of God it must be said, and of Him alone can it be said, that He can be thought of only as existing. He, the infinite One, occupies in our thoughts a position, therefore, accorded to nothing that is finite. In God and in God alone is the idea of Him and His being one and the same. Here is the supreme illustration that the rational is the real and the real is rational.

In the *Critique of the Practical Reason* Kant indicates his position in reference to the moral life. The free control of its own activity which Kant denied to the pure reason, he has vindicated for the practical reason which manifests itself in the various phases of human conduct. By practical reason he means the will that determines itself according to universal laws, and these universal laws he claims possess objective validity, — that is, they are recognized by the human intellect everywhere and at all times, and they impose a common obligation upon all mankind. Kant's special contribution to ethical thought consists in his protest against the prevailing ethical theory of his day, — that

of eudæmonism, the philosophy which finds man's chief end in some form of happiness, and fundamentally happiness as interpreted in the gratification of the selfish appetites and desires which are dictated by the pleasures and pains of life. Hegel's criticism of Kant is that his theory gives the form of morality in a universal law of conduct, but that the formal expression of the law of conduct to do that which is right by no means determines the content of that law, and thereby does not definitely inform us as to what is the right in concrete cases.

It is thoroughly characteristic of the Hegelian method that it always criticises a one-sided view of things, and then seeks to correct it by showing the other and complementary side. So here, Hegel agrees with Kant completely, only he adds that the Kantian system is inadequate and needs to be rounded out in some way that will provide, not merely for the basis of a formal ethic, but for a material ethic as well, so that the two may be regarded as mutually related elements which together form the complete whole.

In the third division of Kant's great work, *The Critique of the Judgment*, the reflective power of judgment is declared to be equiva-

lent to the function of the intuitive understanding. In this position Kant, in a dim way at least, approaches the Hegelian conception of reason as the basis of all things, in affirming that everything which exists manifests its nature according to its inner idea, if we may here use an Hegelian phrase. Thus in the intuitive judgment of beauty in nature or in art, in the judgment of an ideal end which is being realized in all the living organisms throughout the vast range of nature,—in all this man rises to the height of comprehending in some measure that the mere phenomena of the universe reveal in themselves an ideal and a purpose. The universe is thus to be regarded as the incarnation of reason.

Hegel's system marks a point of departure in that he holds that this ideal, this incarnate reason, is not merely revealed to the artistic instinct of the genius or of the poet, but may be made manifest to humbler minds through the simple operations of pure thought alone.

Kant went so far towards the Hegelian position as to assert that the natural purposiveness seen in nature was not an external principle of finality, but was immanent within each organism, wherein the final cause is active as a mold-

ing principle, forming a constructive dynamic centre. He fails, however, to attain to the Hegelian doctrine in its completeness, because he says that, at the last analysis, the idea of an immanent finality can be affirmed with positive assurance only of our thought of things and not of the things themselves. Whereas Hegel insists that there is an objective finality as well as a subjective, or rather that the subjective and the objective are here one and the same; the finality is both in our thoughts and also characteristic of things as well.

In the summary of his review of the critical philosophy of Kant, Hegel assigns to it two points of merit, in that, positively, it emphasizes the independence of reason, and, negatively, it insists that the categories of the understanding are finite. Kant's weakness, on the other hand, lies in affirming that what is false or inadequate in knowledge is due solely to the limitations of our mental faculties. Hegel insists, on the contrary, that the defects of knowledge must be ascribed to the finite nature of the objects of thought themselves and not to the categories by which they are constructed into a system of knowledge.

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

THE chief representative of the doctrine of immediate or intuitive knowledge is Jacobi, who insists that all knowledge obtained through the categories of the understanding is derivative and therefore finite and conditioned, and because finite and conditioned, therefore unsatisfactory. Moreover, through any process of reasoning whatsoever, it is impossible to rise to the high level of apprehending the true, the infinite, the unconditioned, that is, God Himself. But by an immediate revelation of the reason we may know God intuitively. The being of God cannot be proved, but it can be immediately recognized. The words "knowledge," "faith," "intuition," are the terms used to indicate this immediate deliverance of the consciousness. Hegel's criticism of this position is somewhat as follows: Although the knowledge of God may be regarded as an immediate intuition, nevertheless, it is an intuition which must be considered as an intellectual product, that is, it

must rise above the things of sense. It must deal with facts which have special reference to our thinking mind, with facts of inherently universal significance. Pure and simple intuition, therefore, is nothing more or less than pure and simple thought. The distinction between thought and intuition is merely a verbal one. The fundamental difficulty with the position of Jacobi is this, that while he claims the intuition to be immediate, he overlooks the possibility that what may seem to be complete in itself is nevertheless a product, though it be a finished product, and as a product, therefore the result of some process which has produced it. Hegel's position is that in all immediate knowledge the elements which are immediate have behind them somewhere a process, and by that process they are mediated. For instance, a seed is an immediate existence as regards the flower and fruit which may spring from it. As we hold the seed in our hand, we have no hesitancy in calling it a finished and complete thing in itself. The flower and fruit, however, are mediated by the processes which are started by the vital force latent in the seed. And yet from a similar point of view, the seed itself may be regarded as a product resulting from a

process by which it has been mediated, and comes to be what it is in its seemingly complete and independent state. We may further illustrate the Hegelian idea of mediation by the knowledge which we may have of a book whose title, author, and general point of view we know only by common report, but we ourselves have never read the book itself. Such knowledge Hegel would call immediate in a general and abstract sense, and that kind of immediate knowledge would have no special significance or value. However, after reading the book and marking the relation of step to step in the gradual unfolding of the author's conception, and the bearing of each part to the whole as it finally reaches its complete expression, we find that our knowledge has grown in definiteness and consequent value through this process which is one of mediation. And then also the book as a whole will be found to leave upon our mind a certain final impression as a summary of its total significance, which in turn we would call immediate knowledge; for in the course of time the various steps of the process of mediation become merged in the very result of the process itself, and we come to retain in consciousness only the finished product as a

whole. Such immediate knowledge, however, which is the result of a mediating process, is vastly different from the vague and indefinite knowledge which goes before and is independent of all mediation whatsoever. This distinction gives a deep insight into the Hegelian method and general point of view.

So also religion and morals contain, of course, as their most marked characteristics, the elements of faith, or immediate knowledge, and yet from another point of view they must be regarded as conditioned on every side by the mediating processes of development, education, and the formation of character. Hegel holds that everything from one point of view is immediate, but from another point of view is to be regarded as mediated. The relation between mediation and immediacy is one of the keys to a thorough understanding of the Hegelian system. It need be only referred to here in passing by way of anticipation, inasmuch as this relation is developed at length in the second part of the *Logic*. His doctrine of essential being as there expressed is made to rest upon the unity which underlies the seeming antithesis of mediation and immediacy.

Hegel further criticises the theory of immedi-

ate knowledge on the ground that the criterion of truth is found not in the character of that which purports to be true, but in the bare fact that it has found a place in consciousness. This makes subjective knowledge the sole basis of truth. Whatever is discovered as a fact in the individual consciousness is thereby declared to be a fact evidenced by the consciousness of all, and to be regarded even as the very essence of thought itself. This, however, does not necessarily follow; and if granted, it proves too much, for as a result of such an argument there may be found as valid a warrant for the superstitions of savage peoples as for the doctrines of the Christian religion. As Hegel remarks, "It is because he simply believes in them and not from any process of reasoning or argument that the Indian finds God in the cow, the monkey, the Brahmin, or the Lama."¹

It must also be acknowledged that the immediate knowledge of God merely tells us that He is. Thus the idea of God as an object of religion is narrowed down to an indefinite, vague, supersensible being devoid of all positive attributes. From this point of view He must ever remain the Unknown God. Such

¹ Hegel's *Werke*, VI, § 72.

an idea of God is upon the same level as Herbert Spencer's characterization of God as "the Unknowable."

Moreover, the abstract thought of the metaphysician and the abstract intuition are one and the same thing. From either point of view, God is conceived as a being vaguely indefinite and undetermined. To call God a spirit and to say that we know Him as a spirit immediately, Hegel insists, is only an empty phrase; for the consciousness, or better the self-consciousness, which the idea of spirit implies, would necessarily render that idea more specific and definite by analyzing it in such a way as to show the various elements which constitute its essence and by separating it from all else that might be confused with it. But such an act of thought is itself a process of mediation. Thus all strictly immediate knowledge is vague and indefinite, and the very act of making it definite and distinct necessitates the subjecting of its immediacy to a process of mediation. Without such a process all knowledge is both unscientific and unphilosophical.

The results which have been reached through Hegel's criticism of the various attitudes of

thought to the objective world may be briefly summarized as follows:—

The metaphysician has his abstract forms of thought, but they prove to be empty.

The empiricist has a vast wealth of material but no thought forms in which to express the same.

The critical philosopher has his thought forms, but that which seems to be the material at hand ready for the casting, proves, upon investigation, to be shadowy and unsubstantial.

The intuitionist possesses thought forms but they lack any distinctive pattern; and therefore whatever may be the material which is run into them, the casting which results is always the same, possessing no specific characteristics and therefore without significance or value.

The evident defects of these various types of philosophy Hegel seeks to obviate by uniting into one system the partial truths which they severally contain. By what method this is attempted and with what success it is attended, we shall hope to see in the detailed exposition of the *Logic*,—the task which lies immediately before us.

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CHAPTER VI

A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC

THE *Logic* is divided into three parts:—

I. The Doctrine of Being. (*Die Lehre vom Seyn.*)

II. The Doctrine of Essence. (*Die Lehre vom Wesen.*)

III. The Doctrine of the Notion. (*Die Lehre vom Begriff.*)

These divisions represent the successive stages in the progressive unfolding of our knowledge through which the various processes of thought come to their complete and final expression. They are to be regarded as successive stages only in the sense that by our analysis we separate them in our thoughts, and think of one as following the other. But in reality we should conceive of these elements of knowledge in such a manner as to regard one as lying within the other, and this in turn within the third. The progress indicated in their development is one not of advance so much as a deepening insight

into more and more fundamental attributes and relations.

The doctrine of being is the result of an answer to the question as to *what* a thing is.

The doctrine of essence, in answer to the question *of what* is it composed and *by what* is it constituted.

The doctrine of the notion, in answer to the question, *to what end* is it designed and is it capable of progressing.

The complete knowledge of a thing, therefore, embraces the categories of its being, the ground of its being, and the purpose of its being.

It will be readily seen that the first category involves the second, in order to complete its meaning, and that the second involves the third in a like manner, and that the third underlies the other two. For the being of a thing becomes definitely known to us only when we are able to refer it to its appropriate ground, and when we possess some insight as to whence it came and by what processes its being is maintained and perfected; also the ground of its being finds its full significance only in the consideration of the end which it is realizing and which its being subserves. Thus, the question *what* implies the question *whence*; and the ques-

tion *whence* leads irresistibly to the question *whither*.

We may call the category of being the logic of description; that of essence, the logic of explanation; that of the notion, the logic of the final cause.

The first category, that of being, represents knowledge when reduced to its simplest terms. The affirmation of all others that possesses the least significance is that merely of being pure and simple when it stands without further qualification or specification, so that were anything less asserted of an object, knowledge would be reduced to zero.

There are certain terms by which Hegel is wont to characterize being, and an understanding of which will give us an insight into the meaning of the doctrine of being and at the same time prepare us for the appreciation of the fundamental distinction which he draws between being and essence. Being, for instance, is referred to by Hegel variously as abstract, as identity, as absolute identity; again as abstract identity, as immediate, as undetermined, and as being in itself (*an sich*).

By "abstract" is meant that which is partial and incomplete. The category of being is always

spoken of as abstract, representing as it does the first rough draft of knowledge, and necessarily marking the beginning of that which as yet is incomplete and undeveloped.

The term "identity" as applied to being means a uniform sameness or homogeneity, which shows no distinction of parts or diversity of elements within itself, and which sustains no relations, as far as known, to anything beyond itself. It is, therefore, a term used to imply that mere being as regards any definite characteristics or qualities which it may possess is colorless, and as regards any relations which it may sustain to other things, is completely isolated.

The phrase "absolute identity" is only an emphatic expression for the term "identity," and is equivalent to the phrase "mere identity" or mere "sameness."

The phrase "abstract identity" is a combination of the two ideas, abstract and identity. It is equivalent to the phrase "an incomplete and colorless view of things."

The term "immediate," as we have already seen, when applied to knowledge, signifies that which is given as a totality, without any reference to the elements which constitute it, or to the processes by which it is produced. Immediate

knowledge is that which is not subjected to any analysis whatsoever, and such is the nature of mere being.

The word "undetermined" signifies the lack of any definite qualities or attributes, and has the force of the adjective "indefinite" when applied to being.

The phrase "in itself" (*an sich*) means that which is implicit or potential; it is used in distinction to the phrase "of itself" (*für sich*) which signifies that which is explicit. While the former applies to being, the latter applies to essence, indicating that the one is explicitly what the other is implicitly. Thus, being is to be regarded merely as a transition state of knowledge, the veriest beginning of knowledge in fact, inasmuch as that which may become definite and determined as essential being, is still indefinite and undetermined as mere being. It, however, does contain the potential of all that appears explicitly in essence.

We come now to consider the chief characteristics of essence in contrast to those of being. The essence is the result of a deeper insight than is represented by mere being. The essence of a thing is what it is, regarded no longer as an isolated fact, but as a part of a

system of interrelated elements. The idea of system is closely associated with a technical term which Hegel uses constantly in connection with the category of essence; it is the word "reflection." The essence of a thing is revealed only when we see the thing in its complete setting, and when we possess a thorough knowledge of the relations which it sustains to every part of the system to which it may be referred. The thing, therefore, does not shine in its own light so much as in the light reflected from all the coördinate elements with which it is related. We know a thing only when it is in the focal point of the illumination due to its complete setting. It is in this sense that Hegel says that the essence of a thing is known by means of the category of reflection.

Moreover, in order to understand fully the essence of a thing we must analyze the total mass of surface appearances, and disclose the underlying elements and processes which have given rise to its being. As mere being, the thing appears as an unanalyzed whole, a simple product without any reference to the processes which have produced it. In this analysis into constituent elements and formative processes we employ in our thought the category of mediation. Media-

tion is the process by which a thing comes to be what it is as regards its inherent nature and essential characteristics ; it emphasizes especially the means by which the end in question is attained.

Again, while being is always referred to as indefinite and undetermined, essence, on the contrary, is being which has become definite and determined. The definiteness which is characteristic of essence is reached through a process called negation. To make definite, means to mark off distinct limits, beyond which the thing in question ceases to be what it is. The process of negation is therefore the setting up of bounds about a thing, forming an enclosing line which we may call the line of negation, as beyond that line there is nothing which can be regarded as properly belonging to the essence of the thing which is thus limited. Mere being, as we have seen, is homogeneous throughout, lacking all characteristic color and determination, and this defect of being is obviated by disclosing its various parts and their reciprocal relations. But in doing this the several parts must be distinguished one from another, and the accomplishment of this is one of the functions of the process of negation. Negation, therefore, may

be defined as the process of revealing the specific differences between things, or between the several elements and functions of one and the same thing. It is, in a sense, a twofold process,—the discrimination of a thing from all that is external to it, and also the analysis of a thing into its component elements and functions. It is a term, as used by Hegel, which is equivalent to the term “differentiation,” which has entered so largely into the terminology of biological investigation and theory. The differentiation, for instance, of an egg in the process of development is the breaking up of its initial homogeneity, which we might call its mere being, into the related parts revealed in the living organism of the bird newly hatched. It is in this differentiation that the essential nature of the bird is fully disclosed. The Hegelian idea of negation is embodied in the dictum of Spinoza: *Omnis determinatio est negatio*, that is, we determine the characteristic and essential feature of a thing by a sharp distinction between that which it is and that which it is not. When no line of distinction is drawn, knowledge is a blur. It is without definition; just as we say a photographic plate is without definition when we mean that the lines are not clear and clean-cut.

As essence may be regarded as the development and completion of the category of being, in like manner the category of the notion is the development and completion of that of essence. Each stage marks a deeper penetration, and a progress towards the fulness of knowledge. If we inquire as to the nature of the process which necessarily underlies anything regarded merely as a product, we have raised the question as to its essence; and if then we probe deeper and inquire as to the thought which has devised the process, and is at the same time both the dynamic source of the process itself and its complete realization as well, we have raised the question as to its notion,—that is, creative and sustaining reason. The notion, therefore, embraces the truth, both of being and of essence.

It has been before remarked that the category of being represents immediate knowledge,—that is, the acceptance of an object of knowledge as a fact merely while yet unanalyzed and unexplained; and that the category of essence represents mediated knowledge,—that is, knowledge analyzed and explained. The category of the notion, therefore, may be regarded as the combination of these two kinds of

knowledge. It embraces immediate knowledge in the sense of comprehending, from the beginning, the end to be realized as a finished product; it is mediated knowledge as well, in the sense of its being the knowledge of the process, which is necessary in order to realize the end in question. It possesses at the same time the capacity of originating and directing that process.

Moreover, being has been represented as knowledge which is indefinite and undetermined, and essence as knowledge definite and determined; the notion, therefore, in this connection may be defined as the principle of reason which has the capacity of determining itself,—that is, of transforming the indefinite and undetermined into the definite and determined, by its own inherent self-activity.

Again, being has been represented as homogeneous, without any differentiation of its parts, and essence as the breaking up this dull level of sameness into distinct parts; the notion, therefore, may be regarded as the capacity for self-differentiation or self-specification.

As being is the potential, and essence the actual, the notion may be regarded as the capacity for effecting the transition from the

potential to the actual, or the capacity of self-realization.

These ideas of self-realization, self-determination, and self-specification, characterize the notion under the several aspects of development, freedom, and individuality. Such a principle as this, which is able freely to realize its own ends, is, according to Hegel, to be considered not so much in the light of a substance, underlying and constituting the essential being of all things, as a subject, because every manifestation of which it is the ground is a self-manifestation. The first and second parts of the logic, the doctrines of being and of essence, Hegel characterizes as objective, and the third, the doctrine of the notion, as subjective. Being and essence represent the manifestation in the world of reality, the notion represents both the basis of that manifestation and the end of it as well.)

It will be seen that the Hegelian system, as a whole, represents a progressive evolution, and it is of some interest to note that as a process of evolution it is characterized by Hegel in almost the same terms as Mr. Spencer employs in his well-known definition of biological evolution. "Evolution," says he, "is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,

coherent heterogeneity, through successive differentiations and integrations. ”

The change which is indicated by the Spencerian definition occurs between two states of an organism; the first corresponds to that of mere being, the second to that of essence. The same terms, “indefinite” and “incoherent,” are used by Hegel to characterize the state of mere being. The term “homogeneity” has a significance similar to the Hegelian phrase of abstract identity, that is, without distinction and characterization of its parts. So also the opposite terms “definite” and “coherent” permit of an exact application to the state of essence. The term “heterogeneity” indicates, moreover, the state in which the initial sameness has been resolved into separate elements possessing distinctive characteristics, and may in all propriety be applied to the Hegelian conception of essence. The transition from the one state to the other is regarded by Spencer as a process which is mediated through successive differentiations and integrations. “Differentiation” corresponds to the process of mediation by negation in the Hegelian terminology, and “integration” to the synthesis which is the resulting product of such a process. As every integration, according to Spencer,

implies a previous differentiation, so according to Hegel every so-called immediate element of knowledge must be regarded as a product implying a previous mediation or process which has produced it. Or, to use another characteristic phrase of Hegel's, while the Spencerian idea of differentiation corresponds to the process of negation, integration may be regarded as corresponding to the process which Hegel calls absolute negation, — that is, the negation of a former negation, which produces the effect of a new synthesis or affirmation.

There is, however, a marked point of departure in reference to the Hegelian conception of evolution in contrast to that of Mr. Spencer. The latter's definition contains nothing which corresponds to the Hegelian category of the notion. As to what may underlie the series of never ceasing changes, as to the origin of the series itself and its final consummation, there is in the philosophy of Mr. Spencer only the great Unknowable. Here, Mr. Spencer would insist, is reason's barrier; beyond lies the region of conjecture, of sentiment, and of hope but not of knowledge. To an agnostic position such as this, Hegel would enter a vigorous protest, and would urge that, given being and essence,

the thing and its historical evolution, forming a part of the cosmic series of progressive development, the thought is then necessarily constrained to postulate a constructive and determining principle of reason, as the intelligent source and end of it all. Hegel maintains, moreover, that this principle of reason which is sufficient to account for the cosmic evolution from the beginning to the end, which is a self-contained, free activity, creating and sustaining all things within its power, its wisdom and its goodness, can be no other than that which is the Absolute, which is God. When Hegel takes the position, as we have already noticed, that the underlying ground of all things must be regarded as a subject rather than a substance, thence the transition to the identification of this subject with the Absolute or God seems a most natural one. And it will be seen as we advance in the further exposition of the *Logic* that the momentum of the entire dialectical movement renders such a conclusion necessary.

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PART I

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

Das Seyn ist nicht zu empfinden, nicht anzuschauen und nicht vorzustellen, sondern es ist der reine Gedanke und als solcher macht es den Anfang.

— HEGEL.

PART I

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

CHAPTER VII

QUALITY

HEGEL discusses the doctrine of being (*Die Lehre vom Seyn*) under its three aspects of quality, quantity, and measure. Before entering upon the exposition of the Hegelian conception of quality, it would be well to examine somewhat more in detail the general doctrine of being. Such an undertaking will serve at the same time as an introduction to his more specific teaching concerning the quality of being.

If we are agreed to regard knowledge as an evolution, then the beginnings of that evolution must represent the minimum of knowledge. Such a beginning is found in the category of being. In ascribing to an object mere being without any further characterization, we render our assertion as indefinite as

it can well be made. The knowledge which ranges upon so low a level is equivalent to no knowledge at all, or as Hegel tersely puts it, "Being is the same as non-being." The identification of being and non-being when thrust upon us as a bare statement and without commentary upon it, not only startles us but also arouses a very natural feeling of protest, and perhaps of indignation. We say to ourselves "Is Hegel a mere juggler with words? Is it possible that behind this abrupt formula he is secretly laughing at us, and that his whole system is merely a keen satire upon the limitations of the powers of reason?" So it would seem, at least after a rapid and superficial glance at such a proposition. But when we come to analyze the statement that being and non-being are the same, we find that it is only an epigrammatic expression of that which we have always believed most thoroughly; for we are accustomed to say that any statement which is indefinite and non-committal is of no value or significance as knowledge. If it should be put to us in the form of a promise, it would carry with it no weight of assurance that the promise would ever be fulfilled. For us it would

amount to nothing. This is expressed in the proverb: "Some time is no time." We see, then, that Hegel's identification of being and non-being is equivalent to the statement that whatever is presented to us as wholly indefinite, ranks in reference to its worth as knowledge as though it were not. If it is put in this way, the Hegelian epigram wins our assent immediately. The critics of Hegel have sought to entrap him by asking the question, "Do you mean to tell us that a house is the same as no house? that a man is the same as no man? that a God is the same as no God?" Such questions indicate a radical misunderstanding of Hegel's conception of the relation of being to non-being. For in the examples cited, the house, man, God, we have something more in each case than mere being; we have being which has already been rendered definite and explicit, and possesses the whole concrete content which these terms severally connote. These cases, therefore, fall wholly outside of the sphere of mere being, and hence are irrelevant to the point which has been raised. What Hegel affirms is this: that being, mere being, without any characterization whatsoever, absolutely indefinite and

undetermined as regards its essential qualities, — that such being is as nothing.

But while being, from one point of view as abstract being, is the same as non-being, from another point of view, however, it is quite different from non-being. For being in the Hegelian system is regarded as the first term in a series of development. It marks a beginning, therefore, and while it is so far nothing explicitly (*für sich*), still it must be regarded as something implicitly (*an sich*), — that is, it must contain the potentiality of something which is to appear later on in the actual development. In it must be the “promise and potency” of all that is to follow throughout the subsequent stages of its evolution. It would be a correct statement to assert concerning a stone placed upon a parapet at the top of a house: “This stone is at rest. It has no motion.” And yet if it should be pushed away from its support, it would fall to the ground below, because of the gravity potential which it possessed by virtue of its position alone. And so it would be correct to state of it in the first instance that it is both at rest and, nevertheless, potentially at least, possesses motion. The motion is not

actual, it is true, but it is potential, and so far forth its motion is real in a very true sense. If being is to be regarded, then, as the initial term in a series of development, we must think of it as embodying a high potential in reference to its latent qualities.

Suppose, therefore, that the being which we have conceived as the starting-point in this evolution begins to develop its potential qualities into actual. We will find that whatever has been indefinite now tends to become more and more definite, and whatever has been undetermined will now grow more and more determined, as the process advances. The very idea of development itself implies that each succeeding stage of the series is a manifestation of something which in the preceding stage had as yet no actual being. It is in this sense that Hegel affirms that becoming (*Werden*) is the unity of being and non-being, — that is, a transition from that which is not to that which is.

Let us suppose, for instance, that there is an object barely discernible in the twilight. Our knowledge of it is completely exhausted by the bare statement that something is there. What its nature may be more specifically, its charac-

teristics, as to form, color, and the like, — what it is in fact, that is unknown; it is nothing.

But while it is so indefinite as far as our knowledge of its true nature is concerned that we correctly designate it as nothing, nevertheless, it contains at the same time the potentiality of something which under proper circumstances may be revealed. And so we may imagine that the light gradually grows brighter, penetrating the darkness which surrounds it; and with the growing illumination the object becomes clearer, and all that a moment before was indefinite and unknown becomes definite and known. Such a process is one of becoming, and it consists of a transition from the unknown to the known, a revelation of all hidden qualities; and this process may be appropriately characterized as the unity or the uniting of that which is not to that which is, or as Hegel puts it, the unity of non-being and being.

Hegel maintains that his system of thought-evolution brings together in one all the different phases of philosophical speculation which in turn have emphasized exclusively some one stage of the total process of development, and which have overlooked the relation of each par-

tial point of view to the whole. In a similar manner, for instance, several persons might describe a plant, one by referring to the kind of seed from which it sprang, another by drawing attention to its blossom, or another, to its fruit, and still another, to its possible use for medicinal purposes. Each would represent a stage in the complete process of its growth. Each is partial, and all should be brought together in order to form one complete description. Thus, in the system of Parmenides the idea of being was regarded apart from its relation to non-being and becoming. The consequence was that his system represented the world as consisting of rigidly unalterable elements, mere products ready made and unchanging, from which the idea of any process whatsoever was completely excluded. Heraclitus, on the other hand, held that the truth of being consisted of a perpetual becoming, *πάντα ῥεῖ*, he said, — all things flow. Thus the category of becoming in his system excludes all others. Heraclitus, however, marks an advance upon Parmenides, inasmuch as his idea of becoming carries with it also the implication of being, so that while he destroys the being of Parmenides with one hand, he restores it with

the other, regarding it as an essential factor in the process of becoming. It is of interest to note that this historical difference of opinion has followed, as it were, the lines of a dialectic movement, inasmuch as the seemingly contradictory positions from one point of view are brought together in a higher unity, and from a more comprehensive point of view, as the being of Parmenides is absorbed in the becoming of Heraclitus. Hegel's dialectic, as he himself claims, is only a following of the lines of development which philosophical thought, as a whole, has described in its path of progress.

The process of becoming, moreover, in any concrete instance, must result in some definite product. The process of becoming Hegel likens to a fire which is constantly consuming its material, and yet, nevertheless, does not leave an empty nothing as a result. That which is destroyed in one form is conserved in another. The result which is attained by the process of becoming Hegel calls *Daseyn*, — that is, being which has been rendered definite through the manifestation of its characteristic qualities. The term *Daseyn* has the force of the phrase "definite being," and may be so translated.

That which renders being definite is its quality (*die Qualität*). It is that which constitutes it what it is. Modify its quality, and being itself is likewise modified. It is Hegel's plan to discuss the bare idea of quality in general and not to enter upon the discussion of the nature of any specific qualities in particular. The question which he puts is this, "What do we understand by the idea of the quality of a thing in respect to its most general aspects?"

He, at the outset, draws a distinction between the categories of quality and of quantity (*die Quantität*). Quality may be defined as the internal determining factor of being; and quantity as the external determining factor. Any variation in that which makes being what it is will, of course, affect the nature of being itself; but a variation may occur in that which determines how much or how little of the being in question may be taken, and yet this need not necessarily affect the nature of that being itself. A drop in the ocean does not differ in quality from the entire body of which it is but an infinitesimal portion. It is obvious that being and its quality are identical, when we seek illustrations in the sphere of nature. It is not so obvious when we seek them in the sphere of

mind. The various mental functions, for instance, cannot be so accurately described as consisting of certain definite and invariable qualities. The very complexity of the phenomena of mind render their simplification by means of definite qualities a more difficult if not an impossible task. There is, for example, no specific memory or volitional quality attaching to consciousness as such.

The category of quality is to be regarded as having a positive and a negative aspect. Positively, the quality of a definitely determined being constitutes its reality, — it makes it what it is. Negatively, the quality of being is determined by a certain natural limit beyond which, if we proceed in thought, there is immediately a marked change in quality and consequently in the very nature of being itself. There are, however, two kinds of limit (*die Gränze*), — a qualitative and a quantitative limit. Of course the reference in this connection is to the qualitative limit; the qualitative is essentially a limit as to kind, and its bounds mark a definite change of kind. The quantitative, on the other hand, is naturally a limit as to magnitude, and marks a purely quantitative change. In the purely qualitative limit we have a form of

negative determination, in the sense that if its bound is transcended, the being in question suffers a radical change in its nature. Such a limit is, therefore, the determining point of being. To understand the nature of the being which we have in any particular instance, we must know, not only in a general way what kind of being it is, but we must know definitely at just what point a variation in its quality will subject it to a complete transformation into some other kind of being altogether. Hegel wishes to emphasize especially the thought that the very idea of a limit signifies that it marks a line of boundary between two kinds of being. It is impossible to conceive of a limit which would be the boundary of only one thing, for while it bounds one, it separates at the same time from something else. Therefore, every determinate being necessarily implies that something lies beyond its limit; this something Hegel calls its *other*. This conception of an other (*ein Anderes*), the obverse face, as it were, of every definite being, plays a very conspicuous and significant rôle in the Hegelian system. The other which stands over against every definite being is not any other thing whatsoever which happens to lie outside the sphere

of the definite being in question; but it must be that particular other which is, as it were, its next of kin. It would be incorrect to regard a triangle and a horse as an example of a certain definite being and its other. The other is that which not only lies outside of the sphere of some definite being, but at the same time it must lie within the boundaries of some common system to which both may be referred. For instance, a true example of an other in the Hegelian sense, would be that of the ellipse, which is naturally related to the circle as its other. The cultivated fruit which grows on a branch grafted upon a wild stock would be regarded as the other in reference to the main tree.

As Hegel puts it, every definite being in the process of development has a certain meaning *an sich*, — that is, considered merely within its own sphere; but this meaning is always partial because undeveloped, and for its completion necessitates a consideration of the nature of the limit, and this in turn can be known only as we pass over into the adjacent sphere of its other. The full meaning, therefore, of any definite being can be grasped only when we consider it not merely *an sich* but also *für*

Anderes as well,—that is, in reference to its corresponding other.

This conception lies at the basis of the idea of evolution, which is a continuous change in such a manner that every advancing stage is the necessary other of that which immediately precedes it. As the great cosmic system is one of evolution, every determinate being in it must show inherently this tendency to a continuous alteration (*die Veränderlichkeit*) a passing over into its other. But when we pass from any definite being to its other, this other, itself possessing definite being, must also have its other to complete its meaning, and so on without limit. We thus find ourselves launched upon an infinite series that can never be satisfactory, because never complete. It is an endless progression, and can only bring weariness unutterable to the mind which attempts to follow it. Such an idea of an infinite series, Hegel styles a false or negative infinity (*die schlechte oder negative Unendlichkeit*). It represents merely a tedious multiplication of finite terms in a never ending process. The finite, according to Hegel, may be defined as that which contains within itself its own contradiction. Its very incompleteness is the cause of its breaking down

of its own weight. As Hegel characteristically describes it, it negatives itself. It needs always to be referred to some other being as its cause and explanation, its necessary other. But such a process is without limit, as we have seen. Hegel's idea of the true infinite is that, in spite of this indefinitely continued process of referring on and on always to some other beyond, there is at each stage of such a process an intimation that the underlying ground not only of the particular stage of the process in question, but of the entire evolution itself of which it is but a very small phase, rests upon some absolute basis. Therefore, every cross-section, as it were, of the continuous process of development is to be regarded as a manifestation of the eternal reason, of the Absolute, of God. This is in full accord with Hegel's fundamental principle of absolute idealism. In every change, therefore, from any imperfectly determined being to some other there is nevertheless a something which remains unalterable, which when it passes over into its other is still itself. This Hegel calls *Fürsichseyn*, or being for itself,—that is, a conception of being as possessing a certain constant core of self-identity in the midst of all variation, and which preserves its own integrity as definite

being in spite of all modifying forces to which it may be subjected. This essentially permanent element in being partakes, according to Hegel, of the nature of the Absolute, and encloses within its finite appearance a spark of divinity. It is the true infinity (*die wahrhafte Unendlichkeit*).

Inasmuch, therefore, as the quality of any definite being is determined by a process of negation which assigns to it a definite limit, when we conceive of being in its developed form of being-for-self, we must regard this limit as in a certain sense obliterated, because the being thus conceived and its other fall together within one and the same sphere of common reference. This obliteration of a limit or boundary line is a process of negation; but the fixing of the limit in the former process is also a negation. The obliteration of the limit is therefore to be regarded as the negation of a negation, or, as Hegel calls it, an absolute negation, and has, therefore, the force of an affirmation. Thus the seed develops the first shoots which appear above the ground, these change into the stalk and twigs, these put forth leaves, blossoms, and finally bear fruit. Each stage of the growth changes into its other, but they are

all embraced in one; for the various limits which mark the stages of transition disappear completely in our thought of the plant as a whole, which perdures in its integrity throughout the whole process, even in the seed itself. The best illustration of the Hegelian significance of being-for-self is, however, not found in the sphere of plant life. It is found in the higher sphere of consciousness, in the nature of personality, of the Ego. The personality of selfhood remains unchanged amidst the innumerable alterations of its manifold activities, and so far forth partakes of the nature of that absolute permanency which is an essential attribute of the infinite. The idea of the Ego, of consciousness apart from its concrete manifestation in any particular individual (the Kantian *Bewusstseyn überhaupt*) may be regarded as the most comprehensive type of the Absolute. And every individual Ego must therefore partake of the nature of the Absolute whose image it bears, and in whom "it lives and moves and has its being."

We find, moreover, in the category of being-for-self an intimation of ideality. Ideality, according to Hegel, is that elemental principle in all being which is dynamic and constructive, working out its ends from within. It is

the immanent reason within all being. It is the architectonic principle which is self-directing and self-manifesting. As we have seen, determinate being is to be referred to the category of reality; but we are constrained to regard being-for-self under the category of ideality. The two are not contradictory, however, for the category of ideality represents merely a deeper insight and implies the category of reality as its necessary correlate. Hegel draws attention to the fact that the term "reality" is one which is used in two senses. In one sense, as has already been pointed out, reality is conceived as identical with the positive side of determinate being, — that is, the manifestation of some definite quality which renders being what it is. Thus we speak of the reality of a plan or of a purpose, when it remains no longer merely an inner and subjective thought, but has been realized in some definite form of actual being. The second sense in which the term reality is used, is to signify that anything is in a state completely conformable to its essential nature, or, as Hegel would put it, when it conforms completely to its notion or essential idea. For instance, when we say, "That is a real man," we mean by such a

characterization that he is one who has perfectly realized the ideal of manhood. It is in this sense that Hegel insists that reality and ideality are to be regarded as inseparable correlates. The real, therefore, is the ideal, and the ideal is the real.

Inasmuch as being-for-self and being-for-its-other are brought together by our thought through the underlying unity which embraces them both in one and the same system, — it may be, for instance, in one and the same organism, — we consequently may regard these two phases of being as constituting a closed sphere. While the unit thus formed is complex, it is nevertheless to be regarded as one by itself, and separate from all others. To be for self, signifies to be some one individual thing or person. This marks the final stage in the development of the category of quality, and at the same time it suggests a natural transition to the category of quantity. For the very idea of anything which we can designate as one and individual implies that there must be others of the same kind. The idea of one necessitates the complementary idea of the many. The idea of one would be meaningless were it not for the suggested contrast between the one and the many.

As now we can conceive of many ones grouped together, each one may be regarded as excluding every other one from itself, and a relation such as this is one of reciprocal repulsion. But at the same time it must not be overlooked that though in a sense reciprocally repelling, the many ones nevertheless are all of the same kind and consequently fall together in a single system. There must be consequently some bond of attraction which thus holds them together in an underlying unity.

If, now, in this complex unity we emphasize the idea of the separate individuality of each of its elements, we bring to the fore the concept of repulsion (*die Repulsion*). If, however, we emphasize the fact that each one is grouped with many others of the same kind, then we give prominence to the concept of attraction (*die Attraktion*) which constitutes their common being.

The concept of the reciprocal repulsion of the many is found in the ancient atomic philosophy. But there the common bond was regarded as that of chance. The falling into the same group of a number of atoms was considered to be wholly fortuitous. In the Hegelian system, on the contrary, the common bond which gives unity to

each and every system of being, and also unites all systems ultimately into one, is that incarnate reason, the universal creator and organizer.

If the one in any particular system of being is regarded as one merely of many where all are of the same kind, then the idea of quality becomes irrelevant, and may be regarded as suspended altogether. It is thus that the transition is made to the pure idea of quantity, in which the idea of the quality of a number of objects is wholly eliminated because reduced in every case to a dead level of identity.

Hegel's development of being may be briefly summarized as consisting of three stages, and three corresponding processes. The three stages are : —

1. Indeterminate being (*Seyn*).
2. Determinate being (*Daseyn*).
3. Being-for-self (*Fürsichseyn*).

The three corresponding processes are : —

1. Becoming (*Werden*).
2. Alteration (*Veränderung*).
3. Attraction and repulsion (*Attraktion und Repulsion*).

CHAPTER VIII

QUANTITY

THE idea of quantity, as we have seen, is that aspect of mere being from which the idea of all quality has been eliminated. The category of quantity is described by Hegel from three points of view: —

1. Quantity in general (*die Quantität*).
2. Determinate quantity (*das Quantum*).
3. Degree (*der Grad*).

It will be seen in the following exposition that these three aspects of quantity correspond to the three general divisions of quality: —

1. Being in general.
2. Determinate being.
3. Self-determined being.

As regards quantity in general, it may be remarked as a matter of terminology that Hegel applies the term magnitude (*die Grösse*) to determinate quantity rather than to the general notion of quantity. Quantity in general, however, may be considered apart from any refer-

ence to definite magnitude, just as quality in general was considered apart from any reference to specific qualities. While quantity in general may be regarded by itself as an essential moment in the evolution of the universal reason, it must not, however, be regarded as an exclusive category. Hegel has no sympathy with the tendency to reduce all phenomena of the universe to a quantitative basis, including even the phenomena of mind. He insists that a purely mechanical view of the universe, which such a quantitative reduction of all things implies, is by no means a complete or comprehensive view. The mechanical view may seem to suffice in its application to the inorganic world, but it falls short of an adequate explanation when we come to the organic world, and especially when we seek to explain the phenomena of free activity in the sphere of mind.

Inasmuch as the category of quantity is to be regarded as a necessary evolution from the category of being, and also marks a definite characteristic of being, it may be regarded from this point of view, according to the general method of Hegel, as an attribute of the Absolute in one of its manifold phases of manifestation. To define the Absolute merely as quantity would

represent, of course, a very one-sided and exceedingly limited conception ; but if, on the other hand, it were omitted altogether, the idea of the Absolute would prove wanting so far forth in an essential element of its characterization.

When we come to a more specific inquiry as to the nature of our idea of quantity, we find that it may be conceived from two points of view. Quantity may be either continuous (*kontinuïrlich*) or discrete (*diskret*). If we regard quantity as an aggregate of many parts, — or, as it may be put, the one which is composed of the many, — and if, moreover, we emphasize the unity into which the many blend, then we have quantity represented as continuous. If, on the other hand, we discount, as it were, in our thought the connecting bond, and emphasize the isolation and reciprocal exclusiveness attaching to the several parts, then quantity will appear as discrete. A line may be taken as an example of continuous quantity. On the other hand, a bushel of apples would be considered as a discrete quantity. The terms, however, “continuous” and “discrete,” are not mutually exclusive. Quite in keeping with the Hegelian point of view, either one of these terms apart from the other, and excluding the other, represents a

mere abstraction, — that is, a partial and therefore misleading conception. Truth is found always in the unity of the two. Every continuous quantity is in a sense discrete ; and in like manner every discrete quantity is continuous. A line may be regarded as discrete in the sense that it may be viewed as composed of an indefinite number of separate points, or divided into several distinct sections, each containing a definite number of centimetres or millimetres. And on the other hand, a bushel of apples may be regarded as a continuous quantity when, for instance, we compare the price of apples per bushel this year with that of last year. Here the unit which is emphasized is the bushel and not the single apple. The bushel regarded as a whole from this point of view represents therefore a continuous quantity. The Kantian antinomy in reference to space and time, or the constitution of matter, may be resolved by an application of these considerations. The truth is, that regarded as continuous magnitudes they are indefinitely divisible, but regarded as discrete magnitudes they are not indefinitely divisible. The seeming contradiction arises from a difference in point of view.

When we come to the idea of definite quan-

tity, or quantum, as Hegel styles it, we find that it is an idea which arises necessarily in answer to the question, How much? It bears the same relation to quantity in general that definite being does to being in general. Every quantum, or definite magnitude, may be conceived, moreover, as composed of a number of parts which are themselves quanta of lesser magnitude. Every definite magnitude, regarded as distinct from all others, forms a unity, a closed sphere, as it were, apart and by itself, but subjected to further analysis within its own limits; it is a manifold made up of its constituent parts. From these considerations it will be seen that the idea of quantum involves that of number. For number may be regarded as a concept which comprehends the two momenta or factors which are found in the idea of quantum. These two factors are the idea of a sum or total, which corresponds to that of a discrete quantity, and the idea of unity, which corresponds to that of a continuous quantity. Out of the various combinations and reciprocal relations of these two factors we may develop the various modes of reckoning which obtain in arithmetic. We may regard all arithmetical operations as based upon the principle of putting numbers in the

relation of unity, and sum or total amount; and of establishing the equality of these two functions.

Thus the simplest arithmetical operation is that of counting. This may be defined as a process which aims to construct an aggregate or sum total by putting together the separate units, one after another. In this operation each unit ranks the same in value as every other. There is no distinction of any kind between them. But it is possible to conceive each unit in question as possessing a value different from every other, — that is, each unit may be conceived as itself an aggregate or sum, possessing varying values, as 3, 7, 9, 4, etc. When we come to enumerate these sums in order to find the total value in simple units, we are performing the operation of addition.

In multiplication each unit is also an aggregate, but they are all alike and do not vary in value, whereas in addition they are ordinarily unlike. However, multiplication may be represented as a kind of addition. We may have the following aggregates to count: 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8; and we may do this by addition, regarding it merely as a special case in which the aggregates are all alike. Or we can obtain the result

directly by taking eight seven times, which is the process of multiplication. In multiplication it is a matter of indifference as to which of the two factors we regard as the aggregate and which the unit.

The process of raising a number to a power is a special case of multiplication. To raise any number to the second power, for instance, the aggregate is taken as many times as it itself contains simple units. Thus 8^2 is 8 times 8, — that is, 8 taken 8 times. In such a process there is represented the equality of sum total and unity. To raise a number to a higher power requires only a continued repetition of the process.

Addition, multiplication, and the raising to a power give an exhaustive division of the various modes of arithmetical calculation. The three other processes of subtraction, division, and taking the root of a number do not represent distinct types of arithmetical operations, but are to be regarded merely in the light of inverse operations respectively to addition, multiplication, and the raising to a required power.

As in reference to quantity in general we have found the distinction obtaining between continuous and discrete magnitudes, so in reference

to quantum or determinate quantity, there is a similar distinction expressed by the opposite terms of extensive and intensive quantity. Extensive magnitude corresponds to the idea of continuous quantity and intensive magnitude to that of discrete. This correspondence will be seen through the following considerations. Definite magnitude is such only as it possesses a definite quantitative limit. If the magnitude is regarded as a continuous quantity, then the limit is marked simply by the contour of the magnitude itself, — that is, its boundary line of definition. Moreover, from this point of view the separate identity of each part is lost because merged in the whole, which is one and not many, and all included within one and the same limit of circumscription. But if the magnitude is regarded as discrete, then any one of the distinct parts by its position may mark a definite limit. Thus, when we take the temperature of any body, it is the limiting degree which is read off as significant. The quantity of heat which is thus measured is given in terms of intensity or degree (*der Grad*).

In reference to the intensity of quantitative determination, the various discrete units may be regarded as arranged in order so as to form a

series; they therefore do not all count alike. There will always be one which, by its position in the series, will mark the limit, and therefore have a particular significance attaching to it. And as such a series rises or falls, proceeds forwards or backwards, as the case may be, the different units marking the varying limit in every case will indicate corresponding grades of intensity.

As a continuous quantity may be regarded as discrete, so also an extensive magnitude may be conceived as intensive, and an intensive magnitude as extensive. Thus, for instance, the intensity of heat may have an extensive significance as interpreted by the height of the column of mercury. This marks the extent which the mercury, as a whole, has risen in the tube. Hegel illustrates this feature of a change from an intensive to an extensive point of view as seen in the sphere of mind. He draws attention to the fact that a man who has accumulated a certain intensity of mental power is, at the same time, the man who touches life on many sides, so that his capacities have evidently an extensive manifestation as well. This application is somewhat fanciful, it would seem, and should be taken in a figurative rather than in a literal

sense, which, however, Hegel himself evidently does not do.

Hegel again enters a protest against those who would subordinate the idea of intensive magnitude to a mere form of extensive magnitude. He insists that while they are most intimately correlated in thought, nevertheless there is a real distinction between the two that should not be overlooked. The idea of intensity contains an element which is wholly lacking in the bare idea of extension. This, however, must not be interpreted as signifying that the idea of an intensive magnitude is wholly independent of that of extensive magnitude. The one, however, must not be so merged in the other as to lose its individual characteristics completely.

The very concept of quantity itself is such that the limit which is set to it so as to render its quantity a definite amount, or a definite degree of intensity according to the point of view, must be conceived as varying indefinitely without affecting the nature or quality of the magnitude in question. The limit which determines the amount or degree is purely an external determination, and the concept of quantity carries with it the idea of the possibility of pushing out and beyond itself indefinitely.

There is no natural or necessary restriction upon a quantitative limit, and therefore the continuous breaking down in our thought of any assigned limit necessitates the conception of an infinite quantitative progression. In this connection Hegel quotes Zeno, who has put this idea in an enigmatical form: "It is the same to say a thing once, and to say it forever."

Such an infinite series gives, however, a false idea of the true significance of infinity. It is false for the same reason that the qualitatively infinite progression is false, as we have already seen. It is what Spinoza calls the imaginary infinity. As an instance of this conception, Hegel quotes the lines of Haller¹:—

"Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen
Gebirge Millionen auf,
Ich setze Zeit auf Zeit
Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf,
Und wenn ich von der grausen Höh'
Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir seh',
Ist alle Macht der Zahl
Vermehrt zu Tausendmal,
Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir."²

¹ Hegel's *Werke*, VI, § 104.

² I pile up numbers immense, mountains of millions. I add time to time, and world to world. And when I turn from the awful height with reeling brain and look towards Thee, all the power of number increased a thousand fold is not yet one part of Thee.

In commenting upon this passage, Hegel remarks: "The same poet, however, well adds to that description of the false infinity the closing line

'Ich zieh sie ab, und du liegest ganz vor mir.'¹

This means that the true infinite is not to be regarded merely as another world which transcends the finite; and if we are ever to appreciate its significance, we must disabuse our minds of all notions of a *progressus in infinitum*.²

The doctrine of number, as is well known, was magnified by the ancient Pythagoreans into a complete system of philosophy. While in that school there was an undue exaggeration of the concept of number as expressing the essence of being, it must not be overlooked, however, that Pythagoras touched upon an important truth in his teaching when he insisted that there are certain states of things, certain phenomena of nature, the character of which seem to vary according to a scale of number relations. This may be illustrated in the variations in tone and harmony which, according to common tradition, first suggested to Pythagoras the conception of the essence of all things as number.

¹ These I sweep away, and Thou liest fully revealed before me.

² § 104.

Hegel, according to his general method, adopts the teachings of this school not in the light of a complete system of philosophy, but merely as one phase among many in the development of the universal reason. The Pythagorean doctrine corresponds roughly, at least, with Hegel's conception of quantitative relation, which idea marks a natural transition to the third division of quantity, known as measure.

Quantitative relation (*das quantitative Verhältniss*) may be defined as that relation which obtains between numbers of such a nature that the numbers themselves may vary indefinitely, provided only the relation itself remains constant. Thus the relation of 2:4 is the same as that of 3:6. In the midst, therefore, of varying quantities, there is a constant which retains its own specific character through a process that may be indefinitely continued without limit. This idea of certain constant features in the midst of quantitative variation would seem to indicate that this constant value has the force of a qualitative character; for, as we have found, it is the quality which remains unchanged in the midst of quantitative alteration. Thus in pushing forward the concept of quantity in the development of all its possible

implications, we find between coincident alterations in magnitudes which form a ratio a constant relation obtaining of such a nature that the concept of quantity will not explain it satisfactorily, and we fall back again upon the idea of quality in order to account for it. Thus the idea of quality was found to be partial, and when developed to its utmost limit, carried our thought over into the sphere of quantity. Then the idea of quantity when fully developed brought us back again to that of quality. Is the movement of thought only a circle that merely brings us back to the starting-point? According to Hegel's method, the incompleteness of thought at this stage is overcome by the dialectic process which combines these two ideas of quality and of quantity into one complete relation representing an advanced and higher point of view. This relation Hegel calls that of qualitative quantity, or of measure (*das Maass*). This is the third and last stage in the development of the idea of quantity, and represents, as Hegel insists, both the unity and the truth of quality and of quantity combined.

CHAPTER IX

MEASURE

WE have seen how the category of being, when allowed to develop fully its own inherent nature, discloses the phases of quantity and of quality. There now remains to be considered the relation which obtains between quantity and quality, and which in itself constitutes a distinct category. It is an extremely abstract view of quantity which regards it as having no qualitative significance whatsoever. In the concrete which embraces the totality of elements which constitute the significance of a concept, there are some quantitative differences at least which must be regarded as having marked qualitative equivalents. For instance, the general size of any given species of animals is intimately associated with the complex of properties which form its qualitative determinants. This is true to such an extent that the element of magnitude ranks in itself as a qualitative characteristic. For instance, the size of

an elephant is regarded as one of its determining qualitative marks; so also the size of a mouse is regarded as one of its essential properties. The idea of an elephant having the dimensions of a mouse, or a mouse bulking large as an elephant, would do violence to the essential features which constitute the concepts of these animals.

There is, of course, a margin of variation which is allowable, so that the difference in size within certain limits is to be regarded as an accidental property of an animal, having no specific significance whatsoever. Beyond certain well-defined limits, however, this is not the case.

This relation of quantity to quality, which indicates for every quantitative change a corresponding qualitative value, Hegel calls measure (*das Maass*). The term is used in almost the same sense as the word standard, or type. To translate *das Maass* literally as measure does not convey the full significance of the term as it is used by Hegel. It would be better to translate it as the standard measure, or type. Illustrations of its meaning in the Hegelian sense are found throughout the organic world where a definite species is associated with a typical or a standard size. It finds abundant illustration

also in the inorganic world wherein each element possesses its own definite specific gravity, so that the quantitative coefficient becomes in each case a distinctive mark of a definite group of correlated qualities which are constantly present with it. Thus, for instance, the specific gravity of gold is inseparably associated with all the essential properties of gold which give it the specific quality by virtue of which it is constituted as it is. The illustration which is the most perfect is found in the scale of relative differences in the two corresponding series, — on the one hand the variation in lengths of the chords in a musical instrument, and on the other the accompanying variation in differences of tone. The former represent purely quantitative differences, and the latter, qualitative. Between them there exists an exact correspondence. This may be further illustrated by the correlation which obtains between the wavelengths of light, and the corresponding differences in color. All these illustrations emphasize the essential relation which exists between a variation in quantity and the corresponding variation in quality.

In accordance with Hegel's general method of procedure, it will be remembered, every

phase in the progressive development of being is to be regarded as a manifestation of one of the various attributes of the Absolute. In this connection, therefore, the Absolute, or God, may be defined as *das Maass*, — that is, He is the absolute standard of measure, the ideal, or type, of all creation. This signifies that God must contain within His own nature the norm or standard of all things. This is essentially in accord with the Hebrew conception of God as One who has appointed to everything its proper bound and typical form, — to the sea, and land, to the rivers and mountains, to plants and animals, and also to man himself. In his description of wisdom, Job exclaims: —

“God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the place thereof.

For he looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven;

To make the weight for the winds; and he weigheth the waters by measure.

When he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder:

Then did he see it, and declare it; he prepared it, yea, and searched it out.” ⁽¹⁾

Moreover, in the religion of the Greeks this idea is frequently expressed, especially in the

¹ Chapter XXVIII. vv. 23 ff.

/ doctrine of Nemesis, as Hegel points out. According to this conception there is a natural bound to all things, to riches and honor, to power and pleasure, even to pain ; and when the definite measure allotted to each is exceeded, there must inevitably follow its corresponding opposite. It is characteristic of Hegel's general method in this connection to gather from the ancient forms of religion, both an illustration and at the same time a justification of his own point of view. The religious and philosophical teachers of all ages have in Hegel's opinion touched upon important truths which it is his peculiar task to gather together in the unity of a philosophical system that will embrace them all.

Moreover, since there is some form and size which may be regarded as the standard or type for any given species, to take an illustration from the organic world, then this type may be departed from within certain limits without affecting the integrity of the species, as has already been pointed out. Variations from the type within such limits are to be regarded merely as natural departures from what Hegel calls the rule. The term "rule" (*die Regel*) is used to denote the standard form or size in reference to any given class. It has the same significance, in

the Hegelian usage, as the term "mode," which is employed to signify the prevailing type in curves showing the relative distribution of variations, the curve itself indicating the manner in which the variations in question are distributed about the type itself. In these curves the mode is represented by the maximum ordinate, the varying lengths of the other ordinates indicating the relative number of cases corresponding to the different variations.

It is a significant fact, however, that the range of possible deviation from the prevailing type is necessarily limited, so that if it is departed from in any way the type itself is so far changed as to constitute an essentially new type, or a distinct species. It appears, therefore, that there may be a continued alteration of quantity by increasing or decreasing the given magnitude up to a certain definite limit, and the various changes will have no appreciable effect upon the corresponding quality. Thus, while the quantity may be regarded as a variable, the quality nevertheless remains a constant. But in this process of variation some point must always be reached at which a quantitative change begins to produce a qualitative change as well. Hegel illustrates this by calling attention to the fact

that the temperature of water seems to be quite independent of its qualitative state of liquidity, but as we increase the temperature through a wide range of variation there nevertheless is reached finally a degree of heat which marks a decided qualitative change as the liquid becomes transformed into vapor; and at the other limit, where the freezing-point is reached, the liquid of course changes into the solid state. Between these limits the various changes of temperature seem to have no qualitative significance whatsoever; and, as Hegel remarks, in the approach toward either limit, the advance is made without any accompanying circumstances to anticipate it as far as our observation goes, so that the point which marks the beginnings of a corresponding qualitative change is reached, as it were, by stealth. The illustration of Hegel's in reference to the variations in the temperature of water may be further supplemented in the following manner, which may possibly shed some additional light upon Hegel's exposition. It is a well-known phenomenon of physics that before reaching the freezing-point, at 32° F, the decreasing temperature causes a proportional decrease of bulk in the water. This decrease in bulk is continuous to about 39°. At this

point, however, a decided change is noticeable, for the bulk of water now begins to expand instead of contracting as before, and so continues until the fluid passes into the solid state at the freezing-point. This change seems to be a warning note which is sounded to indicate that even a more radical change may be anticipated.

The points which mark in a series of continuous changes the beginnings of a qualitative corresponding to a quantitative difference, Hegel calls the "nodes," or "nodal points," — a term which he has borrowed from astronomy. The line which may be conceived as indicating the continuous changes which may occur between these points without effecting any qualitative difference he calls, "the line of nodes." To understand this reference, it may be well to give the technical definition of a node, which Hegel, of course, has adapted to his purposes. The node as used in astronomy is one of the points at which any celestial orbit cuts the plane of the ecliptic, the latter being a great circle of the heavens in the plane of the earth's orbit. The node, therefore, is a point having a double significance by virtue of its being the intersecting point of two circles, and therefore it may be conceived first as belonging to one and then

to the other. This idea of a point having a twofold significance, Hegel has seized in order to indicate that particular point in quantitative variation which has at the same time a qualitative significance as well. Such a point possesses the combined characteristics which constitute both its qualitative and its quantitative features, just as a point which is common to two circles possesses the characteristic features of each. Between these nodes, however, or beyond them in either direction, the various quantitative differences seem to have no significance whatsoever as far as producing any change of definite qualitative nature. Whenever, therefore, quantitative changes possess no qualitative significance, they cannot be regarded as constituting any standard or type of measure, for the magnitude which they represent has no quality or complex of qualities corresponding to it. Such magnitudes Hegel designates as measureless (*Maasslos*),—that is, lacking the essential characteristics of a standard or a type. Thus it will be seen that the concept of quantity in itself does not determine qualitative differences, inasmuch as some magnitudes have no corresponding qualitative characteristics at all. The category of

quantity, therefore, proves unsatisfactory as an ultimate explanation of qualitative differences. Inasmuch as it falls, as it were, of its own weight, it seems to necessitate by its very inefficiency some additional category which can satisfactorily explain the relation between quantitative and qualitative variations.

A similar situation has developed at every stage of progress in the evolution of the thought processes from the simplest beginnings in mere being to the present condition under discussion. Throughout, each category that has been reached in the progress of thought has proved insufficient to explain itself and all which have gone before, and has laid upon thought the necessity of proceeding to some further stage of development in order to supply its defects and complete its meaning. This is essentially the Hegelian dialectic movement of thought.

We have seen that the idea of mere being carried with it the necessary implication of a complex system of attributes designated as the quality of determinate being.

This concept in turn has been found to necessitate the idea of oneness of being,—that is, being-for-self, an individual separate in a

sense from all others. This idea of the one, the individual, was then found to suggest by necessary implication the idea of the many, — a purely quantitative concept.

Starting then, with the idea of quantity, its highest expression was reached when it was regarded as correlated with the idea of quality. Thus the quantity-quality relation which Hegel calls measure, or better the standard measure, would seem to be the consummation of the entire process.


The relation however being unstable, — that is, existing for certain quantitative values and not existing for others, — the thought is consequently constrained by the very nature of its own processes and its own demands to press onward to a further stage of development, and to ask the question, What is it which underlies these various relations of quantity to quality, rendering them significant at certain coincidental points, the 'nodes' according to Hegel, and at others attaching to them no significance whatsoever? This category of a standard measure is by its very limitations a challenge to thought, that it produce something of a more ultimate nature as its underlying ground. That which is demanded is some satisfactory explana-

tion of the various distinct types which are found in nature, each determined according to its own definite standard of measure.

The most complete expression of the category of being, and the final term in the development of that idea, the concept of standard measure, has been found wholly insufficient to rank as a self-contained and self-explaining category. This last term, therefore, can no longer be regarded as a last term; it suggests rather additional terms in the process of development which will form its natural complement and explanation.

The immediately complementary term in the line of the logical unfolding of the universal reason is that of essence (*das Wesen*), which forms the second main division of the *Logic*. The category of essence is to be regarded as the ground which underlies the various changes which characterize the progressive development of the idea of being. What being is in its essence determines its qualitative characteristics and correlates them with certain definite quantitative changes by the fundamental law of its own nature. The magnitude does not determine the quality, nor does the quality determine the magnitude, but the roots, both of the quan-

titative and qualitative elements in being, lie deeply concealed in the fundamental essence. Hegel expresses this in his epigrammatic manner, "Essence is the truth of being."



PART II

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

Diess ist also überhaupt der Unterschied der Formen des Seyns und des Wesens. Im Seyn ist Alles unmittelbar, im Wesen dagegen ist Alles relativ. Der Standpunkt des Wesens ist überhaupt der Standpunkt der Reflexion. — HEGEL.

PART II

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

CHAPTER X

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES

THE doctrine of essence (*Die Lehre vom Wesen*) forms the second part of the *Logic*. The transition from the concept of being to that of essence marks a decided advance in thought, and involves the introduction of several new ideas. Although these ideas have not been explicitly manifest in the category of simple being, they have been, nevertheless, implicitly present, so that their appearance at the beginning of the exposition as to the nature of essence is to be regarded as the developed expression of a potential factor already present in the preceding stage of being.

The concepts which form the constituent elements in the category of essence are as follows:—

(1) Mediation; (2) Negation; (3) Reflection; (4) Permanence; (5) Systemic integration.

We will discuss these in their order. First as to the idea of mediation, which we have already referred to in a previous chapter. We found that Hegel regards mere being as immediate (*unmittelbar*),—that is, as something which is unaccounted for, that which is to be accepted as a fact, but no reason assigned to it, and not referred to any other thing as its explanation, or by which it might be conceived as being brought about by any process whatsoever.

If, however, a *raison d'être* is given for any determinate being, this at once connects the being in question with its underlying ground, and this is in itself a process of mediation. It is that by which something comes to be what it is (*vermittelt*). Being cannot explain itself, and although we come to accept as a matter of course the various attributes of being, as quantity, quality, degree, measure, etc., nevertheless they are not sufficient to explain or justify themselves. Being, pure and simple, bears upon its face the stamp of derivation. It comes from something more fundamental than itself. It has had an origin, a life history, a

destiny, all of which lie concealed. To disclose these sources and the processes depending upon them is the office of mediation ; and when mediation has completely fulfilled its offices, the true essence of being will stand revealed. The difference between mediate and immediate knowledge may be more explicitly exhibited by noting the different adjectives which Hegel employs in describing the two concepts.

While the immediate knowledge is unrelated, mediate knowledge is related.

The immediate is simply given ; the mediate is explained.

The immediate is elementary ; the mediate is developed.

The immediate marks the beginning of knowledge ; the mediate its development and resulting product.

In the next place, the idea of essence implies the negation of being. Hegel, in the opening paragraph upon the doctrine of essence, defines his conception of essence as "being coming into mediation with itself through the negation of itself."¹ The technical terms which this definition contains may be elucidated by the following considerations. While the idea of being may at

¹ § 112.

first seem to be quite independent and immediate, yet as we have seen in the examination of the necessary relations and connections which such an idea involves, it is found to be dependent upon something else out of which it has arisen, and by which the integrity of its composition is conserved. This is in itself a process of mediation, and this is what Hegel means by the phrase that "being comes into mediation with itself." The category of being, therefore, regarded as self-constituted and self-sufficient falls to the ground. It cannot bear its own weight, and thus undermines itself. This is the meaning of the phrase that the idea of being contains the "negation of itself." Nevertheless, while dying as an independent, immediate, self-contained form, it regains another life in the underlying ground to which it is necessarily referred and by which it becomes specifically determined. In its essence, being — that is, mere being, as such as Hegel puts it — is *aufgehoben*. This is a very significant word in the Hegelian terminology and cannot be adequately translated by any one English word, for it conveys three distinct ideas which must be taken together in order to express its full significance. The verb *aufheben* possesses the threefold mean-

ing with Hegel, — to destroy, to re-create in a new form, and at the same time to elevate. To speak of anything as *aufgehoben* means that it disappears in its given form, but that it reappears in a new form, and that the new form always represents a higher point of view and a substantial progress in thought. The one single English word which comes nearest to expressing this meaning is the word transmute. When Hegel affirms that in essence being is *aufgehoben*, he means that it has lost its independence only to find it again in a dependence which has this peculiar characteristic, that it is not subordinated to anything which is foreign to its own notion or idea, but which is at the last analysis one with the initial being itself. That which being rests upon as its basis must be a part of being itself; otherwise the relation would be external and valueless. While, therefore, the independence of being is in a sense denied, it is in another and a higher sense reaffirmed. The primary denial is a negation: the reaffirmation is brought about by the negation of the former negation. This last is the absolute negation, as Hegel calls it, which is equivalent always to an affirmation. The independence of being which is first denied gives way to a

dependence, but this in turn is denied, because when it is analyzed it is found to be in reality a dependence of being upon its own ground, which is equivalent to a self-dependence; and a self-dependence is the same as independence. Thus this second negation is a reassertion of the original independence; but, in the process of thought through which it has passed, it has acquired a richer and fuller significance; for it is an independence which has been fully justified.

The process of negation with Hegel, it must be remembered, is never extinction or annihilation: it is only a sublimation into a higher form; and the absorption of being in essence is one of the best illustrations of the process of negation, which plays such an important and conspicuous rôle in the Hegelian dialectic. It is in this way that negation is to be regarded as a means of more precise characterization and determination in the progressive development of thought. The nature of negation as a process may be summed up most completely in the term *aufheben*, — the overthrowing, and the restoring upon a higher plane, as has already been described.

The category of reflection presents a point of view from which the doctrine of essence may

be best understood and appreciated. This has been referred to in a previous chapter, but is so important an idea in the general scheme of Hegel that an additional reference may not be out of place at this stage of the exposition. Being is regarded by Hegel as a category which is not self-illuminating. It receives its light from something else which is its ground. The idea of expressing this thought by the term reflection was suggested to Hegel through an analogy with the well-known physical phenomenon of reflection. As a substantial form before a glass is seen through reflection as an image of itself, so being may be regarded as the reflection of that which is its ground. The image in the glass has an immediate reality in a certain sense, but as regards its self-determination it is illusory. Its reality is due to its reflection of the object to which it stands related, and to which it must be referred in order to explain and to justify its own being. Thus the ground of being, and the being as manifested, are related to each other as substance and show,—the underlying essence and the reflected appearance. There are two phrases which are used frequently by Hegel in this connection, and their meaning should be precisely

determined. They are the phrases *Reflexion-in-sich* and *Reflexion-in-Anderes*. The significance of these phrases will always be brought out clearly in their Hegelian usage, if we translate the former as that which shines in its own light, the latter as that which shines in the light of another.

We may say, therefore, that the various attributes of being do not shine in their own light, but in the light of some other, which forms their necessary complement, and constitutes their essence or substantial ground.

Essence is, moreover, to be distinguished from mere being, in that it is the permanent basis (*das Bleibende*), which underlies that which is only the transient manifestation. The several changes which the dialectic movement has been seen to produce among the attributes of being allow no resting-place for our thought. We pass from quality to quantity, and from quantity back again to a quality which possesses at this stage of development the additional characteristic of being quantitatively determined; and thence on to a quantitative determination which has no qualitative significance whatsoever, and through it all the idea of being is not able to show any basis of a per-

manent nature which it can call its own. Nevertheless, the nature of thought is such that we are constrained to demand some permanent underlying ground to which these various changes may be referred. It is in the idea of essence, the necessary complement of being, that we find the solid foundation which underlies and supports all the changing manifestations of being. While everything may be regarded, according to Heraclitus, as ceaselessly changing, yet nevertheless something remains. That which remains, regarded as a constant, is in itself the explanation of all change, and through which all variation may be reduced to law and uniformity. The significance of the variable lies in the fact that it may be referred to some underlying constant. Where there is no constant, variables possess no significance.

The idea of permanency which thus characterizes essence is regarded by Hegel as having an etymological warrant. Being is the German *Seyn*, and essence, or its German equivalent *Wesen*, is the same as past being, that is *vergangen Seyn*, as seen in the past participle *gewesen*. This signifies that whatever has being, is thus declared to be by virtue of that which has been before, and which is therefore related

to it as its *Wesen*, or *ground*. The priority which seems to be expressed in the *Wesen* is, however, not asserted as a priority in time necessarily ; it is merely a logical priority. The past, that which has been before, and which is to be regarded as the ground or essence of that which is, of being, is not past in the sense of having been set aside, or of disappearing ; it is rather to be regarded as conserved, and living again in the present being. The past as the logical prius of being is therefore merely *aufgehoben*, as Hegel would express it, — past and yet perduring.

Hegel's derivation of the word *Wesen*, and by this means establishing its significance, furnishes a characteristic illustration of his general habit of thought, and his conviction that the most valuable thoughts of mankind are often found crystallized in language. As to the suggestiveness of language in this particular, Hegel says: "Language has compressed within it what man has made his own ; and what he has fashioned and expressed in speech contains, either embedded or elaborated, a category : so natural does logic come to him, or rather it is his own very nature."¹

¹ Werke, I, 10 f.

Essence is to be regarded, moreover, as a constituted system of relations. It is a complex consisting of a manifold of various elements which are throughout interrelated, and coördinated. This conception of essence also appears in the German, as seen in such words as *das Zeitungswesen*, the newspaper system; *das Postwesen*, the postal system; *das Steuerwesen*, the revenue system. We have a similar usage in our phrase, the railway system. In such a connection the word *Wesen*, or essence, emphasizes the truth that everything which is, which has being, must be referred to its appropriate place in the particular system to which it belongs and in which is to be found its true ground and proper explanation, and that, moreover, there is no kind of being in the universe which is unrelated to others, or which can remain apart and by itself.

This idea of the ground of being conceived as a system of coördinated and necessarily related elements is in complete accord with the modern theory of logic, which lays special emphasis upon the order and uniformity which characterizes the world of knowledge and the systematic relation which every element must sustain to every other and to the whole.¹ These,

¹ Hibben's *Inductive Logic*, p. 7 f.

then, are the chief factors, or, as Hegel would call them, moments which constitute the concept of essence,—the ideas of mediation, negation, reflection, permanency, and systemic integration.

It is in keeping with Hegel's general point of view that he should define the Absolute as essence. Although we speak of finite essences such as man, nevertheless the term itself in the Hegelian system implies that we have passed beyond finitude, and that there is at the last analysis one supreme essence which is the true infinite and which embraces all other so-called essences within itself. Therefore, according to this conception, all else outside of the Absolute, outside of God, would possess no essentiality. God is not to be regarded merely as a being among many others, or as an essence, even the highest. He is preëminently the being and the essence underlying all others. Hegel draws special attention, however, to the truth that the nature of God is by no means exhausted in the ascription to Him of essence. If God is regarded as essence only, His universal and irresistible power is thereby assured, but His other attributes are overlooked. He is merely the Lord, God Almighty, and his more personal

relations to the world in general, and to man in particular, are not recognized in such a definition. This may be said to be the common defect in the Mohammedan and Jewish religions alike, in which the creator is removed by an impassable gulf from the creature.¹

In the subsequent development of the dialectic movement it will be seen that the category of essence will, by its limitations, necessitate the complementary and final category of the notion, or universal reason. The conception of God, therefore, as essence merely, must also be completed by the addition of those attributes which are involved in the category of the notion.

In the discussion of the category of essence Hegel divides the subject into three parts which will be treated in the three following chapters. They are : —

1. Essence as ground of existence (*Das Wesen als Grund der Existenz*).
2. Appearance (*Die Erscheinung*).
3. Actuality (*Die Wirklichkeit*).

¹ Caird's *Evolution of Religion*.

CHAPTER XI

ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE

THE first aspect under which Hegel treats the category of essence is that of the ground of existence. The conception of the ground of existence implies the idea of something which is fundamental and permanent. We find ourselves in a world of changing phenomena. The elements which form their constituent parts are indefinitely various, and it is a natural impulse to seek for some constant factor that will give determinateness to the great world problem. Hegel's view is that every phenomenon in the universe is the manifestation of its own underlying ground, and that on this account it preserves always its identity with itself; also that the phenomenal appearance must be regarded merely as a reflection of the underlying essence, and that the fundamental law of identity connects essence and appearance as one and the same. The concept of identity is one of the so-called categories of reflection (*die Reflexionsbestim-*

mungen). As illustrations of his conception of identity, Hegel cites that central integrity of being which characterizes the Ego, the logical notion, and God. God is to be regarded as a self-identity, inasmuch as He is the all-embracing constant, the underlying essence, of whose eternal attributes all the glory and splendor of the world are reflections. Man in his conscious life as a personality, as an Ego, also represents a self-identity, inasmuch as his self-consciousness forms a centre to which all the variety of his experiences may be referred, and which forms the one constant factor in the equation of life. Man's activities are thus a reflection of his inner personality. This self-identity alone serves to differentiate man from the brute which possesses no such underlying ground of continuity, and lives in each present experience with no thought before or after. There is, moreover, in every logical notion, also a constant element, the universal, which maintains its identity in the midst of the indefinite variety of its particular manifestations. It is this constant element which forms the underlying ground of our thought processes and gives them definiteness and stability, and of which they are essentially the reflection.

The laws of formal logic which refer to the principle of identity, Hegel interprets in a manner quite in accord with his general method. These laws are commonly enunciated as follows:—

The law of identity proper states that everything must be identical with itself, or briefly expressed, $A=A$. The law of contradiction which is merely the negative expression of the law of identity is that A cannot be at the same time both A and not A .

As thus expressed, Hegel insists, these laws are merely products of the abstract understanding,—that is, a partial and one-sided view of things. As formulated above, these laws allow for no progress of thought whatsoever. They form hard and fast concepts corresponding to a world in which there can be no change, no interrelation of parts, no variety, and above all no life and thought. Instead of an abstract identity, Hegel insists upon a concrete identity,—that is, an identity which exists in the midst of a diversity and whose significance is due to the very diversity with which it is brought into contrast. The formula which expresses the law of identity is not $A=A$. It should be $A=A'$, that is, A differs from A' , and yet in spite of the difference

is one with it. The former equation, $A=A$, expresses merely an absolute identity which is wholly stripped of all differences, and as such is without significance and value.

Hegel defines identity, therefore, as an identity which reflects its own self in every changing variety of manifestation, and in such a manner that the reflection of self is different from it, and yet so intimately connected with it as to be the same. It is a paradox, as thus expressed; but with Hegel, truth lies in paradoxes. The idea of identity, if it is to possess any true significance, implies the correlated idea of difference; and in the progress of thought Hegel proceeds to discuss the concept of difference (*der Unterschied*) as the second category of reflection. The concept of difference appears in its most elemental form as immediate difference, for so Hegel characterizes it. By immediate difference he means mere diversity or variety (*die Verschiedenheit*). By diversity is meant that the various objects are each individually what they are, and that the only connection between them is an external one. When objects which are thus externally related are compared, they are identified to the extent of affirming their likeness, and failure to identify

signifies that their likeness is denied. At this point Hegel's conception of the relation between identity and difference is brought out most clearly, and considerable emphasis placed upon it. He asserts in his characteristically paradoxical manner that objects which are judged to be alike are such only by virtue of an underlying difference, and that objects which are judged to be unlike are such only by virtue of an underlying identity. The one idea reflects its light upon the other. Thus, if we say that a triangle differs from a tree, the assertion has no point, because the two objects compared have nothing in common by which they may be brought together in thought; their differences are not illuminated by the light of any identity. Or, if we should say a man is a man, the assertion would have no significance, for the identity which is stated is not illuminated by the light of any difference. But in this case suppose that the difference is suggested, as in the lines of Burns, —

“A man's a man for a' that.”

The thought has become significant, for the phrase “for a' that” introduces an implied difference, and this at once reflects its meaning

upon the original assertion, which without this contrast of thought would remain a meaningless repetition. Again, if we compare a beech and an oak, or electrical and steam power, the elements of likeness and unlikeness appear as significant because these objects represent concepts which are fundamentally connected as species of one and the same genus, so that the significance of the one is reflected in the light of the other. The difference in such a case which appears upon a background of an identity underlying all species of the same genus may be appropriately called specific difference, or difference of reflection (*Unterschied der Reflexion oder Unterschied an sich selbst, bestimmter Unterschied*). These differences occurring within the area of a common ground serve to separate and distinguish one species from all others. Cognate species admit of comparison, and their differences are always significant for this very reason, that however various the species may appear, they all belong to one common genus. Thus, the idea of mere diversity or variety has been found to develop into a difference which is significant only in the sphere of cognate species, — that is, determinate or specific difference.

There is still another aspect of the idea of difference, which is that of opposition (*der Gegensatz*). Here the kindred elements which enter into the same area of being are arrayed over against each other as positive and negative, and yet in the characteristically Hegelian manner of viewing such opposites, they are to be regarded as constituent elements in one and the same essence. Their opposition is stated only to be resolved in a higher unity according to the logical demands of the dialectic movement. The traditional law of logic known as that of the excluded middle (namely, that, of two opposite predicates, one, and one only, can be assigned to one and the same subject) must be regarded as true merely of the abstract understanding, but not of the reflective reason which regards all things in the concrete, — that is, in the full light of all that they are and of all that they imply. The truth of the idea of essence, according to Hegel, lies in the very opposition of the ideas of positive and negative which finds universal expression in the fact that everything in the universe has its significance only in its connection with that which confronts it as its other. For every positive there is a corresponding other which may be regarded as its

negative. The terms positive and negative do not express an absolute difference. The two at the last analysis are found to spring from the same root. The terms positive and negative may, under all circumstances, be transposed, and the meaning of the terms not in any sense altered. If we agree to designate distance east as +, then distance west would be designated as -; but we might as well have called distance west +, and distance east -. The significance of the terms employed lies wholly in their relation one to the other.

In the concept of opposition it must be distinctly understood that the term which is regarded as positive must not be conceived as opposed to any other whatsoever, but only by that which is peculiarly its other by virtue of some common basis underlying them both. According to a crude conception of the world, it would seem to be composed of a multitude of different objects, and each one wholly independent of every other. This is, however, a most erroneous conception. All elements in the great cosmic process must be regarded as parts of a systematized whole, so that each one is related to that which is peculiarly its other in one and the same underlying system. Thus the north

pole of the magnet is opposed to and yet connected with its south pole ; so also positive and negative electricity are essentially related ; every acid, moreover, is related to its corresponding base. The opposite may be defined, therefore, in general, as that which embraces both itself and its corresponding other within one and the same area of determination. If it is asked what this one and self-same area of determination may be, it would be characterized in the Hegelian terminology as the ground (*der Grund*).

3 This is the third of the categories of reflection, and forms the basis of the other two. Ground is defined by Hegel as the unity of identity and difference. It is the determining factor which renders objects sufficiently alike so that we can observe their differences, or sufficiently unlike so that we can note their resemblances. Thus, the idea of ground contains the truth of all that attaches to the complementary ideas of identity and difference. It is the unity underlying diversity ; it is the essence underlying specific difference ; it is the connecting bond which unites in one every element of being with its corresponding opposite, or other, within the area of a common system.

The logical maxim in reference to the con-

cept of ground is expressed in the fourth law of thought, which is associated with the name of Leibniz and is known as the law of sufficient reason, viz.: "Everything must have its sufficient ground." This means that the true and essential being of any definite object of thought is not to be conceived merely as a constant underlying element which always preserves its strict identity, nor is it to be conceived solely as the underlying source of variability which produces manifest differences; it is not merely positive, nor is it merely negative; it must be conceived as the synthesis of both these ideas, so that it has its being in its other, which, however, falls within the area of its own essence, and the two opposite thus become one. The relation may be illustrated by the analogy of two circles which lie wholly outside of each other and may therefore be regarded as opposites; but then we can conceive the two circles also as lying wholly within a third, and as such may be regarded as parts of one and the same surrounding area.

From another point of view, to use the Hegelian figure, essence as ground is not to be conceived as merely the abstract reflection-in-self (that is, as shining merely in its own light), but

as a reflection-in-its-other (that is, as receiving illumination from that which by the very nature of things stands over against it, and yet at the same time is essentially connected with it as its necessary complement). Every truth has its obverse side; and this must always be recognized if we are to attain knowledge in its fullness. The ground and whatever depends upon the ground must be regarded, therefore, as one and the same content, that is, the same matter of fact. The ground is a simple reference to itself; and what is grounded combines a reference to self with a reference to its other as well. Such a reference involves the idea of mediation, or relativity, that is, the process of explaining a given thing by a reference to something else with which it is essentially related.

The law of sufficient reason, therefore, asserts that all phenomena are so related in an all-embracing system that every phenomenon must be referred to some other as its sufficient ground. There is throughout a complete interrelation and interdependence. The essence of anything, from this point of view, cannot be revealed by showing merely what it is in itself, or, as Hegel would put it, in a purely abstract sense; but it must be shown what it is in reference to some-

thing else which is related to it as its other. To know a thing, therefore, we must know it in reference to all of the possible relations which it may sustain to all other things by which its own essential being is mediated. The most perfect example of what is meant by ground is found in the third part of the Hegelian system, the doctrine of the notion, or the active and universal reason. In such a conception, the idea of ground attains its complete expression inasmuch as it presents a content which is determined in itself and for itself, and hence may be regarded as self-originating and self-constructive. Such must be the essential ground of all things, some form of superintending reason which is freely working out its own purposes. This is the interpretation of Leibniz in reference to the meaning of sufficient ground. His conception especially emphasizes the function of final cause in reference to the connection of phenomena with their ground, and it is in the self-activity of the universal reason that the fullest scope is allowed to the play of final causes. But at the present stage in the development of the concept of ground it cannot be regarded as having as yet attained this capacity of determining itself. It is only

when we reach the third and final stage of the Hegelian system that the conception of a self-directing and self-determining ground emerges in its complete form. The idea of ground, therefore, at this stage of its development must not be regarded as the equivalent of final cause. It is not as yet consciously active, nor does it produce anything, working purposefully towards some definitely conceived end. Being, therefore, regarded as existence, is said by Hegel to issue or proceed from the ground. Hegel's conception of the term "existence" (*die Existenz*) he derives etymologically from the verb *existere*, the literal meaning of which is, to go forth, or to proceed. It would follow, therefore, that existence is merely that which proceeds from the ground. As such it may be regarded as having left the ground behind, just as the product as determinate being was said to leave behind the process of becoming which preceded it. The difference, however, between determinate being and existence is that the latter represents a far deeper insight and an advanced stage of development. Determinate being is accepted as immediately given, no inquiry being started as to its explanation or justification. Existence, on the other hand, is regarded as mediated, —

that is, as referred to its appropriate ground, and thus accounted for and duly explained. But although having issued from the ground, existence nevertheless contains its own ground within itself, so that the ground is not merely a phase in the process of mediation which has been passed through and completely left behind. The ground may properly be characterized as *aufgehoben*, — that is, suspended, and yet transmuted into the more developed form of existence. This relation may be illustrated in our modern conception of the conservation of energy, wherein any given energy seems to be destroyed only to reappear in some changed form, and although the ground of the result, nevertheless it preserves its own identity in the result itself. It is a false view of existence which regards it as related to its ground in an external manner, so that the world comes to be regarded as a collection of different objects, having each a separate existence, and related to each other as ground and consequence, wherein everything bears an aspect of relativity, conditioned by and conditioning something else. In such a world there would be nothing fundamental and final. Such a conception must be supplemented by the doctrine of the notion which, as will be

seen, supplies an unconditioned basis of rationality and purposiveness for all that is contingent and relative.

The existent conceived as having absorbed its ground within itself is in a sense relieved of all dependence upon anything outside of itself; for whatever seems to lie outside of itself, and yet is at the same time related to it, must be regarded as falling within the area of its own being. In other words, the circle which is drawn about any object which has existence, to mark the bounds of its being, is to be drawn with so generous a sweep as to embrace everything by which the being in question is itself mediated, or to which it is essentially related. Whatever exists in this sense, Hegel calls a thing (*das Ding*). He very stoutly disclaims, however, any reference in this connection to the Kantian thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*). He considers this phrase an empty and meaningless abstraction; for if we in imagination take away from a thing its specific characteristics and its relations to all other things, absolute emptiness remains. Hegel's interpretation of the significance of the phrase, the thing-in-itself, is quite characteristic. He maintains that the thing-in-itself, if it is to have any meaning at

all, signifies the thing, whatever it is, in its potential state, — its specific characteristics as yet undeveloped and unrealized. Thus, the child may be considered as the man-in-himself, in the sense that the child is indeed the father of the man. So also the patriarchal state takes rank as the state-in-itself. The germ of the seed is the plant-in-itself. In the developed form the thing is not merely the thing-in-itself, it is also the thing-for-itself (*das Ding für sich*), — that is, the thing whose specific qualities are no longer implicit, but have become explicit and fully developed.

The thing is variously characterized by Hegel :

- (1) As possessing properties.
- (2) As composed of material elements.
- (3) As a synthesis of matter and of form.

That which we call a thing is said to possess properties (*die Eigenschaften*). These properties have an internal connection. The various properties do not constitute a diversity among themselves such as that which has already been described, wherein the different terms have no connection with each other except that which is given by a comparison whose basis is external to them. The properties, however, which inhere in one and the same thing are brought

together by a bond which forms an internal connection and a stable centre of reference.

Again, a thing is composed of material elements (*die Materien*). The several properties of a thing may be regarded from one point of view as each inhering in its own material stuff and as therefore possessing a quasi independence of the thing itself. From such a point of view the thing is conceived as only the sum total of these various qualitative stuffs; so that we might describe a given thing as composed of so much color stuff, of so much saccharine stuff, vegetable stuff, etc. This seems to be a sufficiently correct account of certain inorganic things, especially chemical compounds. Common salt may be reduced to its constituent material elements, muriatic acid and soda. Gypsum may be reduced to sulphuric acid and calcium. Sulphuric acid may be reduced to sulphur, hydrogen, and oxygen. Such are the illustrations which Hegel cites in this connection.

But when we come to organic nature and the more complex forms of being, an analysis into the elemental parts falls far short of a true and adequate account of what a living organism essentially consists. All parts may be revealed; but the vital bond is lacking,—

that which gives form and specific characteristics to the material substratum, whatever it may be. It is the form as distinct from the matter of being. It would be well in this connection to remark in passing that the term form, as Hegel uses it, signifies not the completed form which might be conceived as imposed upon the thing, but rather the active formative principle which, like the architectonic principle of the plant, operates from within, producing out of its own material its particular form and qualities. To arrive at the true conception of the term thing, we must regard it as the synthesis of matter and of form. The thing is not a meeting-point merely of a number of related material elements, each of an ultimate nature; for the fundamental material elements out of which the various things in the universe are constituted Hegel conceives as reducible at the last analysis to one and the same kind of matter, and he insists that the specific differences of the various kinds of things arise from the variety of the formative principles or agencies at work upon and within this fundamental matter. To go so far, however, as to say that the form, or constructive principle, operates externally upon

the matter, or that the matter is independent of the form in any sense, would do violence to the Hegelian conception. Form and matter must not be separated in thought; it is in their unity that the thing has its essential being.

Form, or formative principle, operating therefore within matter, produces many varied results which appear as the essential properties of the thing. The totality of these properties represents the outshining of that which is the essence of the existing thing itself. This outshining of the characteristic features of a thing constitutes its so-called appearance, or its phenomenal manifestation (*die Erscheinung*).

CHAPTER XII

APPEARANCE, OR THE PHENOMENAL WORLD

HEGEL'S doctrine of the thing unites two seemingly contradictory points of view. On the one hand, a thing may be regarded as that which is one and individual, as we would say, a single thing. On the other, however, a thing may be regarded equally well as the summation of its many parts and properties, coexisting and correlated in one and the same unified system. The thing is thus both the one and the many, the unitary ground and the varied manifestation. Thus a plant is a single thing, but at the same time it is a complex of manifold elements, for into its composition are brought together light, heat, water, ammonia, potash, starch, and an indefinite number of material elements which are completely coördinated in the single system which constitutes the essential being and life of the plant. Such an assemblage of these various elements which compose the properties of the plant in their concrete manifestation, is the

shining forth of the inner essence which is centred in the one ground which forms their underlying unity. This shining forth of the inner nature in its outer manifestation Hegel calls *die Erscheinung*. It is the actual revelation of the essence of a thing. The sum of such manifestations gives us the world of phenomena. It is the world of scientific description and interpretation; it is the world of inductive investigation, of observation and experiment; it is the world of exact measurement and of computation, the world of relations and coördinations, the world of uniformity and of law.

The essence, according to Hegel, is constituted by its two principal moments or factors. The one is a reflection in itself (*Reflexion in sich*), and the other is a reflection in something else (*Reflexion in Anderes*). The one represents the central core and organizing principle of being; the other, all the correlated elements associated essentially with it. The reflection in itself refers, therefore, to that which constitutes the essence of a thing; for example, in the case of a plant, it is that which constitutes the plant a single thing, its central, unifying ground and architectonic principle. The reflection in something else refers to all the elements which con-

tribute to the being and life of the plant, and to all its several parts and its distinctive properties. It is this second moment of essence, the reflection or shining forth in something else, which constitutes its phenomenal manifestation.

It is to be observed, however, that there can be no real separation between the essence and external appearance, between the ground and the manifestation, between the noumenon and the phenomenon. Hegel defines the *Erscheinung*, therefore, as the essential manifestation. It is not the mere show (*der Schein*), as distinguished from the substance; it is not an unreality as distinguished from reality; but it is the complete revelation of all that is essentially immanent within. It is wholly misleading, therefore, to speak of *mere* phenomena as though phenomena were only the passing shadow with no corresponding substance underlying them. It will be seen in the subsequent development of the dialectic that every phenomenon in the universe represents an underlying reality, and so the category of phenomenal appearance (*die Erscheinung*), as will be seen, must lead of necessity to that of actuality (*die Wirklichkeit*), which forms the third stage in the development

of the category of essence; they are treated separately for convenience of exposition, but not in reality or in thought. Hegel's position in this connection is directly opposed to that of Kant. The latter insists that the phenomenal has a subjective significance merely, and he postulates an abstract something lying behind phenomena and beyond the range of our cognition, the indefinite *Ding an sich*. Hegel, on the contrary, maintains most stoutly that all phenomena of the universe are so bound up with their immanent essences, that in knowing the outer manifestation we must know also the essential ground. We cannot separate one from the other, and therefore to state that we know only phenomena does violence to the essential nature of the phenomena themselves.

The doctrine of the phenomenal as developed by Hegel may be presented in several pairs of correlative terms. It is due to the fundamental principle of reflection which lies at the base of the category of essence, that its phenomenal manifestations should fall together in pairs, representing each characteristic in its own light and also in the light reflected upon it by that with which it stands in essential relation as its other.

These pairs of correlatives are as follows:—

(1) Form and Content. (*Inhalt und Form.*)

(2) The Whole and its Parts. (*Das Ganze und die Theile.*)

(3) Force and its Phenomenal Manifestation (*Die Kraft und die Aeusserung.*)

(4) Inner and Outer. (*Das Innerliche und das Aeusserliche.*)

As to the relation of form to content, while we may refer all phenomena to the underlying material elements as the ground of their subsistence, yet a deeper insight recognizes a formative principle immanent in the matter, so that at the last analysis the phenomena of the world must be referred to the activity of the inner constructive principle resident within the material substratum of the phenomena themselves. It must be remembered that while this inner principle may be called simply the form of phenomena, it means that which produces the form rather than merely the form which is produced. We must not lose sight of Hegel's conception of the essence of phenomena, — that is, an active principle fundamentally dynamic in its nature. There are two senses, however, in which form is used according to Hegel, and which it is necessary to keep distinct in our

minds. It is used in the sense already noted as an immanent constructive principle such as the architectonic principle which fashions the plant after its kind. Form in this sense is synonymous with the phrase "the law of phenomena." It is used also in a different sense, however, as signifying that which in a negative manner determines from without the bounds of phenomenal manifestation, by assigning to them definite limits, such as the form, for instance, which is given to a casting by its enveloping mould.

It is in the former of these two senses, that of a dynamic constructive principle, that the term form must be conceived if it is to be regarded as one with the content. For instance, that which makes the plant what it is, the sum of its elements and its properties, its content in fact, cannot be separated from the immanent architectonic principle which forms and coördinates these elements into one complex whole. Phenomena are what they are by virtue of the inner working of the fundamental laws of their being. The form, therefore, is the content, and the content is the form. Separate them, and unrelated they lose their significance. Form without content is empty. Content with-

out form is so indeterminate that it cannot be grasped as an object of knowledge. A true work of art is one in which form and content are identical. The style *is* the man. The Iliad has no poetic content, Hegel insists, if we regard it apart from its form. This is true of all great literary creations. A further illustration may be drawn from the present-day discussion in reference to the relation between formal and material logic, — that is, between the form which our judgments and inferences may take, and their significance as determined in the light of actual experience. Form in this connection, without material significance, is barren and without value. In logic the form gives significance to the content, and the content in turn determines the form. There can therefore be no real distinction between formal and material fallacies. They must be regarded at the last analysis, and apart from verbal and superficial distinctions, as one and the same.

But the content must be conceived not only as form which has developed from within, but also as that which has been determined to a certain extent externally by other forms with which it stands in some essential relations. Accordingly a phenomenon may be regarded as

composed of externally related parts, each having its peculiar form, and yet all parts co-ordinated by means of a common bond which constitutes an underlying unity. This conception leads us to the second pair of correlatives,—the relation of the whole to its parts.

The concept of that which we call the whole of anything has its significance in the relation which the parts sustain one to another, and each to the combined aggregation. The whole disappears when we divide it into its component parts. This is especially true of organic life. A living body cannot be divided into its separate parts, and restored at will to its original form and functions. It is only the dead body that admits of dissection. The significance of all the parts lies in their inherence in one and the same organism and their co-ordinated functions in reference to each other and to the whole. The eye is an eye so long as it is a member of the body. An organ severed from its organism becomes at once a meaningless and worthless thing.

Hegel draws attention to the fact also that psychologists often speak erroneously of the parts of the soul, or the parts of the mind, as though endowing such parts with a quasi inde-

pendence. It is of interest to note that he is here emphasizing by way of protest a truth which modern psychology has most fully endorsed,—namely, that psychical phenomena must be regarded as a unity, complex in the variety of functional manifestation, it is true, but nevertheless one and not many. The traditional theory of separate psychological faculties is here discarded by Hegel. He protests that there is not any separate faculty of memory, or of reason, or of imagination, any more than there is a separate organ of the body whose life and function are independent of the other members, and of the organism as the central unity of them all.

It may be said in general, therefore, that the form, or formative principle, is essentially a principle of organization, uniting the many into one and producing a symmetry of parts, a harmony of functions, and a congruence of relations, so that the world of phenomena, whether of nature or of mind, may be conceived by us as a world of order and of law.

Hegel's conception of form, being essentially dynamic, the bond of unity which underlies the relation of the whole to its parts must be conceived as a formative principle, also dynamic.

The relation of the several parts in any complex system one to another, and all to the whole, must therefore be mediated—that is, brought about—by the outputting of some energy. This dynamic element Hegel calls force (*die Kraft*); its outputting is called its external manifestation (*die Aeusserung*). This pair of correlatives will be found necessary to complete the idea of an underlying dynamic basis. Any phenomenon whatsoever from the standpoint of its reflection in itself,—that is, regarded simply in its own light,—presents as its most evident characteristic a central and essential unity. The phenomenon appears, therefore, as an undivided whole. But from a different standpoint, and one that we dare not overlook, the phenomenon appears immediately to break up into a diversity of interrelated and coördinated parts. This is the standpoint of a reflection into something else, or the illumination of the central unity by the light reflected from each of its component parts and their several functions. Consequently, that by which the one breaks up into the many and the many in turn become unified in the one, must be referred to some underlying force which produces the specification of parts, and at the same time holds them together in an all-embrac-

ing unity within one common system. Thus the separate organs of an animal are developed through successive differentiations and integrations, separated into many, yet combined as one, and this is attained by the concerted action of the vital forces which are constantly operative in the organism, and which constitute it what it essentially is.

Force, conceived of as mere force, and without the additional considerations which will be advanced later under the category of the notion, must be regarded merely as a blind force working without purpose or intelligence. As thus conceived, it would require for its activity, according to Hegel, a special vehicle, as magnetic force seemed to require the presence of iron; it would, moreover, be brought into activity only by some special solicitation, such as the presence of some other force upon which it is dependent. Thus, every force would seem to be dependent upon some other, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus, force from this point of view must be regarded as essentially finite, because it is necessarily dependent and restricted.

To speak, therefore, of God as force merely, though it may be writ large, FORCE, is nevertheless an extremely impoverished conception of

the fulness of the divine attributes. This was the fundamental error in Herder's general conception of God. For the category of force must be complemented by the category of a final cause, thus introducing the conception of an activity that is self-determining and purposeful.

Moreover, Hegel insists with characteristic consistency as regards his method and general point of view that the idea of force must not be divorced in our thoughts from its outer manifestation. It is of the very essence of force to manifest itself. Force and its manifestation are one and the same. It is misleading, therefore, to state that force in itself is unknowable. It is knowable, but only in its manifestation; but the manifestation is the essential expression of what the force itself really is.

The final relation, that of the inner to the outer, is a relation which follows logically from that of force and its manifestation. Force in its essential nature represents the inner, and its manifestation of course represents the outer. The two are essentially identical. Mere externality or mere internality are expressions which represent an empty and meaningless abstraction, and nothing more.

It is customary to regard the essence of a

thing as merely that which is inward. It must be remembered, however, that it is of the inherent nature of the essence to reveal itself in some form of external manifestation. As an illustration of this erroneous point of view, Hegel cites the poet Haller. The lines of Haller, which, by the way, Hegel quotes incorrectly, are : —

“Ins Innere der Natur
 Dringt kein erschaffener Geist
 Zu glücklich wann sie noch die äussere Schale
 weist.”¹

With these words of Haller there may be compared the indignant comment of Goethe, which runs as follows : —

“‘Ins Innere der Natur’ —
 O du Philister !—
 ‘Dringt kein erschaffener Geist.’
 Mich und Geschwister
 Mögt ihr an solches Wort
 Nur nicht erinnern ;
 Wir denken : Ort für Ort
 Sind wir im Innern.
 ‘Glücklich wem sie nur
 Die äussere Schale weist !’
 Das höre ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen
 Ich fluche darauf, aber verstohlen.
 Sage mir tausend tausend Male :
 Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern ;

Natur hat weder Kern
 Noch Schale,
 Alles ist sie mit einem Male;
 Dich prüfe du nur allermeist
 Ob du Kern oder Schale seist."¹

Thus, as a man seems to be outwardly, so is he inwardly. What a man is, he does; and what he does, manifests what he is. If his morality, Hegel insists, is a matter of inner intention merely, and if it never bears fruit in any external word or deed, then the inner purpose, however noble it may be, loses its significance and worth. It is the understanding again which seeks to separate the inner from the outer. Thus conceived, they become merely empty abstractions.

Hegel draws attention in this connection to a tendency which seems to operate in ignoble minds to decry and belittle the great and heroic

¹ " 'Into the inner depths of nature' — oh ! thou Philistine — 'no created mind can penetrate.' To me and mine it is hardly necessary to recall such a thought. We think that place for place we are in the inward parts. 'Happy the man to whom nature merely shows her outward shell.' I have heard this repeated for sixty years and curse it withal, — but in secret. I say to myself a thousand thousand times : Nature gives everything lavishly and with good will. She has neither kernel nor shell. She is at the same time both the one and the other. Only, above all things, test thyself whether kernel or shell thou may'st prove to be."

deeds of history by insinuating that the external action may not have a corresponding motive of nobility within. "If the heroes of history," says Hegel, "had been actuated by subjective and formal interests alone, they never would have accomplished what they have. And if we have due regard to the unity between the inner and the outer, we must own that great men purposed to do what they did, and that they did what they purposed."¹

From any point which we may choose to view it, the distinction between inner and outer is resolved in a higher unity into which they are merged as one and the same. It is through the manifestation of force that every inner is necessarily constrained (*gesetzt*) to show itself as outer. Their distinction is to be regarded only as a necessary moment in the expression of their absolute identity. We speak of the relation of inner to outer as though they were contrasted terms of a ratio. Their relation is, however, that of a unity, in which the seemingly contrasted terms merge into one. Their distinction merely serves to emphasize the dynamic process, by which the manifestation of the essence is mediated, and yet this is in no

wise contradictory to their underlying unity as embraced in one and the same system.

The identity of inner and outer, of force and its manifestation, constitutes the category of actuality (*die Wirklichkeit*). This brings us to the final and most complete expression of the nature of essence; and this will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIII

ACTUALITY, OR THE REAL WORLD

ACTUALITY is defined by Hegel as the unity of essence and its manifestation, or the unity of inner and outer. It is incorrect to conceive the inner as the actual, and the outer as merely the phenomenal, the fleeting, the unreal. The actual is the essence as it reveals its innermost being through external manifestation; it is the noumenal as it discloses its nature in the phenomenal. It is a false conception, also, to regard the external expression of that which is actual as the result of a transition from a preceding state of quiescent being to its outer manifestation, though the mediation of some force which acts in an external manner. The actual is not something which is produced, turned out as if by a machine, and therefore to be regarded as a mere product. It is rather that which is self-producing. It is not merely the result of a process of development. It is the energizing force which underlies that

process as well. We have already seen that, according to Hegel's general conception of his system, the complete cosmic process is to be conceived as the expression of reason, and that reason is essentially the creative, constructive, and sustaining force in the universe. But this conception may also be regarded as the essential characterization of the actual, or the real. The two points of view are in reality one and the same, and their significance may be summed up in the Hegelian formula: "The real is the rational, and the rational is the real."

It is absurd, therefore, to draw the distinction between the unreality of thought and the reality of all objective phenomena. It is utterly misleading to say, therefore, that while an idea may be good, or true, that it cannot be realized in actual experience. Such a diremption of the world of ideas from the world of reality, Hegel insists, can arise only in the sphere of the abstract understanding, — that separating function of the mind, which is devoid of all synthetic capacity and unifying power.

There is a popular misconception that Plato recognized the idea and only the idea, as the truth, and that Aristotle, on the other hand, rejected the idea, and retained only the actual.

The true conception of the relation between these two masters of Greek thought is this: that while the actual is the fundamental principle in the philosophy of Aristotle, nevertheless, the actual with him is not merely the brute fact immediately at hand, but it embraces the idea as actuality also, which serves both to interpret and explain the given facts of consciousness. Aristotle characterized the idea of Plato as a mere *δύναμις*, — that is, a mere potentiality, — and insisted that the idea must be conceived essentially as it reveals itself in its manifestation, — that is, as *ἐνέργεια*. He therefore defines reality as an entelechy (*ἐντελέχεια*) — that is, the self-realization of the essence in the phenomena.¹ By this conception Aristotle reconciled the antithesis between the Eleatic and the Heraclitean points of view. Hegel's position is substantially the same as that of Aristotle; for in his system throughout there is a fundamental recognition of the necessity of combining in one the complementary elements of potentiality and actuality. From this point of view the dialectic movement may be defined merely as a process of transition from the potential to the actual.

¹ See Windelband's *History of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., p. 139 f.

Approaching now a more careful analysis of the concept of actuality, we find that its primary and most fundamental element is the idea of possibility (*die Möglichkeit*). The possible, according to Hegel, is an essential moment in every actual phenomenon. It is, however, not to be confused with the barren possibility of mere fancy. In the world of the imagination, all things are possible. It is possible that the moon might fall into the earth. Cæsar might not have crossed the Rubicon. Charles I of England might have been exiled instead of beheaded. Napoleon might have been killed at the battle of Waterloo. All such possibilities of the imagination must rank as footless speculations. The name given to them by Hegel is that of formal possibilities, that is, having the mere form or outer shell of reality. A possibility, however, to which some significance is attached, and which may be called a significant possibility to distinguish it from the merely formal possibility, must always be regarded as the preliminary stage of every form of development which in the very process of its unfolding reveals the necessity to which the potential must have been subjected in order to push itself forth into the actual. Such a

possibility may be called also with appropriateness, real or actual possibility.

Actuality, however, considered apart from its inner potentiality as its essential ground, presents to us only its external face. Looking at it from this point of view exclusively, we find ourselves confronted with the external aspect of actuality which immediately discloses the category of contingency (*die Zufälligkeit*) as its basal characteristic. The contingent refers to the external relation which obtains between phenomena.

This relation may be such that one phenomenon depends externally upon some other phenomenon so that the one forms the condition of the other. The idea of the contingent when definitely expressed in a concrete relation is thus to be regarded as the condition (*die Bedingung*) upon the presence or absence of which depends the presence or absence of the phenomenon which is related to it.

The rôle of a phenomenon which fulfils the function of a condition may be characterized as follows: It is a special existence, an immediate thing; it has also a vocation, as it were, to be destroyed in its primary form in order to conserve the realization of something else. As

such it fulfils its own destiny, and although dying in its own individuality, it lives in another, and the other form for which it was evidently designed by its own nature is so near of kin that it may be properly regarded as its own true self. In other words, to use an Hegelian expression, the condition is *aufgehoben* in the resulting phenomenon to which it gives rise, and into whose actuality its own essence enters and is there conserved. When, however, the point of view is not exclusively confined to the external manifestation, but when the external manifestation is regarded as the necessary development of an inner organizing activity which has been characterized as the real possibility, or the possibility regarded as the potential of reality, then the potential, the process, and the resulting product may be conceived as constituting together the actual fact. The actual fact, moreover, embraces all the purely external relations of contingency, including all the conditions which both contribute to and are merged in the actual fact itself.

In such a process, wherein on one side the potential tends to become actual, and on the other the purely external conditions themselves contribute to the process as essential factors,

and so far forth lose the external character of their relations, — in such a process the development reveals some underlying necessity which expresses itself as a law of uniformity and universality. Hegel defines the idea of necessity, (*die Nothwendigkeit*) as the unity of the potential and the actual. The development of the one into the other we are constrained to believe must take place, and that it must take place in some one definite way rather than in any other. That is what is meant by necessity. Necessity signifies something more than that one thing has been derived from another. The idea of derivation does not exhaust the meaning of necessity. What is merely derivative is a product which is what it is, not through itself but through something else. That which is necessary contains the additional idea that it must be what it is through itself and through the activity of its own inner processes; and even if it is derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived as a vanishing element within itself. The necessary is something which is mediated (*vermittelt*) and yet mediated through that which belongs to itself, — that is, mediated by the inner constraint of its own nature. Such an inner determination which arises from the

very nature of a thing itself, Hegel refers to as *gesetzt*. Any characteristic, according to Hegel, is said to be *gesetzt* when it can be shown as the necessary outcome of the very nature of the object to which it is referred. Whenever that which is given in thought leads by the very necessity of the thought processes themselves to a conclusion dependent upon it as its premise, the resulting conclusion is always described by Hegel as *gesetzt*. All phases of the dialectic process are *gesetzt* in the sense of following by a necessary constraint of thought from the very nature of that which precedes them. This term is so intimately associated with the idea of necessity which underlies the whole dialectic movement of thought that it has seemed worth while to explain it somewhat at length.

The contingent represented by an external condition of a fact is not merely a condition external to the fact and sustaining only a passing relation to it; it must be conceived also as an essential element of the fact itself. The condition and the fact fall together in one and the same system. It is the business of philosophy to reveal the necessity which, although at a far deeper level, nevertheless always underlies the contingent.

It is again the work of the abstract understanding which draws a sharp line of distinction between the idea of necessity and that of freedom (*die Freiheit*). When we regard all phenomena as necessitated, ourselves included, we at first sight seem to occupy, as Hegel puts it, "a thoroughly slavish and dependent position."¹ It must be borne in mind, however, that any kind of freedom which is wholly devoid of the element of necessity is nothing more or less than mere caprice. There is such a thing as a perfectly free activity which nevertheless recognizes the inherent law of its own being, and endeavors freely to realize it. Such freedom is the only true freedom. Were a man to feel that he is under the spell of an inevitable fate and that he is not in the remotest degree dependent upon his own exertions, then it would follow that all his activities would become paralyzed, and he would find himself out of harmony with the world system of which he is a part. To realize, on the other hand, that he is the architect of his own fortune and the master of his fate, is to inspire him with the earnest desire and strong purpose to realize the best that is in him. Hegel holds that the

¹ § 147.

individuality of man is so embraced in the absolute universal as to be conserved and not destroyed. This conception will be more fully developed when we come to the exposition of the notion, which in its highest expression is the divine reason to which all personalities owe their being, and which constitutes at the same time the charter of their freedom.

Necessity, then, is the expression of that binding connection which links together condition, fact, and activity in one and the same system, and the question naturally suggests itself, What is the fundamental nature of that system which exhibits the underlying necessity as a bond uniting all of its essential elements together? Hegel's answer to this question, as might be surmised, is a threefold one. He views the idea of necessity under the following categories:—

- (1) Substantiality. (*Die Substantialität.*)
- (2) Causality. (*Die Kausalität.*)
- (3) Reciprocal activity. (*Die Wechselwirkung.*)

These categories express the several possible ways by which any fact is connected with its corresponding condition through some mediating activity.

The category of substantiality is the immediate and primary form which the relation of necessity assumes in connecting every potential state of development with its corresponding actual. The actual which is present as a fact, appears and then disappears; for a fact regarded as a mere fact, and a separate existence regarded merely as a separate existence, have no permanency. Such facts rise and fall again; they are and again are not. There is a perpetual ebb and flow, growth and decay, throughout all nature.

“Our little systems have their day,
They have their day and cease to be.”

But underlying all these ephemeral forms and evanescent properties, there is nevertheless some underlying basis which remains absolutely constant. This is the fundamental substance. Upon its surface all things appear in their brief moment of individuality. They sink again into the all-absorbing element whence they arose. Their fleeting existence marks them as the veriest accidents of being in contrast to the stability which characterizes the substance of which they are but the passing modes. They are the many; the substance is the one. This distinction corresponds to that which was drawn

between the whole and its parts already referred to in the preceding chapter upon the nature of the phenomenal world.

Hegel's conception of substance bears upon its face the stamp of Spinoza. There is, however, a radical point of departure, inasmuch as Spinoza ascribes no reality to the phenomenal world. The *Erscheinung* is merely *Schein*,—that is, the phenomenal is only an illusion, and possesses no separate individuality of its own. Hegel suggests that this is an oriental strain which has appeared in Spinoza's thinking owing to his Hebrew ancestry. Hegel himself enters a protest against the elimination of the idea of a real individuality. In this connection he introduces into his system the principle of individuality, as insisted upon by Leibniz in opposition to Spinoza.

At this point Hegel also emphasizes the impropriety of calling Spinoza an atheist. His infidelity is not toward God so much as toward the world. His system is essentially one of acosmism. He denied the reality of the world; and in losing the world lost his own soul at the same time, for the unreality of the Ego follows logically from the unreality of the world of which it forms a part.

In the passage in which Hegel criticises the defects of Spinoza's system,¹ there is clearly revealed on Hegel's part the desire to save his own system from a pantheistic drift. He there disclaims most stoutly any profession of pantheism. It is a question, of course, whether his system as a whole may not logically lead to pantheistic conclusions, despite its author's protests to the contrary. Nevertheless, it is a fact which is most significant, that Hegel did not himself judge that his system necessarily demanded a pantheistic interpretation. And this fact should not be ignored in a criticism of Hegel's general position. In the third part of the *Logic*, moreover, Hegel maintains that the Absolute is more than mere substance, for in the doctrine of the notion the supreme reason or God is regarded as subject rather than substance, a personality rather than an empty and indefinite abstraction. Without this qualification the substance of Spinoza would be, as Hegel puts it, "merely the universal all-devouring [*negative*] power, like a vast, dark, and boundless abyss, into which all things sink and are forever lost."²

Hegel's conception of substance marks but a

¹ § 151, *Zusatz*.

² § 151.

preliminary stage which must be further developed and supplemented. The Hegelian substance, regarded merely as substance, while constant and abiding is nevertheless only static. The individual manifestations of the phenomenal occur in connection with it, proceeding from it and again returning to it. But substance, as such, lacks the dynamic power to initiate action, and to produce the results flowing from it. That which is thus connected with it is still only accidental in reference to it. And therefore the concept of substance is necessitated by the inner constraint of thought to develop the idea of causality inherently connected with it. The substance becomes cause; the static passes over into the dynamic. The relation of substance and accident (that is, of substance to any one of the properties connected with it and which rank as accidents in reference to it) we may regard as corresponding to the relation already discussed, — that of the whole to its parts. In a similar manner, also, the relation of cause and effect may be considered as corresponding to that of force and its manifestation.

The German word for cause, *die Ursache*, indicates an original or originating element.

Cause in this sense is to be regarded as a *causa sui*. It possesses, from this point of view, the capacity of initiation, and of producing its effect as the necessary consequence of its own being and activity. From one point of view cause and effect are distinct terms. But this represents a finite and abstract view of their relations, such as is the result of the mere understanding. From a more comprehensive point of view the two terms, which seem to be distinct, in reality fall together as one. The cause reveals itself as a cause only so far as it is manifested in the effect. And the effect has significance as an effect only so far as it is seen to be connected with its cause. In a sense, we speak of the rain as the cause of the dampness of the ground, and yet a deeper consideration reveals the fact that the dampness is the rain itself, only in another form. The rain causes the dampness and it is the dampness. The effect, therefore, is merely the manifestation of the activity of the cause. The cause is conserved in the effect and the effect is potential in the cause.

Although the relation which obtains between the cause and the effect may be regarded as a transition from one state to another, with an accompanying conservation of the former state

in the latter, nevertheless there is nothing to limit this process and so render it thoroughly satisfactory as a final account of the matter. Cause leads to effect, and the effect in turn becomes a cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus, the causal relation may be traced backward from a given effect to its cause, and the cause of that cause, and so on without limit, or forward from effect to effect also without limit. There seems to be no starting-point and no end. As thus stated, the doctrine of causation is incomplete, and therefore most unsatisfactory. A natural complement to this conception of causation is one that is found growing out of its very limitations, and is known as the doctrine of reciprocal activity, or the relation of action and reaction.

Causation, therefore, is to be regarded, according to Hegel, as finding its most complete expression in the concept of reciprocal activity (*die Wechselwirkung*), which represents the relation obtaining between cause and effect as consisting of a mutual interaction. The cause produces the effect, and yet the effect in turn reacts upon the cause in such a manner that the cause is as much a product of the effect as the effect is of the cause.

This principle of interaction is best illustrated by the reciprocal relations which parts of one and the same organism sustain to each other,—for example, in the human body the several organs are related in a reciprocal manner, so that they function in such a way as to act and react upon one another, in an indefinite variety of manifestations. Hegel draws attention also to the relation of the character and customs of a people to their constitution, and insists that this always is of the nature of a reciprocal relation. The constitution is in a sense the outgrowth and the expression of the national character, but from another point of view the national character is intimately affected and modified by the constitution. So also we often say that drunkenness causes poverty; it is quite as true that poverty causes drunkenness. There are instances, therefore, as indicated by these illustrations, wherein the cause in question does not lead to an endless causal progression or regression, but the causal series in such cases is to be conceived no longer as a line extending without limit in either direction, but as a line which bends backward upon itself, representing the reacting influence of the effect upon

the supposed cause. This connection being established, the circulatory movement of causation always works back again to the starting-point. Within the bounds of this circle there is disclosed a certain kind of self-sufficiency. Cause and effect fall together in one and the same area, and in their mutual dependence they are nevertheless independent of everything else. The cause finds in the effect, not merely its other, but its own real self. Cause is not one thing, and the effect something which is outside of the cause, and externally related to it. They together form one closed system. From this point of view, cause must be conceived as possessing in a measure the power of initiative, of self-direction, and self-construction. It ranks no longer as a mere force resident in some underlying substance. It rises to the higher dignity of proceeding from a source which partakes of the nature of a subject rather than a substance. The underlying necessity, a self-imposed necessity, is such as to form a natural transition to that which is, therefore, actually the expression of the truest kind of freedom.

The highest form of substance we have found to be that of cause. The highest form

of cause is that of reciprocal action and reaction. The highest form of reciprocal action is that which passes over into self-directed and self-determined action. The transition now is a natural and easy one to the doctrine of the notion (*der Begriff*), the self-directing formative principle of reason which is the underlying and essential principle of all being. This transition from the category of essence to that of the notion may be expressed in a word,—it is a transition from the idea of substance to that of subject; from the idea of necessity to that of freedom.

PART III

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

Der Begriff ist das Princip alles Lebens und damit zugleich das schlechthin Konkrete. Der Begriff ist das den Dingen selbst Innewohnende ; wodurch sie das sind, was sie sind. Die Idee ist die Wahrheit ; denn die Wahrheit ist diess, dass die Objektivität dem Begriffen entspricht. — HEGEL.

PART III

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

CHAPTER XIV

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION

WE have followed the dialectic movement through the various stages of the categories of being and of essence, and have found the development logically continuous and progressive. Its most complete expression, as reached by our investigation thus far, has revealed a fundamental factor which is not merely a determining factor, but a self-determining factor as well. Hegel's *Begriff*, which we will translate by the word notion, is nothing more or less than this complete expression of all that is contained in the categories of being and of essence. Hegel calls the notion the truth of being and of essence. It is the underlying substratum of all things, needing no support itself because self-supporting; requiring no further explanation of itself because self-ex-

planatory ; dependent upon no external determination because it is self-determined.

We have already discussed the category of form, and have seen that Hegel uses this term always to signify a constructive formative principle essentially dynamic in its nature. By the term notion he means not only that which is the source of this dynamic principle, but also that which is at the same time a self-sufficient source. He has advanced from the conception of form as the principle of activity to that of form as the principle of self-activity.

The notion, moreover, is not to be conceived as merely a form of the understanding, ranking as a logical concept such as our idea of a universal class or group of objects, as of man, dog, horse, and the like. Such a group or class idea, ranking merely as a formal concept, is the veriest skeleton of thought. It is dead, empty, — wholly abstract, as Hegel would put it. The notion, on the contrary, is most thoroughly concrete, — that is, it is thought as an active constructive and productive force. It has more than a mere subjective value. It is not a mere idea in the mind. The true thought is a force, and the true force is self-determining and self-active ; all other thoughts and all other forces

are but the shadows of reality. The true thought manifests itself in some external manner, in the inventions of the mechanician, in the institutions of the state, in the charities of the church, in the paintings and statues of the artist, in the deeds great and small of human beings, who think, and plan, and act withal. Hegel regards the notion as the living spirit of all that is actual, pervading and dominating all forms of life and all phases of activity, from the simplest to the most complex, and from the lowest to the highest. The standpoint is evidently one of absolute idealism. The chief and most characteristic feature of the doctrine of the notion is that of subjectivity, for Hegel says again and again that the underlying substance of the universe as conceived by Spinoza should be a subject and not a substance. The notion he calls, therefore, the Ego, — that is, the underlying power beneath, and in all things is also a personality. It is essentially self-conscious. It is not merely an intelligent force, but it is an intelligent force working both consciously and purposefully. There is in the Hegelian system no place for a force, as conceived by von Hartmann, which works intelligently but unconsciously, and therefore blindly.

The element of necessity, moreover, which lies at the basis of the concept of substance and of causation, is in the doctrine of the notion transmuted into freedom, inasmuch as the necessity is regarded as a self-imposed necessity. The self-determining power of the notion is to be conceived, therefore, as essentially a free activity. It is an activity not merely *an sich*, — that is, possessing the potentiality of activity, nor is it merely *für sich*, — that is, the explicit realization of the potential activity; it is both *an sich* and *für sich*, — that is, it possesses the self-sufficient power and capacity for self-determined activity, an activity which consciously transmutes its potential into the actual.

Thus conceived, the notion, being spontaneous and unconditional, may be regarded as the final and most complete characterization of the Absolute. The Absolute, therefore, may be most adequately defined as the notion. This is not only the highest expression of the nature of the Absolute, it is the all-comprehensive definition as well. The notion embodying the truth of all phases both of being and of essence, it follows that all the characterizations of the Absolute contained in the categories of being and of essence which the successive stages of the dia-

lectic movement have manifested, may now be completely summed up in the all-embracing nature of the notion. Hegel, therefore, defines the notion also as the totality of all things (*die Totalität*). It represents the fulness of all content, being both self-contained and all containing. The moments of all forms of activity are embraced within it. It is the great unifying principle of the cosmos. It forms both the whence and the whither of all things. It must, therefore, be immanent in all things. The notion, moreover, contains all the earlier determinations of thought as conserved in itself. The contradictions which have been necessarily involved in the earlier stages of the development have been overcome by being sublimated in its higher unity.

The dialectic movement from the standpoint of the notion is essentially one of development (*die Entwicklung*). That movement in respect to the earlier category of being we found to be that of a transition, the passage from definite being to its corresponding other. In the category of essence, the dialectic process is mediated by the idea of reflection which marks no transition from definite being to its other but rather an illumination of definite being by the light

cast upon it by its other. The other thus functions as the complementary correlative of the original being in question, and gives to it point and significance. But when we come to the category of the notion, there is an actual development from that which is given into its other in such a manner that the unity of the two is completely preserved, and the former finds in its other only that which is the complementary part of itself. As such it forms the truth of the transition which characterizes the dialectic movement in being, and of the reflection which characterizes the dialectic movement in essence.

The evolution which is due to the activity of the notion is essentially a self-development. It is of the very nature of the notion that it should manifest itself, and that, too, in all the various phases of its manifold possibilities. The idea of development, the continuous unfolding of all that is potential in the notion, demands a single unifying principle in the midst of the superabounding diversity of content, manifesting itself in a progressive process in which each succeeding stage is more completely realized than the one before.

The manifestation of this principle takes place in time, producing the present cosmic order;

nevertheless, the truth of this principle in its fullness and in all the logically coördinated stages of its evolution must be regarded as unconditioned and undetermined by time. The essential nature of this evolution is primarily dialectic, — that is, each stage must be regarded as the necessary complement of the one before, in the sense that it overcomes its contradictions and supplies its defects. This is fundamentally a logical demand. As Hegel would put it, any given stage is *gesetzt* by that which precedes, — that is, from that which is contained in the former, the reason is necessarily constrained to infer the latter. Thought is thus under compulsion, — the compulsion of its own nature to develop its concepts from the simplest to the more and more complex. Each stage of such a development, because unsatisfactory as the complete expression of truth, demands a fuller and more satisfactory stage which lies just beyond, which will in a measure correct its errors and supplement its defects, but which in turn will cause new questions to arise which it cannot answer and new contradictions which it cannot resolve. And thus the onward dialectic movement proceeds not from one period of time to another so much as from the idea of imperfec-

tion to that of perfection, from the idea of incompleteness to that of completeness. When the temporal process has been completed, it furnishes a completed product. You cannot go backward, rolling it up again, as it were, into its closed potentiality, and then repeat the process at will. Movement in time is from the bud to the full-blown rose, but the rose cannot shut and be a bud again. But this reverse movement is always possible in reference to the thought relations which underlie any series of development. Given certain premises, the conclusion must develop itself out of them; and given the conclusion containing its major and minor terms, it is possible to work backward when once the proper middle term has been discovered to the original premises. It is the so-called process of reduction which reverses the forward movement of deduction.

Moreover, the development in time is essentially finite; the dialectic development of thought is essentially infinite. The development in time represents a gradual change from stage to stage; the dialectic development is a fuller and fuller revelation of that which, in spite of its indefinitely varied manifestations, is ever one and the same,—the absolute. The

temporal development falls within the dialectic movement, and may be regarded as a moment in the larger process.¹

In the revelation of the full significance of the notion, or in other words, in its dialectic movement, three stages appear which are so related that either the first or the second taken by itself proves to be misleading and unsatisfactory, and has a final significance only when it unites with the other to form a complete synthesis which constitutes the third stage. These stages form the three divisions of the category of the notion. They are as follows:—

(1) The Notion as Subjective. (*Der subjective Begriff.*)

(2) The Notion as Objective. (*Der objective Begriff.*)

(3) The Notion as the Synthesis of Subjective and Objective. (*Die Idee.*)

The fundamental thesis which Hegel endeavors to maintain is that the reality of thought consists in its productiveness. He regards thought, as we have seen, as a constructive, self-determining force underlying the universe of things, fashioning all creatures, and shaping

¹ See Baille: *Hegel's Logic*, Chapter IX; also McTaggart: *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, Chapter V.

all events. Now, if thought is merely subjective, it appears, as regards its essential function as a force centre completely paralyzed. On the other hand, mere objectivity which is regarded as separated from any subjective thought whatsoever is essentially irrational, and such a state, from the Hegelian point of view, must be considered as unreal. The objective is not set over against the subjective, but the subjective is immanent in the objective; and it is of the very nature of the subjective as a thought activity that it should strive to realize itself in the objective. As Hegel puts it, our "thoughts do not stand between us and things, shutting us off from things; they rather shut us together with things." The synthesis of these two moments constitutes the notion in its true form and function. The notion thus in its highest expression is the Idea (*die Idee*) — that is, the supreme Reason, the Absolute. The subjective notion and the objective notion are each indeterminate and incomplete. In the synthesis of subject and of object, the world of thought and the world of reality, we find the true type of notion, — not merely formal and abstract, but concrete, dynamic, conscious, all-controlling, all-embracing, free.

CHAPTER XV

THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION

THE subjective notion, as we have seen, is the notion regarded merely in one of its aspects, as constituting the sum of the thought processes. These processes taken together form a system in which all of the thought relations are determined by the fundamental nature of thought itself. These relations divide naturally into three typical thought forms, and in this division Hegel follows the traditional logic. These forms are as follows:—

- (1) The Notion regarded simply as a formal Notion. (*Der Begriff als solcher.*)
- (2) The Judgment. (*Das Urtheil.*)
- (3) The Syllogism. (*Der Schluss.*)

The primary type of thought which Hegel calls the notion, regarded simply as notion, corresponds in some of its main features to the ordinary concept of formal logic. It is treated in the Hegelian system without reference to its natural setting as one of the component parts

of the judgment and syllogism. This view of the notion is of course only a provisional one which represents merely an abstract analysis of the thought processes, preliminary to a subsequent synthesis, which will represent their component parts as properly coördinated and unified. The notion thus conceived as a separate thought element, is found to contain three essential factors, or as the Hegelian terminology goes, moments,—that of universality, of particularity, and of individuality (*das Allgemeine, das Besondere, das Einzelne*).

It should be noticed that Hegel does not divide notions into three kinds, the universal, the particular, and the individual, but he regards the one and the same notion as embracing in a unity these three coördinated aspects. Hegel at the outset in the discussion of the notion evidently wishes to emphasize the truth that while the categories of reflection, such as appearance and ground, cause and effect, and the like, may be separately apprehended each apart from its correlative, this however is not the case concerning the categories of the notion. These categories must be conceived as inseparable moments of the one notion, and if they do not all appear in a complete synthesis of

thought, the very integrity of the simple notion itself is essentially impaired. A notion regarded as representing a universal merely, that is a class or group idea, must rank in our thoughts as an absolutely empty genus unless it contains some suggestion at least of the capacity to realize itself in different kinds of species which would then represent its particularity. And a particular notion, representing a species, not only implies a higher genus which is its necessary universal, but it in turn must suggest also the capacity of realizing itself in definite individuals. The relations of genus, species, and the individual, represent most clearly and adequately the three Hegelian moments of the simple notion,—universality, particularity, and individuality. Any one of them necessarily implies the other two.

Hegel's criticism of the traditional logic is that its general term or class idea is a notion in only one of its aspects, that of its universality, and that the other two moments of particularity and of individuality are overlooked. Thus it follows that the purely formal logician, the literalist, often ignores particular instances which are not in accord with his general notions, or else wrests his individual

facts so that they may conform to his preconceived theories. It is the moment of individuality in the notion which constitutes its actuality, which differentiates it from the mere fancy of the imagination. The individual object is always the most convincing proof as well as the clearest illustration of the universal. Nothing will so quickly reveal the emptiness of thought as a succession of glittering generalities which admit of no particular application or definite verification. And on the other hand, also, it must not be overlooked that if the significance of the individual is to be adequately interpreted, it must be possible to refer it unerringly to some universal. The work of the scholar or of the man of science is not complete when he has collected facts, however numerous they may be; he must relate fact to law and rise above the particular results of his investigation to the appreciation of the universal which they embody. This relation of the individual object to the universal, Hegel illustrates by showing that it was only when the world came to recognize every man, whether Greek or barbarian, bond or free, as possessing an infinite and universal nature, that man's real significance for himself and for society was

fully understood and properly valued. The recognition of a man as a person and not a thing is simply the recognition that the principle of personality is in reality a principle of universality. The universal is not to be conceived, therefore, as merely the sum total of the various elements which a number of individuals have in common; it is rather that active principle which specifies and determines the individuals, building them together in a unity with itself. As Hegel says, "Things are what they are through the action of the notion immanent in them and revealing itself in them."¹ Thus every individual in the midst of all his particular traits of character and conduct reveals the universal strain of humanity.

Corresponding respectively to the three moments of universality, particularity, and individuality are the three categories which were found to constitute the fundamental elements of the idea of essence,—namely, that of identity, of difference, and of ground. Thus the universal is, in its nature essentially self-identical,—that is, perfectly homogeneous throughout and without distinction as to the particular varieties which embody and illustrate it. It is, however, under

¹ § 163, *Zusatz* (2).

an irresistible compulsion of thought (*gesetzt*) to break up into particular varieties or species, and this it does through the process of differentiation according to the category of difference. But in these particular manifestations it is the underlying universal which is always present. Moreover, the universal can manifest itself as an identity in the midst of all differences only in that which can form the common ground of such a union,—namely, in a series of different individuals.

When the universal subjects itself to the natural compulsion of thought, and becomes more specific by manifesting the various aspects of its particularity, then we have the notion developed in the form of a judgment. To judge is to make definite and specific the complete nature of the notion.

This specification of the notion which is the essential function of the judgment, is a process of breaking up the homogeneity of the notion in its purely universal features, and showing that it admits of a varied manifestation in respect to a number of particular instances of the universal, each ranking as a distinct species within the all-embracing genus. To specify these particular instances in detail, and give at the

same time their differentiating characteristics, would necessitate a series of judgments whose sum, when complete, would exhaust the full significance of the universal notion as such. The German word for the judgment is *das Urtheil*, — that is, the primary division, — and thus signifies most strikingly the original breaking up of the notion into the particular forms of its manifestation, which, as we have seen, constitutes the essential function of the judgment.

The judgment when expressed in words naturally shapes itself in the following form, "The individual is the universal." This asserts an underlying identity between the universal, as such, and its particular manifestation in some concrete individual instance.

Hegel's conception of the essential function of the copula will be found to be in complete accord with the view of the modern logic. The copula does not signify that the subject and predicate of a proposition have been brought together merely by a juxtaposition of thought, and thus connected by a convenient thought form. Its function is rather to emphasize the fact that the two seemingly separate elements, appearing as subject and predicate terms, respectively, are in reality identical, and that their

fusion into one is indicated by their union in one and the same judgment through the connecting copula. The subject and predicate terms must not be regarded as two independent extremes. Nor is the predicate to be conceived as a general characteristic, lying outside the subject, and having a separate existence somewhere in our heads. It is an essential phase of the subject itself.

It must be remembered in this connection that the judgment is merely an expanded form of the notion. There is an obvious unity attaching to the essential nature of the notion. This unity is not lost, therefore, when the notion puts itself in the more explicit form of the judgment. The seemingly separate terms which the copula connects have no really separate subsistence apart from their underlying connection. When we say "This rose is red," we mean that the particular rose now in the field of perception partakes of the nature, and is a specific instance, of the universal red; and on the other hand, that the universal red, in connection with this particular rose, manifests itself in the specific shade of red which characterizes this special rose in question.

In general, it may be said, that in every judg-

ment the subject and predicate so blend together that the particularity of the subject partakes of the nature of the universality expressed in the predicate, and that on the other hand the universality of the predicate in turn partakes of the nature of the particularity expressed in the subject. The identity of the subject and predicate, thus bound together in one, constitutes what Hegel calls the specific content of the judgment (*der bestimmte Inhalt des Urtheils*). It is that which constitutes the judgment's essential significance.

The relation, moreover, in which the subject and predicate become one is not due to our thinking, which, as it were, imposes this connection externally upon things. The relation, on the contrary, exists in the very nature of the things themselves, and our thought about them is only our discovery of a relation already existing. If the notion is to be regarded, as Hegel insists, as the constructive force immanent in all things, then the judgment is merely the definite manifestation of the indwelling potentiality of the notion in an explicit manner and in certain specific instances. It is an actual manifestation, moreover, and one which is subjectively revealed to be that which it is in its objective reality.

In this connection Hegel distinguishes between a judgment and a proposition (*der Satz*). The proposition contains an assertion in reference to a given subject, which does not stand in any relation of universality to its predicate, but expresses some single state or action which is the result of a contingent relation of subject and predicate, as the so-called narrative judgments, such as "Cæsar crossed the Rubicon," or "It rained last evening." In the judgment proper, the connection between subject and predicate is freed from any disturbing element of contingency. This distinction does not obtain, however, in the formal logic, as the proposition is a term there employed to indicate merely the judgment as expressed in language in the form of a sentence.

Hegel divides the judgment into three types, which correspond to the three main divisions of the Logic:—

- (1) The Judgment of Being.
- (2) The Judgment of Essence.
- (3) The Judgment of Notion.

These types of judgment form a series of progressive development. The distinctions between them are due in each case to the logical significance of the predicate. There is, for instance,

a manifest difference in logical value between the two judgments:—

The rose is red.

The statue is beautiful.

The former is the result of a simple perception, while the latter is the result of a more complicated thought process which is based upon a comparison between the object of perception and the kind of being which we conceive it ought to realize,—that is, its ideal or its essential notion.

Corresponding to the category of being, we have the qualitative judgment (*das qualitative Urtheil*).

Corresponding to the category of essence, we have two judgments,—that of reflection, and that of necessity (*das Reflexionsurtheil, das Urtheil der Nothwendigkeit*).

Corresponding to the category of the notion, we have the notional judgment (*das Urtheil des Begriffs*).

The qualitative judgment, or the judgment of being, Hegel defines as one which ascribes to the particular subject a quality which is universal, and yet which does not characterize all the individuals of the same class to which the subject belongs. For instance, when we say, “The rose

is red," the universal quality of redness is ascribed correctly to the rose in question, but it is not possible to extend that ascription to all roses generally. Therefore, in asserting "The rose is red," we imply that some roses exist which are not red. Consequently, for every affirmative judgment of this kind there must be a possible negative judgment which parallels it. The predicate, in other words, belongs to the special subject under consideration, but not to the underlying universal notion of which the subject is a particular manifestation.

It is proper, therefore, to characterize a qualitative judgment as correct or incorrect, but never as true or untrue. For to affirm that a judgment is true means that the predicate is an essential element of the underlying notion to which the subject must be referred. Hegel says, "In the judgment of the notion the predicate is, as it were, the soul of the subject by which the subject as a body is characterized through and through."¹

If, instead of starting with an affirmative judgment and deducing by necessary implication a corresponding negative judgment, we should start with the negative judgment, such

¹ § 172, *Zusatz*.

as "This rose is not red," we are as necessarily constrained to deduce the implied affirmative; for the negative statement that the rose is not red implies some other color. Inasmuch as the subject in such cases is not a universal, the negative either expresses an empty identity, that the rose which you see has the color which you see, or else it is to be regarded as a so-called infinite judgment in which an absolute incompatibility is set forth such as might be expressed in the judgment "A circle is not a tree." In the formal logic, such a judgment is regarded as representing the *reductio ad absurdum* of irrelevant negation. But Hegel insists that a judgment of such a nature may possess some significance as the description of certain concrete relations whose nature can only be thus characterized. For instance, death is the infinite negative as regards life, since death signifies a total negation of life. Disease, on the other hand, represents merely a simple negation, inasmuch as certain functions may be only temporarily impaired, that is, contingently negated; and this negation is at once overcome when with returning health the normal functioning is resumed, but not so with the negation which is expressed by death.

When we come to the judgment of reflection, we find that Hegel defines this type of judgment substantially as one in which the subject no longer appears as a special case or particular instance, but is represented as related to something else which is implied in the predicate. The relation which is thus stated is true not only for the particular subject in question but for all others of the same class universally. The following is a judgment of this type:—
 “This plant is edible.” This signifies a universal connection between all plants of the same kind represented by the subject and a certain effect which it is possible for them to produce upon a definite part of the great world system to which they belong,—namely, the gustatory and digestive processes of man. It is called a judgment of reflection, because it is only in the light of something else brought into relation to it that the adjective edible can be applied to a plant. Its edibility is a characteristic which arises simply from its being brought into relation with man.

This type of judgment in general breaks up into three varieties:—

- (1) The Singular Judgment.
- (2) The Particular Judgment.
- (3) The Universal Judgment.

If we have a singular judgment such as the following, "This plant is wholesome," there is implied in this that there are some other plants also which are wholesome. This latter form would then be a particular judgment. In some cases, moreover, the nature of the particular judgment is such that it may be found possible upon further investigation to enlarge it to such an extent that it will embrace the universal as well. The progress of knowledge is from the singular to the particular, and then from the particular to the universal. For instance, we start with the judgment, "This metal conducts electricity." Then we advance to the larger statement in the form of a particular judgment "Some other metals conduct electricity." Finally we reach the universal, "All metals conduct electricity." These judgments represent widening circles of knowledge. Thus the individual merges its seemingly individual characteristics with those which are common to the other members of the same species, to every one of which the same predicate may be applied as was primarily applied to the individual in the form of a singular judgment. There are predicates, moreover, of such a nature that, when ascribed to an individual subject, imply

not merely an advance to a particular, but to an all-embracing, universal judgment. In such cases there are no negative instances, and therefore the individual is to be regarded as a type of the whole class. As Hegel puts it, "The individual man is what he is in particular only in so far as he is before all things a man as man and in general."¹ Any property which belongs to the individual, and at the same time to every other member of the same species, ranks as a necessary attribute. It is universal for the very reason that it is necessary. The judgment of reflection which expresses a universal relation between an attribute and the subject as a whole, must be consequently a judgment of necessity as well. And thus the transition from the judgment of reflection to the judgment of necessity is a natural one.

Hegel discusses the judgment of necessity under its three aspects, as, —

- (1) Categorical. (*Das kategorische Urtheil.*)
- (2) Hypothetical. (*Das hypothetische Urtheil.*)
- (3) Disjunctive. (*Das disjunctive Urtheil.*)

In the categorical judgment, the predicate expresses the essential nature of the subject.

¹ § 175. *Zusatz.*

It represents the essence of the subject, moreover, in respect to the most elemental of the categories of essence, that of substantiality. Thus, in the judgment of simple assertion, which is the characteristic feature of the categorical judgment, such as "Iron is a metal," the idea of metallity is regarded as the underlying substance which constitutes the essential nature of iron. The categorical judgment, however, lacks completeness, inasmuch as it does not embrace in its statement the elements of particularity,—that is, of definite and specific description.

When we introduce the specifying element which renders a general statement more particular and therefore more definite, we have always the hypothetical form of judgment,—if A is B, C is D,—that is, where the subject only under specified conditions leads to its necessary consequent. This specified condition gives to the subject a particular aspect. In the hypothetical judgment the relation which is set forth is that of cause and effect, the second of the categories of essence.

When, however, the subject, regarded as a genus, is completely specified through an exhaustive division into its component species,

we have the disjunctive judgment. It is of the form, "A is either B, or C, or D." In such a judgment the predicate is coextensive with the subject, the genus always being equal to the sum total of its several species. Therefore the genus is expressed in its totality, and the totality of any genus is its notion. This marks the point of transition to the judgment of the notion.

In this latter class of judgments the subject is regarded as conforming more or less adequately to its ideal,—that is, to its notion. The predicates which are available in this form of judgment are such as the adjectives good, true, beautiful, wise, perfect, and the like. Each one implies a norm which the subject in question is judged as completely illustrating; and in the negative judgments, of course, as failing to illustrate.

The judgment of the notion divides into three classes:—

(1) The Assertory Judgment. (*Das assertorische Urtheil.*)

(2) The Problematic Judgment. (*Das problematische Urtheil.*)

(3) The Apodictic Judgment. (*Das apodiktische Urtheil.*)

The assertory judgment is one which contains the bare statement that a given subject is in full accord with its ideal. Such a judgment, however, may be challenged by one who holds an opposite opinion. This gives rise to the second form, the problematic judgment.

The problematic judgment is one which is qualified by the modal copula, *may be*, implying obviously the possibility also that it may not be. However, if the relation between the subject and predicate is reënforced by a subsidiary statement, either expressed or implied, which indicates the ground of their connection, we have the third form, the apodictic judgment.

The apodictic judgment is one which asserts that the relation between subject and predicate is such that it must be true. It is no longer a matter of opinion, but of necessity. When the reason which reënforces the cogency of a judgment is fully elaborated, we pass by a natural transition to the syllogism. For example, the judgment that a certain law will prove harmful to the best interests of the community, can be shown to be an apodictic judgment,—that is, necessarily true, if we show that it is essentially unjust,—and our judgment would then be put in the following form:—

“This law, being obviously unjust, must necessarily prove harmful to the best interests of the community.”

Expanded into the form of a syllogism, it would run as follows:—

All unjust laws are harmful.

This law is unjust.

∴ It must prove harmful.

Whenever a judgment under challenge reveals its underlying ground as its justification, we have a syllogism. The statement that anything must be true is justifiable only when it can be shown that there is a sufficient reason to warrant it. The syllogism, therefore, is merely the expanded form of the apodictic judgment.

A syllogism is a judgment which is accompanied by its own proof. In the apodictic judgment, we have an individual subject whose particular characteristics warrant our reference of it to its universal. In its elaborated form, as expressed by the three terms which make up the syllogistic structure, the individual and universal are brought together by means of a common term, the traditional middle term of the formal logic, in such a way as to form together a logical unity. In the major and minor premises we have separate judgments, their point of

articulation being the middle term; this separation of the major and minor terms in the premises is completely overcome in the conclusion, and we have a return to the unitary notion which holds the major and minor terms together in one judgment. Thus Hegel defines the syllogism as the unity of the judgment and the notion,¹ — that is, the separate judgments of the premises coalesce in the one notion which underlies the conclusion. The statements contained in the two premises are the result of the analytic function of thought. The fusion of the major and minor terms in the conclusion is, however, the result of the synthetic function.

The syllogism should not be regarded as an arbitrary or artificial grouping of judgments together in thought. We do not, properly speaking, construct syllogisms. The syllogistic process is rather the universal mode in which the phenomena of the universe manifest themselves. It is, moreover, a true description of the endless activity by which the Absolute ever manifests Himself. Hegel means by this that all being and all activity of the universe are to be regarded as the manifestation of a universal by means of certain particular and specific

¹ § 181.

characteristics which it reveals in the sphere of some definite concrete individuality. The syllogism is merely an expression in general of the process which provides for the varied interplay of the universal, the particular, and the individual in their manifold relations. Every notion as a universal manifests itself in individual instances through particular characteristics which differ with the various species which it embraces. And on the other hand every individual reveals its full significance only when it may be referred to its corresponding universal by virtue of its particular characteristics. It seems to be of the very nature of thought to bind together in one the three ideas of universality, particularity, and individuality, which is nothing more or less than the syllogistic process. Therefore, reason by its very nature tends to express itself in the form of a syllogism; and as it is of the essence of reason, according to Hegel, to manifest itself dynamically as the essential constructive force of the universe, it follows that the syllogistic principle underlies the active processes of all nature and of all mind.

Hegel discusses the syllogism under its three aspects as follows : —

(1) The Qualitative Syllogism. (*Der qualitative Schluss.*)

(2) The Syllogism of Reflection. (*Der Reflexions-Schluss.*)

(3) The Syllogism of Necessity. (*Der Schluss der Nothwendigkeit.*)

In the qualitative syllogism the subject of the conclusion as an individual is referred to its predicate, a universal because of a certain quality which it possesses.

The qualitative characteristics are expressed by the middle term, which is of the nature of a particular.

Thus in the form of the syllogism the subject of the conclusion, which is always the minor term, is the individual.

The predicate of the conclusion, which is always the major term, is the universal.

The middle term, which does not appear in the conclusion but in each of the premises, is the particular. All this Hegel expresses in the formula I-P-U, which means that P, the particular, is the middle term between I, the individual as minor term, and U, the universal as major term. In similar formulæ the same order is preserved to designate all possible varieties of syllogistic structure, — namely, the

first letter always represents the minor term; the last, the major term; and the middle letter, naturally, the middle term.¹

Expanded into the form of a syllogism, the formula I-P-U would become:—

An *individual* has certain *particular* characteristics.

All such *particular* characteristics belong to a certain *universal*.

∴ The *individual* belongs to this *universal*.

It will be noticed in the above that the first premise stated is the minor, and the second the major. Reversing this order, and abbreviating, the syllogism runs as follows:—

All P is U.

I is P.

∴ I is U.

This will be recognized as a syllogism of the first figure, in which the middle term appears as subject of the major premise, and as predicate of the minor. Now, in this syllogism, each premise in turn must be regarded in the light of a conclusion which has been previously mediated by some other middle term. In other words, if the ground of each premise is fully

¹ Hegel uses the letters E,B,A for *das Einzelne*, *das Besondere*, and *das Allgemeine*, respectively.

expressed, it necessarily reveals a syllogistic structure. If, therefore, we should assume that the major premise, "All P is U," is the conclusion of a subsidiary syllogism, the middle term in that case must be of the nature of an individual. Putting it, therefore, as the middle term between the particular as minor and the universal as major, the formula for this new syllogism would be, P-I-U.

If this formula should be elaborated so as to express fully the syllogistic structure, it would be as follows:—

Certain *individuals* have *particular* marks.

These *individuals* all belong to a certain *universal*.

∴ These *particular* marks characterize this *universal*.

This syllogism is in the third figure, — that is, the middle term appears as subject in each of the premises. It will be observed that such a conclusion is valid only when the individuals examined are so numerous and of such a kind as to preclude the possibility of the discovery of any negative instances; otherwise the third figure can prove only a particular statement.

If in a similar way, we assume the minor

premise of the original syllogism, "This I is P," to be the conclusion of a subsidiary syllogism, then the remaining term which does not appear in this conclusion, — in this case the universal, — would be the middle term, and the syllogistic formula would be I-U-P. In its expanded form it gives the following syllogism: —

The *individual* is the *universal*.

The *particular* is the *universal*.

∴ The *individual* is the *particular*.

This is in the second figure, — that is, the middle term appears as predicate in each of the premises. The conclusion is not valid unless we regard the major premise as having the force of a judgment in the following form, "Only the particulars in question are the universal." Otherwise, the second figure can prove only a negative conclusion. To secure from it an affirmative conclusion, the major premise must always be qualified in some such manner as is indicated above.

These transitions, which Hegel thus effects from figure to figure may be seen more clearly perhaps in the following concrete illustrations. The syllogism in the first figure, corresponding to the formula I-P-U, may be expressed as follows: —

This whale is a mammal.

All mammals are vertebrates.

∴ This whale is a vertebrate.

In this syllogism

I = whale (individual).

P = mammal (particular species).

U = vertebrate (universal genus).

The syllogism in the third figure proves as its conclusion the major premise of the above, "All mammals are vertebrates." Its formula is P-I-U.

It may be illustrated by the following:—

Certain individuals (I) are mammals (P).

The same individuals (I) are vertebrates (U).

∴ All mammals (P) are vertebrates (U).

This conclusion follows only upon the supposition that the individuals examined warrant an inductive generalization upon the ground that the possibility of negative instances has been completely eliminated. Again, the syllogism in the second figure, proving as its conclusion the minor premise of the original syllogism, "This whale is a mammal" may be illustrated according to the formula I-U-P as follows:—

Only mammals (P) suckle their young (U).

The whale (I) suckles its young (U).

∴ The whale (I) is a mammal (P).

In these syllogisms the judgments all express an identity in spite of differences, as when we say "The individual is the universal." Now, if in such judgments the element of difference is wholly eliminated, then the subject and predicate in every case may be simply equated, and all the terms in the syllogism will become strictly identical, giving us the quantitative or mathematical syllogism which would appear in the following form:—

$$I = P.$$

$$P = U.$$

$$\therefore I = U.$$

The truth which is contained in such a syllogism may be expressed by the axiom, "Things which are equal to the same third thing are equal to each other." This may be regarded as the limiting case of the syllogism proper.

In the qualitative syllogism the individual is represented under the aspect of some one of its attributes, and, therefore, an indefinite number of syllogisms may be formed in reference to any individual object of investigation or of interest, according as we choose to vary the several attributes which may for the time being happen to attract our attention. Thus we say that a certain rose is red, or fragrant, or it is fading, or

is not yet full blown, and so on indefinitely. When, however, we choose an attribute which is an essential property of all roses whatsoever, we have always the syllogism of reflection, — that is, the concept of a rose is illuminated by the light reflected upon it by one of its essential attributes. Or in other cases, it may not be a specific property so much as an essential relation which the object of thought sustains; when, for instance, we fail to understand the essential significance of a certain tool until we discover the particular use to which it is adapted, and this is allowed to reflect its light upon the nature of the tool itself. In the syllogism of reflection, therefore, the quality which is taken as the middle term is not merely one of many attributes chosen at random, or through caprice, or suggested by some passing circumstance, but it should be an attribute of such a nature that it must necessarily belong to every other member of the same species which is represented by the individual, as well as to the individual itself. The significance of the species is thus reflected in its characteristic attributes which all its individual members possess in common. It is the bond of unity which holds together all individuals of the same class in one group.

The syllogism of reflection therefore may be divided into three subsidiary kinds : —

(1) The Syllogism of Allness. (*Der Schluss der Allheit.*)

(2) The Syllogism of Induction. (*Der Schluss der Induktion.*)

(3) The Syllogism of Analogy. (*Der Schluss der Analogie.*)

The primary form of the syllogism of reflection is a syllogism in the first figure, and is known as the syllogism of allness. It endeavors to show what distinctive attribute or attributes are common to all members of a class. Hegel illustrates this by the traditional syllogism : —

All men are mortal.

Caius is a man.

∴ Caius is mortal.

The weakness of this syllogism lies in the fact that the universality of the major premise, "All men are mortal," obviously depends upon the tacit assumption that the conclusion is true. The major premise implies that a previous induction of an exhaustive nature has been made.

Thus a transition is effected by the necessities of thought to the inductive syllogism, such as the following : —

This man, and this man, and so on indefinitely,
are mortal.

This man and this man, and so on indefinitely,
constitute all men.

∴ All men are mortal.

The formula for this syllogism would be

I.
U-I-P.
I.
etc.,

wherein is signified that the middle term (I) is indefinitely repeated, and is the sum of a number of individual cases. Passing from the individual instances, however numerous they may be, to the universal, which must necessarily transcend our experience, our reason rests upon the postulate that whatever is observed to be an essential property which a number of individuals have in common, will be found to obtain in all the individuals which resemble them sufficiently to be regarded as members of one and the same class, or species.

This gives us the third form of the syllogism of reflection, which expresses an underlying analogy as the warrant for the inductive generalization previously performed. In this syllogism of analogy the inference is based upon the

logical principle that inasmuch as some things of a certain kind possess a certain well-marked quality, therefore the same quality will be found in the case of other things of the same kind. The individual instance under investigation may be regarded as a typical case, and, therefore, as standing for a class, it so far forth partakes of the nature of a universal. The common bond, moreover, which unites together objects of the same kind, and by virtue of which they are what they are, cannot be merely the result of a fortuitous coincidence of similar qualities, but is a necessary and essential characteristic of the very nature of the things themselves. This forms a natural transition to the syllogism of necessity.

The syllogism of necessity may be divided into three kinds : —

- (1) The Categorical Syllogism.
- (2) The Hypothetical Syllogism.
- (3) The Disjunctive Syllogism.

In the categorical syllogism the individual is referred to its appropriate universal by means of the intermediate particular, or species to which it more proximately belongs. This syllogism would be in some such form as follows : —

A certain individual belongs to a particular species.

The species belongs to a certain genus.

∴ The individual belongs to that same genus.

In the hypothetical syllogism the universal or the genus is represented as the ground of the particular or the species. Its major premise is of the form, "If *A* is, so is *B*." The minor premise represents the presence or the absence of the necessary condition, and the conclusion the resultant realization of the effect, or the failure to realize it, as the case may be.

In the disjunctive syllogism the universal is resolved into its component parts. It is the highest form of the syllogism, for it represents an exhaustive manifestation of the full concrete essence of the universal. The minor premise of this syllogism expresses what parts in any given cases are present or absent, and the conclusion expresses the resulting presence or absence of the other parts as thus determined.

This syllogism in its disjunctive form marks the natural transition also to the category of the notion in its second aspect, that of objectivity; for an exhaustive manifestation of the universal shows not merely the sum total of its thought relations, — that is, in reference to its purely sub-

jective aspect, for then its manifestation would be partial and not exhaustive, but it furnishes as well scope for its external actualization in the world of reality. The notion represents a totality, and that, too, is the essential function of the disjunctive syllogism, — to represent the given object of thought in its totality. Moreover, there is no such thing as a totality which is not realized in all of its concrete fulness. The notion, therefore, as a fundamental constructive principle, is not to be regarded as a force operative *in vacuo*, but in the concrete system of things, of persons and of events, in life and its wealth of inexhaustible possibilities.

CHAPTER XVI

THE OBJECTIVE NOTION

AS we have seen, Hegel regards the disjunctive syllogism as the point of transition from the subjective to the objective notion. Let us examine this statement more in detail, in order that we may the more clearly understand the essential relation of the subjective to the objective notion. The disjunctive syllogism is merely the subjective notion expressed in its highest and most complete form. It signifies as regards its syllogistic structure that the subjective notion is essentially an active process of thought, for this is the meaning of the syllogism in general; and as regards its disjunctive character, it indicates that the process in question is a complete unfolding of the total significance of the notion. Gathering together these characteristics in a single statement, we find that Hegel regards the subjective notion in its highest form of expression as an active

force, revealing its various phases through a process of mediation, in a manner which gives complete scope for the realization of all its possibilities. The subjective notion as thus conceived contains within the very conception itself the ground of its objectivity. In speaking of the transition from the subjective notion to the objective, we do not express correctly the significance of the Hegelian conception. It is not a transition properly speaking, for the objective lies within the subjective as a potential moment of the same. Hegel insists as a fundamental postulate of his whole system that the syllogistic process is not merely an act of consciousness. We have seen that the subjective notion contains the implicit categories of being, essence, existence, substantiality, cause and effect, and the like. The subjective may, therefore, be regarded as the programme of cosmic evolution, while the objective is the historical evolution itself. Either would be incomplete without the other. Again, the idea of an active process which is the essential significance of the subjective notion, necessitates a resulting product; and the product, which is the result of a mediation, it is true, is nevertheless as a product something immediate, and this immediacy is one

of the characteristic features of objectivity. Hegel defines an object as that which is "independent, concrete, and complete in itself."¹ There is only one conceivable object which perfectly fulfils the requirements of this definition,—the Absolute, God. The totality of all things, the universe in its progressive unfolding in space and time, represents the one all-embracing object. And while within this totality, Hegel recognizes separate and independent objects, nevertheless their reality is assured only in so far as they partake of the nature of the unifying Absolute underlying them, whose essential nature and being are independent of space and of time.

At this point Hegel refers to Kant's criticism of the ontological proof of the being of God, which is based upon the statement that the thought of a thing does not necessarily imply its existence, and insists that the highest expression of the subjective notion is an altogether unique thought, of such a nature as to combine the notion of God and His being in one. Hegel says, in commenting upon the Kantian criticism, in the introductory part of his *Logic*: —

"The unexampled favor and acceptance which

¹ § 103.

attended Kant's criticism of the ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To mark the difference between thought and being, he cited the instance of a hundred thalers which, as far as the notion is concerned, are the same hundred thalers, whether real or only possible, though the difference is manifest as regards their effect upon a man's purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or fancy is not on that account actual, and that a picture of the imagination or even a logical notion cannot attain to being. Setting aside the fact that it may not incorrectly be styled a barbarism of language to apply the term notion to things like a hundred thalers, it is still true that they who like to taunt the philosophic conception with the fundamental difference between being and thought, might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be, indeed, any more trivial observation than this? Above all, it must be remembered, when we speak of God, that we have an object of a very different kind than any hundred thalers, and unlike any particular notion, idea, or whatever we may choose to call it. The very nature of everything finite is

expressed by saying that its being in time and space differs from its notion. God should be, however, expressly conceived to be that which can only be 'thought of as existing.' His notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God."¹ The question which naturally suggests itself at this point is whether Hegel's system is not pantheistic, whether the individuality of man is not completely lost in the universality of God. If man is only a spectator for a brief time of an extremely limited portion of the great world evolution which is solely the external manifestation of God, which is in fact God, then the whole Hegelian system, as the product of the human mind, contradicts and stultifies itself by thus eliminating the human individuality as a real factor of the system itself. The question whether the system leads logically to pantheism, it is not in the scope and purpose of this work, as one simply of exposition, to discuss; nevertheless, it may be remarked in passing that Hegel himself stoutly maintains that individuality is not suppressed in universality, but is conserved (*aufgehoben*) in a higher state of being and existence, and he most emphatically

¹ § 51.

disclaims for his system this imputation of a pantheistic taint.¹

It has been seen that the warrant for the notion of objectivity is contained at the last analysis in the notion of the Absolute, "the only true being." So also, in a similar manner, the warrant for the notion of human personality, Hegel declares, is to be found only in the underlying, all-embracing personality of God. It is a thought similar to that of St. Paul, "In Him we live and move and have our being."

The notion of objectivity, as developed by Hegel, manifests itself in three forms:—

- (1) Mechanism. (*Der Mechanismus.*)
- (2) Chemism. (*Der Chemismus.*)
- (3) Teleology. (*Die Teleologie.*)

In the mechanical type, the objects stand related in an external manner, and without evincing any natural affinity as regards each other. They are immediate, and each indifferent to all the others.

In the chemical type, the objects exhibit an essential tendency to change and unite with others, so that their significance really lies in their union with something else.

In the third type, the teleological relation

¹ See § 151, *Zusatz.*

expresses the unity of mechanism and chemism. Like the mechanical object, it is, in a sense, a self-contained totality, inasmuch as a purpose has always some complete effect as an end in view; at the same time, it is subjected to the principle of differentiation and change in order to realize the end, which principle is the essential characteristic also of chemism.

Hegel divides the principle of mechanism into three kinds:—

(1) Formal Mechanism. (*Formeller Mechanismus.*)

(2) Mechanism accompanied by affinity. (*Differenter Mechanismus.*)

(3) Absolute Mechanism. (*Absoluter Mechanismus.*)

Formal mechanism possesses two essential characteristics. The object has the notion within it only as a potential; for the notion as subjective is primarily outside of it. And in the second place, the objects remain independent and are related to each other only in an external manner. Figuratively, we speak of a mechanical memory, where ideas are associated externally and where the element of thought to a large extent is omitted. Hegel says, "Whenever a man's mind and will are not in his actions, his

conduct is called mechanical.”¹ The relation which obtains between objects which are mechanically connected is one of pressure and of impact, which operate essentially as external forces.

The second form of mechanism has associated with it the element of affinity. An object which is operated upon by some external force is affected by it not merely according to the nature of the force operating upon it, but as well by its own nature. Thus a billiard ball made of ivory and another made of putty behave differently when subjected to precisely the same impact. Therefore, what it is possible for any object to effect mechanically does not depend merely upon its own native force, or as Hegel puts it, its own centrality (*die Centralität*), but also upon the nature of the object upon which it acts as well, — that is, the centrality of the other lying outside of itself. In other words, no object is fully self-centred; and when two objects are so related that the centre of each must receive some complementary element which belongs to the centre of the other in order to complete its significance, the relation between them is of this second type, that of

¹ § 195.

mechanism with affinity. The illustrations of this order of mechanism which Hegel gives are the relation of gravitation, in which the result varies according to the relative centrality of each of the objects mutually attracted; the relation of desire to its object; and the relation of the social instinct which binds together the different members of one and the same society.

Every object may be regarded as a system within itself. The centre of such a system Hegel calls an abstract centre, — that is, without reference to anything outside of itself. When two objects come into a mechanical relation, one to the other, the centre of each in turn becomes the relative centre of the other. The centre of that system which includes the two objects and their relative centres within its scope is the absolute centre. Absolute mechanism is merely the fully expressed form of the type of mechanism with affinity. These relations of the various kinds of centres may be illustrated by the mutual attraction of two masses, each of which may be represented as concentrated at a single point, which is its abstract centre. Each point has in turn a relative centre in the other, and both are referable to an absolute centre which lies between them.

Thus the earth revolves about the sun as its relative centre; its absolute centre lies between earth and sun in such a way that the earth and sun both revolve about it. However, the absolute centre is so near the sun centre that the difference is discounted, and we refer simply to the earth's revolution about the central sun. But to speak precisely, the real centre of the system lies between the earth centre and the sun centre. Inasmuch as this is a mechanical relation, it is dynamic. And the dynamic always expresses itself in a syllogistic process, — that is, the mediation of two terms by means of a common or middle term. We have, therefore, a triad of syllogisms, corresponding to the three possible mechanical relations. Let I represent any individual object, P its particular or relative centre, and U the universal or absolute centre.

The resulting syllogisms would be as follows: —

(1) The type expressed by the formula I-P-U, in which the relative centre is regarded as the mediating term between the individual object and its absolute centre.

(2) The type expressed by the formula U-I-P, in which the individual object forms

the mean between its relative and absolute centres.

(3) The type expressed by the formula P-U-I, in which the universal or absolute centre is the mean between the individual object and its relative centre.

As an illustration of these three syllogisms, Hegel cites the state in its various relations to the individual and his particular needs. "In the first instance, the individual in virtue of his particular being, or his physical and mental needs (which when completely developed give civil society) enters into union with the universal,—that is, with society, law, right, government. Secondly, the will or conduct of the individuals is the intermediating force which procures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, etc., and which gives to society, law, etc., their fulfilment and realization. But, thirdly, the universal—that is, the state, government, and law—is the mean, the underlying substance in which the individuals and their satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, intermediation, and persistence." ¹

In mechanism the related objects preserve a quasi independence; but when they lose their

¹ § 198.

independence in the affinity which each has for its antithesis, and they so coalesce that the identity of each is merged in the product resulting from their combination, then the relation thus characterized is that of chemism. Thus a natural transition is effected from the mechanical relation to the chemical. The product thus formed is a neutral, inasmuch as the individual striving of each of the elements which constitute it ceases completely when the process has been finished and the product alone remains. However, concerning this neutral, which we may regard as the mean, it may be resolved by chemical analysis into the two original extremes. But the inverse process is independent of the former combining process. The resulting product does not of itself separate into its component parts. The first process exhausts itself, and its activity ceases when once the product has been formed. There is in these operations of chemical combination and of chemical analysis no centre of initiation. Chemical affinity seems in a manner to be a kind of selective attraction, and yet there is no self-directing activity. If there were, it would have a longer life, and not consume its energy in the process of using it. The chemical pro-

cess, therefore, does not rise above a conditioned and finite activity. "The notion, as notion, is only the heart and core of the process, and does not in this stage come to existence in its own individual being. In the neutral product the process is extinct, and the existing cause falls outside of it."¹

This lack of spontaneous activity, of all initiative, indicates a state which is unsatisfactory in the extreme. The very nature of thought constrains us to demand some more fundamental relation than either mechanism or chemism as the supreme principle of activity in the universe. Such a relation must involve the element of purpose or finality, in which there is a liberation of the notion or reason. It is in the teleological relation that we find an explicit and undisguised manifestation of a supreme principle of intelligence in its free conscious activity. In mechanism and chemism the notion is present, it is true, but only in the germ, and not yet evolved. The notion, however, in the form of the aim or end (*der Zweck*) comes into an existence of its own. In the lower relations the notion is imprisoned, as it were, behind the barriers of objectivity. But

¹ § 202, *Zusatz*.

in the teleological relation these barriers are burst asunder, the objectivity overcome, and the subjectivity of the notion completely asserted. Hegel expresses this by saying that the idea of an end to be achieved is the negation of immediate objectivity; it is also a recognition of the antithesis between subject and object, and the overcoming of the same. Thus when we entertain a purpose in mind, its subjective character is antithetical to the purpose conceived as realized objectively. But when the purpose in the mind goes forth into action, and the objective end is actually realized, then all difference between the end in view and the end achieved has been overcome, and there is a complete synthesis of subjective and objective.

The difference between efficient cause and final cause may be indicated at this point. The efficient cause appears as passing into its other, the effect, and it therefore loses its essential priority in the latter by sinking into a sort of dependency. The aim or end, on the other hand, must necessarily contain in its own nature the determining and significant factors of the whole resulting process. In the simple causal relation the effect seems to emphasize its nature of otherness as regards its cause.

By aim or end we must not think merely of the purposes which are ever present in consciousness, and which we achieve by means of objects external to us. There is also an inner design, an immanent finality in things themselves, as has been emphasized both by Aristotle and Kant. The purely external design, the adaptation of means to ends, may be seen in the various phenomena of utility. Hegel cites as an illustration of the relation of the subjective to the objective in teleology the case of appetite or desire. There is the subjective desire, on the one hand, and the object which will satisfy it, on the other. But the two are apart, and therein consists the contradiction between them. It is only in the complete satisfaction of the desire through the attainment of its object, that this contradiction is overcome, and the two extremes, subjectivity and objectivity, become reconciled. The teleological relation is represented by a syllogism, in which the subjective design coalesces with its external object, by means of a middle term which constitutes the unity of both. The middle term is the means which is used to bring about the desired result.

Hegel marks three stages in the development of the subjective design.

(1) The Subjective End. (*Der subjective Zweck.*)

(2) The End in process of accomplishment. (*Der sich vollführende Zweck.*)

(3) The End accomplished. (*Der vollführte Zweck.*)

The first syllogism of final cause is made up of the following three terms: —

The universal is the end indefinitely desired.

The particular is the end definitely desired, as a particular mode of the universal in question.

The individual is the self whose activity makes a particular choice out of the various possibilities which the indefinite universal embraces.

Thus, we might have as an indefinite end in view, the building of a house. This would stand as a universal admitting of an indefinite variety of particular modes of realization. The individual choice would then appear as the determining force, initiating the actual process of accomplishment towards a specific end.

In the second place the initiative activity of the individual throws itself immediately upon something objective which it appropriates to

itself as means of bringing about the desired end. Here the middle term is the subjective power of the notion tending to bring together the subjective end desired and the objective material which is to be used in its realization. In finite design the mediating term in this process is twofold, a combination of the active powers of the individual, and the objective material upon which they work as the means of realizing the end in view. Thus, in the illustration of building a house, the materials used in its construction must be first immediately appropriated by the constructive mind before they can become its instruments in the actual putting together of part to part in the realization of the complete architectural design, which process is essentially one of mediation, — that is, syllogistic. Or to cite Hegel's illustration, drawn from another and a higher source: "Every living being has a body; the soul takes possession of it, and in that act has at once objectified itself. The human soul has much to do before it makes its corporeal nature into a means. Man must, as it were, take possession of his body, so that it may be the instrument of his soul." ¹

¹ § 208, *Zusatz*.

All this is preliminary to the actual realization of the design by means of the objective materials and forces which have been both invaded and pervaded by the purposing mind. This brings us to the point where the end is finally realized, — the third and last stage in the process. Now while the subjective end rules these material processes which are the mechanical and chemical forces already described, it does so without losing itself in them. It takes advantage of their activity and compels them to serve its ends, while its controlling intelligence is in the background. This Hegel calls the craft of reason (*die List der Vernunft*). The craft of reason consists in the controlling sway which it exercises over objects while yet permitting them to obey their own mechanical or chemical bent. "Divine Providence," says Hegel, "may be said to stand to the world and its processes in the capacity of absolute craft.¹ God lets men direct their particular passions and interests as they

¹ Wallace in this connection translates the word *List* as cunning. When applied to the Deity, it is apt to leave an incorrect and rather disconcerting impression. The word "craft," which may also offend the sentiments of some when applied to God, seems, however, to be less objectionable in this respect, and has therefore been used in the above translation.

please ; but the result is accomplished, — not of their plans but of His, and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom He employs.”¹

The realized end expresses the complete unity of the subjective and the objective ; but in finite design the accomplished aim is itself no less fragmentary and defective than was the initial aim and means used in the process of its realization. The end which is achieved is only itself an object, which may again become the means or material for other purposes, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Infinite design is, on the other hand, of such a nature that it comprises within its own self the means to realize its ends. The process of the same is one of self-mediation. It is the self-determined notion, representing the complete unity of subject and object. This Hegel calls the idea (*die Idee*), — a term which he has selected in order to emphasize its nature as that which is essentially and fundamentally reason itself.

In mechanism and chemism the notion appears as *an sich*, — that is, implicit. In the teleological relation, it is *für sich*, — that is, explicit.

¹ § 229, *Zusatz*.

But in the eternal purpose (*die Idee*) it is both *an sich und für sich*, — that is, revealing itself by the light of its own nature in a manifestation completely self-determined and self-directed.

CHAPTER XVII

THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON

HEGEL identifies the idea with truth. By truth he means the complete correspondence of any object with its notion. That is only a formal truth, mere correctness, which consists solely in a reference to our consciousness. Truth in a deeper sense is the identification of subject and object. In this sense the Absolute is the idea, the truth itself. Every individual object of knowledge represents a phase of the Absolute, but a partial and imperfect phase. Every finite object fails to realize its notion completely, and therefore is so far forth limited and defective. All objects are true so far as they prove to be what they ought to be. The true man is the ideal man, — that is, one who perfectly realizes the idea of a man. So also the true state, the true work of art, are such so far only as they realize their ideal.

The idea, moreover, as we have already seen, is not merely the underlying substance of all

things. It is essentially the subject. It is personal and conscious as well as intelligent. All individuals find their truth in this one universal mind which upholds all things by His wisdom, power, and love. Far from being a mere abstract conception, the idea is the most concrete of all possible manifestations, for it embraces the totality of all objectivity. The categories of being, essence, and the notion find their truth only in this supreme category of the idea.

The mere understanding would criticise the doctrine of the idea as containing inconsistencies and contradictions, such as are expressed in the terms, "subject and object," "finite and infinite," "the ideal and the real," "the one and the many." Yet it must be remembered that it is of the very nature of the dialectic that the idea, inasmuch as it embraces the totality of the universe, should involve contradictions; but which, however, at the same time it is sufficient to overcome, and to present in a profounder unity. The activity of the idea is eternal. The cosmic process is fundamentally the manifestation of reason; it is the idea revealing itself in objectivity. The idea represents an infinite judgment whose several terms consti-

tute an independent totality of such a nature that each term growing to the fulness of its own being passes over into its other and advanced form, thus providing for a progressive evolution of the one central idea which is eternally self-complete and self-sufficient. None of the other categories exhibits this totality as complete in its two essential aspects of subjectivity and objectivity.

Hegel refers to the dialectic process of the manifestation of the idea as an absolute negativity (*absolute Negativität*),—that is, a process in which there is an antagonism of opposites, which is the first negative; but this antagonism is overcome by means of the negation of the first negative, which is the absolute negation or real affirmation. Thus the notion as subjective is arrayed against the notion as objective, but this contradiction is overcome by an immanent dialectic which finds its way back again to a subjectivity which embraces objectivity as well. This state is something more than the mere unity of subjective and objective, or of the infinite and finite; for as Hegel insists, the idea is essentially a process which implies the idea of movement, whereas the term unity implies rest. Moreover, it is not a mere unity in which the infinite

has been neutralized by the finite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being; but in the absolute negative function of the idea, — that is, the overcoming of antithesis by a more profound synthesis, — the infinite is to be regarded as overlapping and embracing the finite; so also thought embraces being, and subjectivity embraces objectivity. The idea in its process of development passes through three distinct stages : —

(1) The Idea as Life. (*Das Leben.*)

(2) The Idea as Knowledge. (*Das Erkennen.*)

(3) The Absolute Idea. (*Die absolute Idee.*)

In the first form the idea is revealed in its simplest state as immediate, — that is, without manifesting the underlying ground by which it is constituted and the relations which it is capable of sustaining.

In the second form the idea appears in its state of mediation or differentiation, — that is, it has become specified and definite by the manifestation of its particular characteristics and relations. It is in this stage that the idea becomes conscious of itself. Its essential form is that of knowledge, both theoretical and practical. The process of knowledge leads to a final

synthesis which embraces all of the specific differences revealed in the process of development. This gives the third form of the idea, the absolute idea which as the last term of the evolution proves itself to be the first also, and the underlying basis of the process as a whole. It is the source, ground, consummation all in one. In its primary form the idea is manifested immediately as life. This is the initial point in the objectifying of the subjective notion. As a beginning, it is to be merely accepted as immediately given. Starting, therefore, with this datum of a living being, Hegel proceeds to analyze its nature. Every living being is an individual, preserving its individuality through all the various changes of bodily growth, and the indefinite variety of its particular moods and activities. Moreover, all particular manifestations are to be referred to a central principle which is the ground of their unity and the source of their being and activity. This central principle is by nature essentially a universal. Thus in a living body we have exhibited the universal principle of its being, its soul centre, also its particular activities and phenomenal manifestation, and the individuality which is self-preserved in the midst of all possible variations. The living body, therefore, embraces in

the simplest possible form the three moments of the notion, individuality, particularity, and universality. All of its component parts form a complex system exhibiting, as Hegel styles it, a negative unity (*negative Einheit*),—that is, a unity which combines within itself differentiated, opposed, but at the same time essentially related parts; it is a unity in the midst of difference.

The defect of life consists in the fact that its notion and its reality do not correspond. It is characteristic of life that soul and body are separable. The notion of life is the soul, and the soul has the body for its reality. But in its simplest and primary manifestation the soul is, as it were, poured out and diffused into the corporeal elements, and, therefore, the soul is in its earliest stage sentient only, and not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life consists in overcoming this preliminary stage of being and reaching the stage of self-consciousness. This process, however, has to run through three stages before it attains to the higher level of knowledge.

The first stage is the process of the living being within itself. Its corporeal parts are relatively external, and present an evident distinction and antagonism between its elements which

are surrendered to one another, assimilate one another, and persist by reproducing themselves. All these functions, however, are to be referred to the activity of the architectonic principle within; consequently the underlying unity is preserved in the midst of this indefinite variety of seemingly independent functions. The process of the vital subject within its own limits appears in the three forms of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction.

As sensibility the soul is present in every part of the body, so that their independence and mutual exclusiveness is only a seeming, and they are in reality merely elements of one and the same central and all-pervading subject.

As irritability, the living being seems to break up into separate parts, a process of differentiation.

As reproduction, the living being is perpetually restoring itself out of the inner differentiation of its members.

In the second stage the living being proceeds to exert its power over inorganic nature; it subdues and assimilates it to itself. The result of this process is not a neutral product as in chemistry, but the living being embraces the inorganic elements within its own life. The inorganic nature, however, which is subdued by the vital

agent, surrenders itself in the process because it is potentially what life is actually. This is in full accord with the fundamental postulate of the Hegelian system that there is but one elemental force in the universe, the mind force, and that it underlies the elements of inert matter as well as the vital forces and activities. When, therefore, a living being assimilates its corporeal elements, matter is raised to a higher level in which is effected the realization of its potential essence. Thus, even in its material elements, the living body may be said to find itself. When, however, the soul is separated from its body in death, the elemental forces of objectivity begin their play upon the lower mechanical and chemical level. There is even in life a constant tendency in these forces to assert their lower functions, and life is a perpetual battle to subdue and elevate them.

The result of this continuous process of assimilation gives us the third stage in the development of life, a combination of particular organs and functions constituting a definite and specific order of the living being, which Hegel characterizes as implicitly a genus or kind (*eine Gattung an sich*). The living being, regarded as a genus, ranks as a universal. This universal

particularizes itself in a number of individuals through the connection of the living subject with another subject of its own kind.

The process of the genus brings it to a being of its own. But the being as an individual is dependent and mediated. The individual is implicitly a universal, but in his immediate existence is merely an individual. Death shows that the universal is the power that upholds the immediate individual. The mere animal never proceeds so far in its generic life as to have a being of its own. It yields to the domination of the genus. Tennyson has given expression to this Hegelian idea in the lines : —

“ Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams, —
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life.”

In the process of life, however, there is a constant struggle to overcome the immediacy which is the defect of life, so that the idea may come to itself, and realize its own truth in a free existence of its own. That which appears as a generic universal in a lower sphere extricates itself and manifests itself as Ego or consciousness in its higher evolution. It is the process of the idea coming to a consciousness of itself,

and in this higher form it exists free and for itself. In this consciousness, two judgments are involved. The first is a distinguishing of itself in its pure nature as subjectivity; the second, the recognition of an objectivity seemingly external to itself. On the one hand, there is the Ego, the universal reason, and, on the other, the non-ego, or the objective world. The one is spirit, the other is nature. The two are implicitly identical but not yet necessarily recognized as explicitly identical. That the identity of nature and spirit should be only implicit is the mark of finitude. It is the peculiar office of reason to render explicit their fundamental identity. It is in the process of cognition, therefore, in the idea coming to a self-consciousness, that the onesidedness of subjectivity and of objectivity is overcome. In this process there is, on the one hand, a rationalizing of the objective world,—that is, its translation into subjective conception and thought; and on the other, an assertion of subjective ideals in the midst of the objective phenomena of being, modifying and adapting them to its needs and standards. The tendency of thought to rationalize the universe,—to interpret by reducing it to the simplest forms of description and formulating its funda-

mental laws,—this is the labor of science in its search for truth, and is, according to Hegel, cognition properly so called, or the theoretical activity of the idea. The tendency to compel the phenomenal world to conform to the ideals of reason, and to realize the ascendancy of the good, is the peculiar office of the practical activity of the idea, or volition. Thus cognition is of two kinds:—

- (1) Theoretical Knowledge, or Cognition Proper. (*Das Erkennen als solches.*)
- (2) Practical Knowledge, or Volition. (*Das Wollen.*)

The finite cognition labors under the difficulty of being unable to overcome the antithesis of subject and object. The reception of the material data of the senses by the cognizing subject seems to be merely an assimilation by the thought process of that which is in a way foreign to it. Its categories never enter into complete union with it. Therefore, while reason is active here as everywhere, it is reason in the form of the understanding merely, and it fails to reach the higher level of reason in two particulars: It presupposes an objective world already given and ready made, and secondly, it views the mind as a *tabula rasa*, which is

perfectly passive in receiving and recording impressions made upon it by the data of sense-perception. The true view of the subject in its cognition of the object is that the mind is an active force not merely confronting the objective world, but in it, and through it, and underlying it as well.

Finite cognition, working even upon the lower level in which a ready-made world in antithesis to the knowing subject is the nature of the presupposition framed by the perceiving mind, operates in two distinct forms:—

(1) The Analytic Method. (*Die analytische Methode.*)

(2) The Synthetic Method. (*Die synthetische Methode.*)

The analytic method examines every individual phenomenon for the purpose of discovering its various particular characteristics, separating the essential from the unessential, and then referring it to its appropriate genus, cause, or law as the case may be, any one of which would represent its corresponding universal.

The movement of the synthetic method is the reverse of the analytic method. The starting-point of the synthetic method is that of the universal. Its activity is essentially construc-

tive. It works as an architectonic principle to produce all the particular manifestations of itself which are possible in accordance with its essential and universal nature, and as revealed ultimately in the organization and completed being of concrete individuals. For the various elements which enter into the constructive activity of the notion, Hegel employs the following terms:—

The essential nature of the fundamental universal in its synthetic activity is given by definition.

The particular manifestations of which it is in general capable are given by division.

The concrete individuality, which is always some definite object, constituted by a nexus of complex relations, is called a theorem.

The process which supplies the necessary elements which serve as mediating terms in the nexus of complex relations is called the process of construction. Its function is to fuse into one these different elemental parts.

The process from which cognition derives the necessity of this nexus is called demonstration.

Hegel has taken the names of these familiar logical processes, which in the traditional logic are essentially thought processes, and in the

present connection has applied them to the actual dynamic processes operative throughout the entire realm of nature in the production of all beings animate and inanimate, each fashioned in particular forms according to its kind. Moreover, it is the function of cognition to prove that the relations between the different elements in the objective world which it perceives are necessary relations. It is in this process, which Hegel calls demonstration, that an underlying necessity is revealed, whereas in the primary presupposition of finite thought the world is regarded as simply given and, as far as known, its relations contingent and variable. But in the process of cognition itself, there has been a progress towards an appreciation of existent relations as necessary. This necessity, Hegel affirms, is the necessity of reason. It is reached by subjective agency. This subjectivity was conceived at the starting-point by mere understanding as a *tabula rasa*. This conception must now give place to the higher conception of the reason. Subjective thought must be regarded as essentially active, as a modifying and determining principle in the midst of the crude data of sense-perception. The knowing mind is essentially active, and in the manifesta-

tion of this activity it determines the manner and the end of that activity. Thus the transition is effected from theoretical to practical cognition,—that is, from cognition proper to volition. The significance of this, according to Hegel, is that a true appreciation of the nature of the universal necessitates its apprehension as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active, and imposing modifications. It merely emphasizes in this particular connection the fundamental principle of the entire Hegelian system, the recognition of the ultimate nature of reason as dynamic,—or, in other words, that the all-embracing unitary force in the universe is spirit and not matter.

In volition the subjective idea is ever striving to assert itself and to mould the world, which stands seemingly opposed to it, into a shape conformable to its own ends. The end which is ever dominant in the activity of the universal reason is the realization of the good. At this point in Hegel's system the dialectic movement reaches a level at which the logical and ethical lines converge. Thus, intelligence takes the world as it finds it; the will proposes to make the world what it ought to be. But here the finitude of volition is obvious, inasmuch as there

exists a constant contradiction between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be. However, in the process of the will itself, it abolishes its own finitude and overcomes the contradiction therein involved, and this is effected by producing a unity between the theoretical and practical idea,—that is, when that which is corresponds perfectly with that which ought to be. The idea possesses the deeper insight which recognizes that the discrepancies between the real and ideal are merely superficial, that essentially they are in accord, and that the world perfectly reveals the full purpose of its immanent notion.

Thus the idea is stripped of all finitude. It is the Absolute Idea; as defined by Hegel, it is the unity of the theoretical idea which regards the world as it is, and the practical idea which endeavors to make the world what it ought to be. Moreover, as cognition implies life, the Absolute Idea is a unity of cognition and life as well. It embraces naturally all the moments which enter into the evolution of the idea. In life, regarded merely as immediate being, the idea appears *an sich*,—that is, implicitly; in cognition it appears *für sich*,—that is, the idea as explicitly conscious of itself. In the Absolute Idea it is both *an sich und für sich*,—that is,

self-contained and all-embracing. All the movements of its development fall within the sphere of its own determination. The idea has need of no support upon which to rest; it acknowledges no dependence upon any element outside of itself. In its evolution there are no contingent factors or external conditions. "The idea," says Hegel, "is the *νόησις νοήσεως* which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea."¹ The true content of this idea, that which it thinks about and acts upon,—for it must be remembered that the idea is both cognitive and active,—must be regarded as the entire system, whose development we have been following. Of this evolution the Absolute Idea is the consummation,—a consummation, however, which is not the resulting product of the process itself; for while the idea is the last term of the series it is also the first term, and the ground of the whole process as well. The true significance of the idea is admirably illustrated by Hegel in the following paragraph, which is well worth quoting in full :—

"With this retrospect of the process of development the Absolute Idea may be likened to an old man, who expresses the same religious

¹ § 236, *Zusatz*.

convictions as a child, but for whom they possess the added significance of his whole life. Even if the child understands in a measure the truths of religion, still they have value for him only in a limited sphere, outside of which lies the whole span of life and the wide, wide world. Such is the case with human life in general and the various events which constitute its fullness. All labor is directed towards some goal, and when it is reached, we are surprised to discover nothing else save the bare end itself which had been purposed. The interest, however, lies in the whole movement. As a man pursues his life's vocation, the mere end itself may appear to him very circumscribed; but in the attainment, whatever it may be, the whole *decursus vitæ* is comprehended. So, also, the content of the Absolute Idea is the complete sweep of its onward movement which we have followed thus far. There is, finally, the recognition that the development as a whole constitutes both its content and its interest. Moreover, it is peculiarly the philosophical insight which is able to appreciate that while everything, when regarded in its isolation, may appear restricted, nevertheless, its real value consists in its relation to the whole and its function as an essential

moment or factor in the Absolute Idea. Thus it is that having had the content, we now have the knowledge that this content is the living unfolding of the idea, and that this simple retrospect is contained in the very form of the idea itself. Each of the stages hitherto surveyed is an image of the Absolute, at the beginning, however, with restricted limitations, and consequently it is self-constrained to press forward to a complete revelation, which process is the dialectic method of development.”¹

¹ § 237, *Zusatz*.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RELATION OF THE LOGIC TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

THE exposition of the *Logic* would be incomplete without a word, at least, in reference to the relation of the *Logic* to the two other philosophical disciplines of Hegel. *The Philosophy of Nature* (*Die Naturphilosophie*), *The Philosophy of Mind* (*Die Philosophie des Geistes*). These two form the second and third parts respectively of the *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

It would seem at the first glance as though these sciences were arranged in the order of a serial development, so that *The Philosophy of Nature* would represent an advance upon the first part of the *Encyclopædia*, the *Logic*; and *The Philosophy of Mind*, the completion and consummation of the two preceding disciplines. This view, however, is erroneous and mislead-

ing. A careful student of the *Logic* cannot fail to be impressed with its fundamental doctrine, that the supreme reason, or the Absolute Idea, is the creative and sustaining principle of all being, and not merely a principle of abstract thought as such. And this present exposition will have failed of its purpose if it has not left a similar impression upon the reader's mind. This principle, being granted as fundamental and essential to the Hegelian system,—namely, that the rational is also the real and that the laws of thought are the laws of being,—it follows, consequently, that both nature and mind must be regarded as falling within the scope of the all-embracing reason, or idea. It is affirmed again and again of the idea that it constitutes the totality of all being, and as such, therefore, it must comprehend the spheres both of nature and of mind.

Moreover, Hegel himself insists that it is a false mode of statement to speak of the transition from the idea to nature, and thence to mind. The term transition (*der Uebergang*) has acquired in the Hegelian usage a peculiar significance. It means always an advance from an incomplete stage of development to a higher and more complete. This was found to be

the case in every step of the progress from the simplest conception of immediate being to the complete all-embracing idea. The idea, moreover, represents that stage of development which is absolutely sufficient unto itself. It not only completes all defects, removes all limitations, and resolves all contradictions, but it is in the fulness of its own nature incapable alike of supplementation or of deterioration. To speak, therefore, of a transition from the idea to nature, would imply that the idea needed the concept of nature as a necessary complement in order to supply its defects and overcome its contradictions. Hegel expressly states that the idea does not become nature, but that it is nature. From this point of view, therefore, *The Philosophy of Nature* may be regarded as an attempt to rationalize nature, — that is, to show that throughout all of its processes and underlying all its forces, and forming the essence of all its laws, there is ever present the immanent reason.

Again, the transition from any given stage of development to a higher and complementary stage is always brought about through the inner constraint of thought. The transition is always conceived as a necessary one (*gesetzt.*) The

nature of thought is such that it is constrained to proceed onward to perfection. But from the idea to nature there is no transition in such a sense. On the contrary, Hegel insists most emphatically that the entire system of nature is the result solely and simply of the free activity of the idea. As he expresses it, "the idea primarily resolves as the outcome of its own inherent being to allow itself freely to reveal its essential being as nature."¹ We have seen that the idea possesses not merely a knowing function but also a willing function as well. It is essentially an active force. The whole tendency of its being as dynamic is to reveal its activity along the lines of the free manifestation of its own nature. The Absolute Idea, however, by no means exhausts itself or loses itself in its self-revelation as nature and as mind. The supreme reason, the Absolute Idea, God, however He may be named, is in and through all His works, yet nevertheless transcends them. This is unequivocally expressed by Hegel in the larger *Logic* as follows:— "The content of the *Logic* is the revelation of God as He is in His eternal essence before ever the world was formed, or a finite spirit came

¹ § 244.

into being.”¹ We may say, therefore, that it is of the very essence of the divine spirit to reveal Himself, and that such a revelation comprehends both nature and mind, and yet the Absolute Ego is not absorbed in the revelation itself.

But may it not be possible that the revelation itself is illusory, a passing shadow with no corresponding substance? The dialectic movement which we have been following from its beginning to end would seem to confirm this view, inasmuch as all finite beings and all finite relations fail of self-sufficiency and permanency in the various stages of their development, and only in the Absolute Idea is there found a satisfactory resting-place for the thought which has tested all preceding stages and found them wanting. “The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are unseen are eternal.” Is, then, the whole cosmic process in time and space a fleeting show? Is the spirit of man but the flashing ray of the central sun, lost forever in the dark and void, or perchance returning again in other forms to be reabsorbed in the primeval light? On the contrary, Hegel in his *Philosophy of Nature* and his *Philosophy of*

¹ *Log.*, I, 33.

Mind endeavors to ground these essential manifestations of being upon substantial foundations. Nature cannot be illusory, a mere seeming, for there is immanent in it the Absolute Idea. And so also the finite mind does not fall outside of the infinite, but within the area of its being and power. Moreover, inasmuch as the Absolute Idea is essentially a free activity, and as the human spirit partakes of the very nature of this Idea, its freedom is thereby assured and with its freedom, its immortality.

By way of summary, it may be stated that the problem of the *Logic* is solved in the Absolute Idea, that fundamental principle of reason which is self-explanatory and capable of explaining all lower categories which are to be regarded merely as particular phases of its own self. But in the unfolding of the dialectic process which eventuates in the Absolute Idea, it is discovered that reason is essentially a principle of activity as well as a principle of knowledge. The Absolute Idea, therefore, as the supreme expression of reason, reveals its own nature in the cosmic processes; and in spite of the temporal and spatial contingencies of the great world system, it demonstrates its own eternal nature and purposes as the ground and end of it all.

For the enduring and abiding elements in the cosmic order are those which partake of the nature of the Absolute Idea, and which come to a full revelation in the mind of man, disclosing his affinity with the Absolute Mind, and stirring within his breast intimations of divinity and immortality.

APPENDIX

A GLOSSARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS IN HEGEL'S LOGIC

Absolut: That which is unconditioned and conditions all things. That which is complete within itself, all-embracing, all-determining, the infinite, the eternal, God. In its highest expression, it is the *absolute Idee*.

Abstrakt: A one-sided and partial view of any object of knowledge; a term used in contrast to concrete, which signifies a comprehensive view of things embracing all possible considerations as to the nature of the things themselves, their origin, and the manifold relations which they may sustain.

Allgemein, Allgemeinheit: Universal, universality. The universal is not merely the summation of the various marks which are common to a number of individuals, by virtue of which they are regarded as members of one and the same group or class. The term has attached to it the additional significance of possessing a dynamic essence which is the source and the active constructive principle of all its particular manifestations.

Analytisch: Analytical; in contrast with synthetical (*synthetisch*). The analytical method examines every individual phenomenon for the purpose of discovering its various particular characteristics, separating the essential from the unessential, and referring it to its appropriate cause, law, or genus, — that is, to its corresponding universal.

The synthetical method starts, on the other hand, with the universal. Its activity is essentially constructive. It works as an architectonic principle to produce all the particular manifestations which are possible in accordance with its essential and universal nature, and as revealed ultimately in the organization and completed being of concrete individuals.

Das Andere: The other, — that is, the complementary aspect, of any object of knowledge which is necessary to the complete understanding of its significance; its correlative. The other may be a cognate species, or the end for which the object in question may be used, or some other object with which it is essentially related; it is, in short, the complete setting of the object which gives to it depth and completeness of meaning. As applied to the process of development, the other of any stage in the process is the subsequent stage which lies immediately beyond it, and which for the time being is contrasted with it, but into which it passes through the constraint of the dialectic movement.

Anschauung: Perception. A direct and immediate knowing, as opposed to knowledge obtained by the mediating process of thought. The object may belong either to the internal or to the external sense. See *Vorstellung*.

An sich: In itself; a phrase used to signify that which is implicit, or potential, in contrast to the phrase *für sich*, which signifies that which is explicit or actual. The phrase which is compounded of these two contrasted phrases, *an und für sich*, signifies that which possesses the capacity of transforming whatever is potential into the actual manifestation of the same; it is the capacity for self-determination and self-direction.

Aufheben, aufgehoben: To transmute, transmuted. There are three distinct though related ideas which this term expresses, — to destroy a thing in its original form, to restore it in another form, and to elevate it upon a higher plane. It represents always a progress in thought and in development. It is difficult to translate this term by any one English word. To transmute or to conserve would perhaps approximately express its meaning.

Bedingung: Condition; whatever is necessary in causation to the eventuation of the effect.

Begriff: Notion. It is the universal principle of reason which underlies all processes of thought. It is essentially dynamic. It is not merely the supreme category of thought, but it is also the fundamental law of being as well. It is the creative architectonic force of the universe. While *Seyn* is being, regarded merely as that which is immediately given, unexplained, unrelated, and unanalyzed, and *Wesen* refers to the underlying principles of being, its manifold relations, and essential ground, the *Begriff* represents a far deeper insight; it is more than the mere source of determination and efficiency, it is the central force of self-determination and self-specification, realizing its own subjective purposes through their essential manifestation in the world of objectivity, and as such it constitutes the truth both of *Seyn* and of *Wesen*.

Beisichseyn: Being by itself; applied to an object of knowledge to indicate that it is self-sufficient and self-contained. See *Fürsichseyn*.

Besonderheit: Particularity; having significance only, however, when recognized as the particular of some universal.

Bestimmung: From *bestimmen*, to define or determine; it is that differentiating capacity which gives to any

object of thought definite form and character. The *Denkbestimmungen* are the most general forms of thought determination, and which themselves determine all others of a more particular or specific nature, — the categories.

Bestimmt: Specifically determined.

Bestimmtheit: The actual realization of the capacity expressed by *Bestimmung*; it signifies a state of definiteness; it refers to the specific and determinate character of any object of knowledge.

Beweis: Demonstration. See *Definition*.

Beziehung auf sich: A phrase which indicates a relation existing within the boundaries of the object of knowledge itself. From such a point of view the object of knowledge is regarded as a closed system, and for the time being, at least, isolated in reference to any larger system or systems with which it may sustain essential relations.

Beziehung in Anderes: Indicates the essential relation of any object of knowledge to that which confronts it as peculiarly its other, — that is, its necessary complement in some larger system of thought within which the given object of knowledge together with its other necessarily fall.

Sich auf sich beziehende Negativität. See *Negativität*.

Daseyn: Being which is definitely determined in contrast to *Seyn*, mere being which is wholly indefinite and undetermined. *Daseyn* is also used in contrast to *Existenz*, which latter signifies being which is definitely determined, but with an implied reference to the source of the being in question, its essential ground. The terms *Seyn*, *Daseyn*, *Existenz*, form a series which represents successive stages in the progress of thought as regards a more precise determination and explanation.

Definition: Definition. The essential nature of the fundamental universal in its synthetic activity is given by definition. The particular manifestations of which it is in general capable are given by division (*Division*). The concrete individuality which is always some definite object constituted by a nexus of complex relations is called a theorem (*Theorem*). The process which supplies the necessary elements which serve as mediating terms in this nexus of complex relations is called the process of construction (*Konstruktion*); its function is to fuse into one these different elemental parts. The process from which cognition derives the necessity of this nexus is called demonstration (*Beweis*).

Denkbestimmungen: Categories. See *Bestimmung*.

Dialektik: Dialectic, a term used as a general characterization of the Hegelian method. It signifies that process of thought which recognizes the inherent contradiction involved in every finite statement, and at the same time possesses the capacity of overcoming by an appropriate synthesis every observed contradiction upon a higher level of thought.

The term is used in two senses, the one referring to the threefold process as a whole; the other solely to the second stage of the process, that of contradiction.

Differenz: Difference. This term can be defined only in its relation to the term *Identität* (identity). They are so related that the differences which obtain between objects have significance only when contrasted with an essential identity which forms their background, and in like manner the identity which may be affirmed in any instance has significance only when brought into relief by the contrast of some underlying difference. When identity and

difference are used as predicates without this reference to each other, there arises the false and unmeaning abstraction of mere difference or mere identity.

Ding an sich: The thing in itself. This Kantian phrase is used in a peculiar manner by Hegel. With him the *Ding an sich* refers always to the thing in its germinal or potential state. The seed, for instance, is the plant in itself; the child is the man in himself.

Division: Division. See *Definition*.

Eigenschaft: The quality, property, or attribute of a thing.

Einzelheit: Individuality. The individual object of knowledge has significance only when the particular and differentiating characteristics are known which make it possible to refer the individual in question to its proper universal.

Entwicklung: Evolution, development. The dialectic movement is essentially one of development, though it traces the logical rather than the temporal stages of the process.

Erkennen: Cognition; one of the higher forms in which the *Begriff* manifests itself. It is the notion rising to the level of a consciousness of itself and its own processes and the objects of its own knowledge.

Erscheinung: Appearance or phenomenon. It is that aspect of being which is revealed in the world of phenomena. It is to be distinguished from *Schein*, which is the mere appearance, the shadow, illusion. The *Erscheinung* is the shining forth of that which is the underlying ground and essence of being. With Hegel the phenomenon has no significance apart from its noumenon. The one is the necessary complement of the other.

Etwas: A somewhat or something. Any object of knowledge which possesses determinate being (*Daseyn*). Every *Etwas* is *positiv* by virtue of what it is, *negativ*

in so far as it excludes from its own being its corresponding other.

Existenz: See *Daseyn*.

Form: Form; with Hegel it signifies a formative, constructive principle, which is immanent in the underlying substance of things.

Freiheit: Freedom.

Für sich: Explicit, actual. See *An sich*.

Fürsichseyn: Being for itself, — that is, being which defines its own bounds and determines its own properties. It is self-determined, self-contained being. Its independence however is asserted but not explicitly justified. In *Beisichseyn*, the independence of being is regarded as fully justified.

Gedanken: Thoughts; a term often used by Hegel to mean merely abstract thoughts, the ordinary concepts of the formal logic.

Gegensatz: Antithesis; the second stage of every dialectic movement and an essential moment or factor in the resulting synthesis by which it is united upon a higher plane to that which upon a lower level of thought appeared as its opposite.

Gesetzt: From the verb *setzen*. Any object of thought is *gesetzt* which is necessarily and explicitly determined by the logic of the situation. Whenever that which is given in thought leads by the very necessity of the thought processes themselves to a conclusion depending upon it, that conclusion is always described by Hegel as *gesetzt*. Every phase of the dialectic process is *gesetzt* in the sense of following by the very momentum of thought itself from the nature of the stage immediately preceding it.

Gesetztsseyn: The condition or state of being *gesetzt*.

Grad: Degree or intensity of qualitative variation, as the degree of heat or cold, etc.

Gränze: Limit, marking the line of differentiation between any object of knowledge and its other. See *Schranke*.

Grund: The ground underlying all surface appearance; the basis upon which the existence of any object of knowledge depends. It is the noumenon underlying every phenomenon. It is the constant and permanent essence of all objects of knowledge.

Idealität, Ideal: Ideality, ideal. The ideal is essentially characteristic of the truly infinite. It is the abiding and constant element in every definite being underlying the changing and unstable elements which constitute its finiteness. Therefore the finite and the infinite, the real and the ideal, are not irreconcilable opposites. Every finite being possesses elements of infinity. The truly real is such by virtue of some essential strain of ideality. And the human has the capacity of becoming partaker of the divine nature.

Idee: The Idea; the highest form of the *Begriff*, or notion, as manifesting its conscious, free, and self-determining essence, the consummation and the source of all knowledge and of all being.

Identität: Identity. See *Differenz*.

Abstrakte Identität: Abstract identity; an incomplete and colorless view of things.

Absolute Identität: Complete identity; mere sameness, an indefinite homogeneity.

Mit sich identisch: Self-identical,—that is, presenting a sameness throughout and lacking any differentiation of parts or specification of functions. Anything which is completely homogeneous throughout is *mit sich identisch*.

Inhalt: Content. It has meaning only when it is regarded as one with the form.

Kausalität : The category of causality.

Konkret : Concrete ; a complete comprehensive view of things. See *Abstrakt*.

Konstruktion : Construction. See *Definition*.

List : Craft. It is a characterization of the manner in which reason works out its ends in nature by bringing under its control the mechanical and chemical forces of the world and swaying them at will.

Maass : Measure. The standard measure or typical form to which all things in their several spheres, more or less perfectly correspond.

Mittelbar : Mediate. This term is used in contrast to *unmittelbar*, immediate. Anything is *unmittelbar*, immediate, which is represented as an object of knowledge given but unanalyzed and unexplained. And anything is *mittelbar*, mediate, which is regarded as a product due to a certain process by which it is brought about or mediated.

Immediate knowledge is given ; mediate is explained. The immediate is unrelated ; the mediate is related. The immediate is elementary ; the mediate is developed. The immediate marks the beginning ; the mediate, the result.

Möglichkeit : Possibility, — the possibility, however, not of the fancy, but that possibility which represents a definite potential capable of actual realization.

Moment : Moment or factor ; an essential element in any complex system or process.

Negativ : Negative ; refers to the element of difference in the essence of any object of knowledge, and whose significance lies wholly in the relation to its complementary element ; the positive. The two unite together in constituting the essential ground of being.

Negativität : Negation ; the process of the so-called negative reason which confronts any primary thesis with

its corresponding antithesis. The *absolute Negativität* is the overcoming of this first negation by a denial which involves a higher point of view. This second negation, being the denial of the first negation, has the force of an affirmation. It is, however, not a simple reaffirmation of the primary thesis; it is a process which, while affirming the primary thesis, at the same time embraces its contradiction in the resulting synthesis as one of its essential moments or factors. Negation as a process, moreover, draws a line of distinction between any object of knowledge and that which lies immediately beyond it as its other. This is a line of definition, inasmuch as it differentiates that which a thing is from that which it is not. In this sense negation is a process of determination.

Negative Einheit: A system containing many different parts, all of which are, however, united through an underlying unity; it is a unity in the midst of diversity.

Sich auf sich beziehende Negativität: A self-imposed negation,—that is, a system which contains within the sphere of its own essential being certain contradictory elements which cause the system as it stands to fall of its own weight, as it were, and indicates the necessity of overcoming such contradictions by the introduction of some higher category of thought.

Nichts: Non-being. It is that stage which is not yet reached in any process of development but may become *Seyn*, or actual being, through the process of becoming (*Werden*).

Nothwendigkeit: Necessity.

Objectiv: Objective. It is a term used to designate in the Kantian sense all that is universal and necessary

in any object of knowledge. Hegel adds, however, that thoughts as universal and necessary are not to be regarded merely as *our* thoughts but as the real essence of existing things as well.

Objectivität: Objectivity; that stage in development of being which is the explicit manifestation of the subjective notion immanent within it.

Positiv: Positive; a term whose significance lies only in its relation to its correlative, the negative. See *Negative*.

Realität: Reality. The positive aspect of any determinate being which constitutes it what it is, and as such it forms an essential *moment* of that which is truly infinite and therefore ideal. See *Idealität*.

Reflexion: Reflection; that fundamental process of thought by which any object of knowledge is fully revealed only when we see it in its complete setting and possess a thorough knowledge of the relations which it sustains to every part of the system to which it is referred. The object itself, therefore, cannot be said to shine in its own light so much as in the light *reflected* from all the coördinate elements with which it is related.

Reflexion in sich: The process by which an object of knowledge shines in its own light.

Reflexion in Anderes: The process by which an object of knowledge shines in the light of something which is related to it as its other, or complement; that which is essentially its correlative.

Setzende Reflexion: Positing reflection; that phase of the process of reflection which regards being as self-illuminated, and therefore as immediately given and independent.

Voraussetzende Reflexion: Presupposing reflection. This represents a deeper insight, in that it sees that the

supposed immediacy and independence of a given object of knowledge must be referred to some other which is its necessary presupposition.

Aeusserliche Reflexion: External reflection; in which the relation existing between being and that upon which the being depends is regarded as a purely external relation, the one affecting the other wholly from without.

Bestimmende Reflexion: Determining reflection; which regards the seemingly external relation as in reality obtaining between coördinate elements of one and the same essential system of being.

Reflexionsbestimmungen: The categories of reflection.

Regel: Rule, — that is, the usual or typical form which is found to characterize members of the same class or species.

Satz: Proposition; a statement which is correct as regards certain circumstances but does not hold true universally and necessarily. It differs in this respect from the judgment (*das Urtheil*) which contains this element of universality and necessity. The proposition may be said to be correct or incorrect; the judgment, however, is either true or not true.

Schein: Show; to be distinguished from *Erscheinung*, appearance or phenomenon, which see.

Schluss: Syllogism. This is not merely the logical form of inference; it is used also to characterize every active process in the world of being which unites together any two elements through the mediation of a third, the common or middle term. The syllogistic process is one, therefore, which underlies the activities of being as well as of thought.

Schranke: The bound; marking the limit which any definite being may have attained at any particular stage of its development, but which by the inner

constraint of its own nature it must transcend in the more advanced stages of its development.

Seyn: Being; in the sense of mere being, indefinite and undetermined. See *Begriff*.

Subjectiv: Subjective; not merely that which concerns the individual and personal thoughts and interests in distinction from the whole body of facts in the world of phenomena, but that which is at the same time immanent in the fact, and as thus immanent constitutes the very truth of the fact itself and its informing principle.

Substantialität, Substanz: Substantiality, substance; that which is the absolute formative principle and source of all power and necessity in the universe. At its last analysis, substance is revealed as subject, — that is, the power of an absolute personality.

Synthetisch: Synthetical; see *Analytisch*.

Theorem: Theorem. See *Definition*.

Totalität: The sum total of all properties and relations pertaining to any object of knowledge taken not as a mere sum, but as a systematic unity.

Uebergang: Transition; a term used to indicate the passage of thought from any given stage of its development to that which lies immediately in advance and which is essentially connected with the former by the inner necessity of the thought process itself.

Unvermittelt: That which is not mediated. It is a term used to imply that although a process of mediation doubtless underlies the object of knowledge to which it is applied, nevertheless that process is not as yet recognized or rendered explicit. See *Mittelbar*.

Unmittelbarkeit: Immediacy. See *Mittelbar* and *Unvermittelt*.

Unterschied: Difference. It is something more than mere diversity (*Verschiedenheit*); it also signifies a

determinate and specific difference (*bestimmter Unterschied*) which serves as the differentiating mark of a definite species.

Ursache: Cause; its root meaning indicating that the cause as the primary essence must underlie its effect (*Wirkung*).

Urtheil: Judgment; its root meaning signifies a division into elementary parts, and this significance is preserved in the essential function of the judgment which is the process of breaking up an indefinite and incoherent universal into particular forms of its manifestation which are both definite and coherent. As a process, judgment applies not merely to the activity of thought but to the activity of being as well.

Verhältniss: Relation; applied especially to the relation which obtains between any object of knowledge and its correlative as mediated by the category of reflection, such as the causal relation or the relation of reciprocal activity.

Vermittelt, Vermittelung: Mediated, mediacy. See *Mittelbar* and *Unvermittelt*.

Vernunft: Reason; as distinguished from *Verstand*, the understanding. Reason is that function of the mind which overcomes, in a higher synthesis, the contradictions which it is the function of the understanding to observe and which, however, it cannot reconcile. The understanding regards the various objects of knowledge as distinct, separate, isolated. Reason is the synthetical function of thought which, while it by no means ignores the differences amidst the world of phenomena, nevertheless possesses the capacity of apprehending the unity which underlies all differences.

Verschiedenheit: Diversity.

Verstand: Understanding. See *Vernunft*.

Voraussetzung: Postulate.

Vorstellung: A generalized image of a class or group of objects in distinction from *Anschauung*, which is the immediate perception of an object, and *Begriff* which is the thought grasp of the essential significance of a universal idea without any adventitious aid from the pictures which the imagination may attempt to form of the same.

Wahrheit: Truth; according to Hegel truth consists in the complete conformity of any object of knowledge with its fundamental *Begriff*, and this implies a process in which it is seen in the totality of its relations.

Wechselwirkung: The category of reciprocal activity.

Werden: Becoming; the process through which non-being issues into being.

Wesen: Essence. See *Begriff*.

Widerspruch: Contradiction.

Wirklichkeit: Actuality. The concrete unity of essence and appearance.

Wirkung: Effect. See *Ursache*.

Zufälligkeit: Contingency; the contingent is that which does not have the ground of its being in itself, but in some other.

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
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